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An institution such as the Privy Council is the supreme judicial body for some 
Commonwealth countries. The main objective of this research is to understand the 
extent to which the Privy Council decision making on the constitutionality of the death 
penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean influenced by judicial politics. This issue is 
extant to the Commonwealth Caribbean society and therefore a legal analysis of it is 
necessary to generate new insights into the judicial politics of the Privy Council. 
Therefore, the decision making on the constitutionality of the death penalty is the 
vehicle used in this research to present explanations in response to this issue. This is 
demonstrated through the theories of judicial behaviour in the perspectives of the legal 
model, the institutional model and the attitudinal model of such behaviour. It worth 
noting that in some Commonwealth Caribbean States the death penalty is the 
punishment prescribed by law for persons guilty of the crime of murder. However, 
there are serious concerns with the application of this punishment. A case law analysis 
of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean from a policy perspective will 
be pursued. Also, of major concerns in this regard is that it is hypothesized that the 
constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean is influenced 
by judicial politics. This research will focus on exploring, evaluating and explaining 
the hypothesis on the death penalty in the area of judicial politics.  It involves 
examining the structure, nature and the relationship between the concept of judicial 
politics and that of the constitutionality of the death penalty.  Wider issues such as an 
analysis of judicial reasoning by the Privy Council involving the death penalty and 
also human rights issues have been pursued. Thus this research also necessitates 
assessing the jurisdiction and jurisprudence of the Privy Council and the Caribbean 
Court of Justice in evaluating the judicial attitude towards the issue of cruelty of the 
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INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH PURPOSE 
1.1: Background of Study 
 
Law as a subspecies of politics. The purpose of this research is to conduct a 
contemporary legal analysis of judicial politics in the Privy Council in order to further 
understand and explain the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean. This 
would be necessary to adequately theorise some identifiable statements on the death 
penalty which are in the public domain.1  It was Judge Harry T. Edwards of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit who said: “judges have 
a common interest, as members of the judiciary, in getting the law right, and that, as 
a result, we are willing to listen, persuade, and be persuaded, all in an atmosphere of 
civility and respect.”2 
 
Bearing this quotation in mind then this research presents a case law analysis on the 
of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean along with a legal and textual 
analysis of the decision making on the constitutionality of the death penalty by the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council [hereinafter called “the Privy Council”].3   
 
Therefore, the objective is to investigate the extent to which the decisions in the 
Commonwealth constitutional appeals impact on the death penalty in the 
                                                 
1 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Consultations on Crime in Trinidad and Tobago (Ministry  
of the National Security Trinidad 2007) 79: Riley and Others v Attorney General [1982] 35 WIR 279, 
PC: Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC. 
 
2 Harry T. Edwards, ‘The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making’ (2003) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 151 (5) 1639 – 1690 at 1645.  
 
3 Thomas Mohr, A British Empire Court – A Brief Appraisal of the History of the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council (Irish Academic Press, Dublin Ireland 2011) 125. 
2 
 
Commonwealth Caribbean. Judicial decision making is an important area of this 
research as it speaks to the components of the decision that influence a judge‘s ruling 
in constitutional matters as well as to the larger impact that those rulings have on the 
history of the Commonwealth Caribbean society. It is worth noting that those 
decisions would have an enduring impact on the Commonwealth Caribbean society 
long after the judges have left the bench. Further, the justices of the Privy Council 
have the task of deciding some of the most controversial death penalty issues in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean society.   
 
One of the goals of this thesis is to analyse the judicial decision making of the Privy 
Council on the constitutionality of the death penalty in the region and to present the 
impact that those decisions have on our society.  A research of this nature will 
demonstrate a legal and textual analysis on the judicial behavior of judges in terms of 
what judges do as judges and in this particular case the concept of judicial decision 
making policy. Kouroutakis research suggested that judge’s intervention into judicial 
decision making policy demonstrates either the concept of judicialization of politics, 
or judicial activism, or judicial policymaking.4 In this particular instance it entails an 
analysis of the category of judicial behavior known as judicial politics that is reflective 
of the law versus social and public policies.5  
 
                                                 
4 Antonios E Kouroutakis, ‘Judges and Policy Making Authority in the United States and the European 
Union’ (2014) 8 (2) International Constitutional Law Journal 186 – 200 at 187. 
 
5 Lawrence Baum, The Puzzle of Judicial Behavior (The University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor 2005) 




Legal doctrine of judicial politics. The objective of this research is to present an 
understanding of the legal doctrine of judicial politics in the Privy Council through 
the issue of the constitutionality of death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean. 
Ely, Vinz, Downing, and Anzul indicated that researchers need to understand the 
meaning of words and or phrases for themselves before directing them to others.6  
 
It is in this regard the term ‘judicial politics’ which is used in this research has been 
described as the sensitizing concept ascribed to the current theories and approaches of 
the Privy Council in addressing issues pertaining to the death penalty.  It is the kind 
of judicial behaviour which embraces the choices that justices make in judicial 
decision making.7 Joondeph described politics which is applicable to the court to be 
synonymous to judicial discretion if they are not strictly dictated by the accepted 
sources of legal authority.8 
 
In addition, Tamanaha’s, writing ascribes five meaning to judicial politics to wit law 
as a subspecies of politics, politics as producing public policy, politics as ideology, 
                                                 
 6 Margot Ely, Ruth Vinz, Maryann Downing, and Margaret Anzul, On Writing Qualitative Research 
Living by Words (The Falmer Press 2004) 19. 
 
7 Frank B. Cross, ‘The Justices of Strategy’ (1998) 48 Duke Law Journal 511 – 570.  
 
8 Bradley W. Joondeph, ‘The Many Meanings of "Politics" In Judicial Decision Making’ (2008) 77 (2) 
University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review 347 – 380 at 349 said: (“Perhaps the broadest 
conception of "politics" as it applies to courts is as a synonym for judicial discretion. On this reading, 
judicial decisions are political if they are not strictly dictated by the accepted sources of legal authority, 
such as the relevant text, history, tradition, or precedent. That is, when a judge exercises personal 





politics in controversial issues and politics in judicial appointments. However, he 
made it clear in the said article that such meanings are not exhaustive.9   
 
Moreover, this research on judicial politics will focus on Tamanaha’s first description 
of judicial politics that is law as a subspecies of politics. This would be on the basis 
upon which judges construct their decisions and in this instance on the 
constitutionality of the death penalty.10 Cross on the other hand suggested that the 
oversimplification of judicial behaviour does not really capture the reality of judicial 
decision-making.11 In this regard the operational description herein for judicial 
politics, as it relates to the death penalty, is understood from Tamanaha’s, writing is 
a judicial process that produces public-policy decisions.12 In effect judicial politics as 
presented in this research depicts such decisions which are judicially contrived by the 
Privy Council that impacts on the Commonwealth Caribbean Society. 
 
In this research, what is considered to be judicially contrived by the Privy Council, is 
presented as a general theory of judicial behaviour which resulted in the lack of 
certainty of the death penalty by that institution. This research will also be reflective 
of the inconsistency in the area of sentencing and more so in the application of the 
                                                 
9 Brian Z. Tamanaha, ‘The Several Meanings of “Politics” in Judicial Politics Studies: Why 
“Ideological Influence” is not Partisanship’ (2012) 61 (759) Emory Law Journal 760. 
 
10 Ibid.  
 
11 Frank B. Cross, ‘The Justices of Strategy’ (1998) 48 Duke Law Journal 511 – 570 at 538. 
   
12 Brian Z. Tamanaha, ‘The Several Meanings of “Politics” in Judicial Politics Studies: Why 





death penalty as a punishment. Thus, it will be demonstrated in this research that the 
concept of judicial politics offends against the principle of equality before the law and 
certainty of the rule of law. This position was also articulated by Bagaric who suggests 
that the law must be certain and therefore the legal standards must be declared in 
advance to the legal situation.13 
 
It is proposed that this research will demonstrate the inconsistency that judicial politics 
presents in matters of the constitutionality of the death penalty.14 The decision in the 
Pratt’s case15 is evidence of this and the focus of this research is to present the theory 
of judicial behaviour to explain how the judges of the Privy Council use the legal 
doctrine of judicial politics to get what they want as it relates to the law.16  In this 
regard Dworkin indicated the varying nature of judicial decision making particularly 
in the areas of constitutional matters when he said that judges must sometimes make 
new law, either covertly or explicitly.17 
                                                 
13 Mirko Bagaric, Punishment and Sentencing: A Rational Approach (Cavendish Publishing Limited 
2001) 19 suggests that (“Just as consistency in punishment – a reflection of the notion of equal justice 
is a fundamental element in any rational and fair system of criminal justice, so inconsistency in 
punishment, because it is regarded as the badge of unfairness and unequal treatment under the law, is 
calculated to lead to an erosion of public confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice.”).  
 
14 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC.  
 
15 Ibid.  
 
16 Arthur Dyeve, ‘Unifying the field of comparative judicial Politics: Towards a General Theory of 
Judicial Behaviour’ (2010) 2 (2) European Political Science Review 297 – 327. 
 
17 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Hard Cases’ (1975) 88 (6) Harvard Law Review, 1057 – 1109 at 1058 indicated 
that: (“Theories of adjudication have become more sophisticated, but the most popular theories still put 
judging in the shade of legislation. …. Judges should apply the law that other institutions have made; 
they should not make new law. That is the ideal, but for different reasons it cannot be realized fully in 
practice. Statutes and common law rules are often vague and must be interpreted before they can be 
applied to novel cases. Some cases, moreover, raise issues so novel that they cannot be decided even 
by stretching or reinterpreting existing rules. So judges must sometimes make new law, either covertly 




On the other hand Rosenberg subscribes to Dahl’s views on the political nature of 
judicial decision making by saying that decision making by the court was political as 
well as legal.18 This view has placed in context the nature of this study of the decision 
making of the Privy Council.  This research exploration embraces a legal analysis, 
evaluation and explanation into the legal doctrine of Judicial Politics’ inherent in the 
Privy Council that impacts on the constitutionality of the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean.   
 
It is a doctrinal-politics approach which embodies a close association between the 
analysis of judicial politics and the practices of the Privy Council as a judicial 
institution. This research also entails a presentation of a logical but objective 
explanation of the Privy Council’s decision making models on the constitutionality of 
the death penalty which has engulfed the concept of judicial politics.19  
 
The death penalty remains the lawful punishment in some of the Commonwealth 
Caribbean States for people convicted of murder and as such it is essential that one 
has a proper grasp of this penalty from a Commonwealth Caribbean perspective.20  It 
                                                 
18 Gerald Rosenberg, ‘The Road Taken: Robert A. Dahl’s Decision-Making in a Democracy: The 
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker’ (2001) Emory Law Journal 613 – 630 at 625.  
 
19 Ibid.  
 
20 Shantel A. McDonald, ‘A True Sense of Independence: The Abolishment of United Kingdom’s 
Influence Towards the Legal Affairs of The Commonwealth Caribbean’ (2015) 22 (1) ILSA Journal of 




should be noted that the Commonwealth Caribbean region is made up of twelve 
independent countries and six British dependent territories.21   
 
Those independent countries are Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago22 whereas the British 
dependent countries are Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands,  
Montserrat and Turks and Caicos Islands.23 It is proposed that the geographical frame 
for this research revolves only around twelve independent Commonwealth Caribbean 
countries that have the death penalty as the punishment for the crime of murder.24  
 
Moreover, an acquaintance with this research topic is of utmost practical importance 
since it entails a general scope of the death penalty in States in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean region.  This would be from a legislative and also a jurisprudential 
standpoint.  An understanding of both areas is necessary since it would demonstrate 
the concept of judicial politics which is entangled in judicial reasoning on 
constitutional issues pertaining to the death penalty at the level of the Privy Council.25  
                                                 
21 Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, English - speaking Caribbean’ ... Companion to World Politics 




23 Ibid.  
 
24 Ibid.   
 
25 Shantel A. McDonald, ‘A True Sense of Independence: The Abolishment of United Kingdom’s 
Influence Towards the Legal Affairs of The Commonwealth Caribbean (2015) 22 (1) ILSA Journal of 




From the research standpoint it is proposed to pursue a legal analysis of constitutional 
decisions of the Privy Council. This is necessary to investigate the extent to which 
judicial politics impacts on the death penalty as a punishment.  In this regard Webber 
suggested that the ordinary practice in a research of such a nature would be to explain 
or predict Supreme Court rulings based on the ideology of the justices.26  
 
It is for this reason that this proposed research necessitates adopting an interpretive 
model of constitutional documents whereby a number of judicial decisions for the 
period 1975 to 2009 relating to the constitutionality of the death penalty would be 
reviewed, analysed and evaluated.  This period is significant to this research since 
there are several constitutional decisions available which impact on the 
Commonwealth Caribbean’s public policy on the death penalty. In this regard 
Tittemore credited the role attorneys played which resulted in a series of Privy Council 
decisions that had a profound impact upon the standards and procedures for applying 
the death penalty.27 
 
                                                 
26 Kate Webber, ‘It is Political: Using the Models of Judicial Decision Making to Explain the 
Ideological History of Title VII (2016) 89 (2) St. John’s Law Review 841 – 881 at 851.  
 
27 Brian D.  Tittemore, ‘The Mandatory Death Penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean and the Inter-
American Human Rights System: An Evolution in the Development and Implementation of 
International Human Rights Protections’ (2004) William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 445 – 520 at 
465 credited: (“The efforts of the London attorneys resulted in a series of Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council decisions that had a profound impact upon the standards and procedures for applying the 





Moreover, Kastellec and Lax emphasised that justices used case selection to develop 
particular legal doctrines.28 Therefore, it is worth noting that the Commonwealth 
constitutional appeals decided by the Privy Council are the vehicles which convey this 
research. These decisions are notable for their statements which poised to develop on 
issues surrounding the constitutionality of the death penalty as a punishment in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. In addition, some of the decided cases which revolved 
around human rights issues, affect the legitimacy of the constitutionality of the death 
penalty.29  
 
Of practical significance to this research is the opinion in Pratt and Another v.  
Attorney General for Jamaica and Another.30  This case has been a landmark one with 
regard to the principle on the delay in the carrying out of the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean.  This decision has reshaped the application of the death 
penalty in the region and it also opened up the justice system for other significant 
constitutional challenges to the death penalty.31  
 
On the issue whether the law influences the choices that Supreme Court justices make 
Tarr suggested that a nonlegal factor—namely, the political and social attitudes of the 
                                                 
28 Jonathan P.  Kastellec, and Jeffery R.  Lax, ‘Case Selection and the Study of Judicial Politics’ (2008) 
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 407 – 446 at 408. 
 
29  Ibid.  
 
30 Pratt and Another v.  Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC. 
 
31 Brian D.  Tittemore, ‘The Mandatory Death Penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean and the Inter-
American Human Rights System: An Evolution in the Development and Implementation of 




justices themselves—could have played a part in the judicial process and judicial 
policymaking.32 In addition, Black and Owens also indicated that it has become 
unquestionable among judicial politics scholars that justices are motivated primarily 
by their own policy goals.33 This would suggest that there are different theories of 
judicial behaviour that have been developed and shaped decisions making in the 
Supreme Court.34  
 
In this research, it is proposed to focus on three theories of judicial behaviour to 
explain the how and the why the Justices of the Privy Council decide Commonwealth 
constitutional appeal cases on the death penalty in a certain way.  In terms of the 
court’s decision, Young, in his research on the death penalty in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean, indicated that courts that are viewed as more conservative tend to look 
more favourably on the death penalty, while on the other hand courts that are more 
liberal tend to be less likely to support it.35 
 
Young also said that the ideological factors refer to the judge’s place on the liberal-
conservative continuum whereas the legal factors refer to the influence of statute law 
                                                 
32 G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial Policymaking (5th edn. Wadsworth Cengage Learning 
2010) 228. 
 
33 Ryan C.  Black and Ryan J.  Owens, ‘Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The Collision of Policy 
and Jurisprudence (2009) 71(3) The Journal of Politics 1062 – 1075 at 1062. 
 
34 Ibid.  
 
35 Harold Young, ‘The Death Penalty: The Law Lords Alter Course in the Commonwealth Caribbean’ 




that underpins the decisions of the court.36  Paramount to this research would be the 
focus on those factors illustrated by Young in terms of the legal, institutional and 
attitudinal models. They will be explored to explain the ideological policy goals of 
Justices of the Privy Council in deciding Commonwealth constitutional appeal cases 
on the death penalty. 
 
Legal model.  In essence the legal model refers to traditional interpretive approaches 
of judicial decision making. In essence this model can be considered as a predictor of 
judicial behaviour since it is based on the original intent approach. Brennan, Epstein 
and Staudt writing on the subject of the ‘Macrotheory of the Court’ describe the legal 
model approach by saying that the judges are neutral deciders who approach their 
decision by looking at existing legal tenets and doctrine.37 
 
In this regard with the legal model, a judge will apply his legal training and knowledge 
to the facts at hand and decide the matter in an objective legal manner.  In presenting 
the Austrian perspective on judicial decision making, Holbrook said that the legal 
model posits that judicial decisions are based on the facts of the case and the rule of 
law.38 This therefore means that the application of this model does not include a 
                                                 
36 Harold Young, ‘The Death Penalty: The Law Lords Alter Course in the Commonwealth Caribbean’ 
(2017) 10 (2) Journal of International and Global Studies 64 – 85 at 70. 
 
37 Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein and Nancy Staudt, ‘Economic Trend and Judicial Outcomes: 
Macrotheory of the Court’ (2009) 58 Duke Law Journal 1191 – 1230 at 1204 said: (“Legal approaches 
suggest that the Justices rendering opinions in cases and controversies privilege existing legal tenets 
and doctrine: they are neutral deciders who look to the … Constitution, statutes, judicial precedent, and 
various other legally relevant materials to maximize the correctness of answers to the legal issues 
presented.”).    
 
38 Christopher M. Holbrook, Judicial Decision-Making: An Austrian Perspective (University of 
Missouri, Department of Political Science, 2011) 1 – 20 at 2. 
12 
 
judge’s personal preferences but is an indication of the judges setting aside their views 
in order to create a rational and efficient system for the greater good of the society.   
 
George and Epstein describe the legal model in terms of judicial decision making 
based on past cases.39 Take for instance the De Freitas v. Benny case which not only 
epitomises the legal model of judicial behaviour but it is also a symbol of the 
retributive theory of punishment. In that case the Privy Council applied the law to the 
facts of the case to formulate the precedent that is binding on the issue of delay in 
carrying out the death penalty.40  
 
Eskridge described the legal model alternatively as the rule of law model. In defining 
this model he further said that judges should strive to interpret case facts correctly, 
adhere to applicable precedent and apply statutory texts faithfully.41  It is worth noting 
that some judges of the Privy Council such as Lords Morris, Diplock, Dilhorne, 
Kilbrandon and Salmon for their judgement in the De Freitas case42 were considered 
to be strong interpreters of the rule of law on the death penalty. 
 
                                                 
 
39 Tracey E.  George, and Lee Epstein, ‘On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making’ (1992) 
American Political Science Review 323 – 337 at 324 indicated that: (“At its core, legalism centers 
around a rather simple assumption about judicial decision making, namely, that legal doctrine, 
generated by past cases, is the primary determinant of extant case outcomes.”).   
 
40 De Freitas v. Benny [1975] 27 WIR 318, PC. 
 
41 William N Eskridge, Jr. Chevron as a Canon, ‘Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What 
Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases’ (2010) 110 Columbia Law Review 1727 – 1816. 
 




Of noteworthy importance and a reflection of the legal model is the case Riley and 
Others v Attorney-General of Jamaica and Another43 the precedent case to the Pratt 
case.44  There are also other cases of noteworthy importance which followed Pratt’s 
case.45  Some of those cases endorsed the principle stated in the Pratt case46 that allows 
the convicted murderer to have his sentence commuted to life imprisonment.  Thus, it 
is important to determine from a Commonwealth Caribbean perspective, the rationale 
for the Privy Council decisions in terms of the constitutionality of the death penalty. 
In this research the rationale is described as judicial politics which is the legal doctrine 
researched herein and with a focus on judicial behaviour.  
 
Institutional model. The institutionalist model highlights the impact of policies and 
procedures of the courts. In effect this model emphasizes a broad institutional context 
in which courts and judges operate. It ensures that judicial bodies do not operate in a 
vacuum. Gillman and Clayton indicated that judges in pursuing their policy goals, are 
often severely constrained by their institutional environment.47 Therefore, within this 
environment are precedents which are case laws.48  
                                                 
43 Riley and Others v Attorney-General of Jamaica and Another [1982] 35 WIR 279, PC. 
 
44 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC. 
 
45 Ibid.  
 
46 Ibid.  
 
47 Howard Gillman and C.W. Clayton, Supreme Court Decision-making – New Institutionalist 






The institutional model of judicial behaviour symbolised the concept of following 
precedent whose principle demonstrates that like cases should be treated alike.49 This 
model draws its strength heavily on the insights of the rational choice theory. Lovett 
described this theory as a set of tools that sometimes help social scientists in their 
efforts to understand and explain social phenomena.50 Therefore, its principle can 
affect decision making in a particular way.51   
 
Some judges of the Privy Council such as Lords Edmund-Davis and Fraser for their 
judgement in the Abbott case;52 Lords Bridge and Hailsham for their judgement in the 
Riley case53 and Lord Hoffman for his dissenting judgement in the Lewis case54 were 
considered to be conservative justices since they were strong followers of precedents.  
The judicial rulings of these judges have given the indication that they were strong 
followers of the institutional model towards the death penalty.  In this regard their 
judicial behaviour suggests that they were guided by the institutional concept of the  
 
 
                                                 
49 Harry T. Edwards, ‘The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making’ (2003) 151 (5) 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1639 – 1690.  
 
50 Frank Lovett, Rational Choice Theory and Explanation (18 (2) Rationality and Society, Sage 
Publications, 2006) 237–272 at 265. 
51 Lewis A. Kornhauser, ‘Appeal and Supreme Courts’ (1999a) New York University School of Law 
45 – 62. 
 
52 Abbott v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago and Others [1979] 1 WLR 1343, PC. 
 
53 Riley and Others v Attorney-General of Jamaica and Another [1982] 35 WIR 279, PC. 
 




rule of law since they used established rules in previous court cases as the basis for 
their judicial decisions.55 
 
For instance, Lord Hoffman in the Lewis case was very critical of this approach by the 
Privy Council and suggested that there was no justification to depart from the 
precedent.56 On the one hand this approach of the justices explains the judicial process 
of interpretation and application of the Constitution where the members of the Privy 
Council, in death penalty matters, produce decisions which are judicially contrived.  
On the other hand, this statement is a clear endorsement by Lord Hoffman of the 
institutional model of following precedent. 
 
Attitudinal model. The Attitudinal model defines the behaviour of Supreme Court 
justices which in some contexts directly reflects their attitudes toward policy issues.57   
Scholars are of the opinion that judges behave attitudinally when they make decisions  
based on policy preferences or political ideology. In a research on interpreting judicial   
behaviour, Ryan indicated that an attitudinalist behaves opposite to a judge who  
adheres to the legal model which means that they will not follow precedent.58    
                                                 
55 Jack Knight and Lee Epstein, ‘The Norm of Stare Decisis’ (1996) 40 (4) American Journal of Political 
Science 1020. 
 
56 Lewis et al v Attorney General of Jamaica and another [2001] 2 AC 50, PC Lord Hoffman said: (“If 
the board feels able to depart from a previous decision simply because its members on a given occasion 
have a ‘doctrinal disposition to come out differently,’ the rule of law itself will be damaged and there 
will be no stability in the administration of justice in the Caribbean.”).      
 
57 Lawrence Baum, The Puzzle of Judicial Behavior (The University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor    
2005) 1 – 230 at 6. 
 
58 Megan Ryan, Interpreting Judicial Behaviour: How Content Analysis of Language Reveals the 
Values, Philosophy, and Judicial Decision Making Style of William H. Rehnquist (University of 
Arkansas, Fayetteville, 2012) 1 – 109 at 96 indicated (“An attitudinalist will behave in the opposite  
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The attitudinal model is essentially the political version of decision making, where 
judges decide disputes in light of the ideological attitudes and values of the justices. 
Brennan, Epstein and Staudt, writing on the subject the ‘Macrotheory of the Court,’ 
also identified with this model within the terms of the political model of decision-
making and demonstrated the Justices’ political preferences.59 The ideological 
viewpoint referred by Brennan, Epstein and Staudt is synonymous with the concept 
of the attitudinal model.  
 
 Accordingly, Yates and Coggins postulated that the attitudinal model suggests that 
judicial outcomes are driven by judges’ sincere policy preferences.60 This therefore 
means that an essential role of the judiciary and in particular courts of last resort 
depend to some extent on the individual attitudes and values of the  policy preferences 
of the justices who are the office holders of the court of last resort.61 Such an idea was 
                                                 
way of a judge who follows the legal model. Meaning they will not follow precedent or legal tradition  
and they will make rulings that are more activist in nature because they will not restrain themselves by 
looking for the legislative intent.”).    
 
59 Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein and Nancy Staudt, ‘Economic Trend and Judicial Outcomes: 
Macrotheory of the Court’ (2009) 58 Duke Law Journal 1191 – 1230 at 1204 – 1205 said: (“Political 
theories of decision making, by contrast, assume that the Justices have political preferences that they 
seek to embed in their opinions. The political theory does not ignore precedent or law-related factors 
but views the development of doctrine as a way to implement partisan and ideological viewpoints and 
to keep lower courts judges in line.”).       
 
60 Jeff Yates and Elizabeth Coggins, ‘The Intersection of Judicial Attitudes and Litigant Selection 
Theories; Explaining U.S. Supreme Court Decision-Making’ (2009) 29 (263) Journal of Law and 
Policy 263 – 299 at 263 postulated that: (“In political science, the Attitudinal Model suggests that 
judicial outcomes are driven by judges’ sincere policy preferences—judges bring their ideological 
inclinations to the decision-making process, and their case outcome choices largely reflect these policy 
preferences.”).       
 
61 Sebastien Jodoin, ‘Understanding the Behaviour of International Courts An Examination of Decision-
Making at the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals’ (2010) Journal of International Law and 




well captured in a different jurisdiction by Justice Dickson in the Supreme Court of 
Canada. In the case Hunter v. Southam, Inc.62 he referred to the Constitution as a living 
thing which the judiciary must consider in interpreting its provisions.63 
 
Moreover, Baum and Devins described the role of justices of the Supreme Court in 
simple terms by saying that the Supreme Court Justices are members of society, and 
their decision making over time, will reflect changing social norms.64 It is in this 
regard that judges such as Lords Griffiths, Lane, Ackner, Goff, Lowry and Woolf for 
their judgement in the Pratt’s case;65 Lord Slynn for his part in the judgement in the 
Lewis case66 and Lords Scarman and Brightman for their dissenting position in Riley 
case67 have demonstrated the propensity to be liberal justices and were inclined to 
deviate from following precedents which reflect changing social norms in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean society.  They see the institutional model of following 
precedent as a constraint on the development of the law and in particular public policy 
                                                 
62 Hunter v Southam, Inc. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, Can. Justice Dickson said: (“It must, therefore, be 
capable of growth and development over time to meet new social, political and historical realities often 
unimagined by its framers. The judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and must, in interpreting its 
provisions, bear these considerations in mind.”).     
 
63 Ibid.  
 
64 Lawrence Baum and Neal Devins, ‘The Supreme Court and Elites’ (2010) 98 Georgetown Law 
Journal 1515 – 1581 at 1521. 
 
65 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC. 
 
66 Lewis et al v Attorney General of Jamaica and another [2001] 2 AC 50, PC. 
 




within the society. Thus, they decide matters on the basis of their personal ideology 
or judicial preference.68   
 
This theory of personal ideology or judicial preference was articulated in a 2006 article 
by Czarnezki and Ford who indicated that Judges decisions are a function of what 
they prefer to do, tempered by what they ought to do, but constrained by what they 
perceive is feasible to do.69 In their writing on ‘The Norm of Stare Decisis,’ Knight 
and Epstein declared that the concept of precedent was a constraint on justices’ 
personal ideology or judicial preference.70  
 
These dynamic changes by the liberal judges of the Privy Council was based on the 
attitudinal model of judicial behaviour whose principle draws heavily on the insights 
of social choice theory. In this regard Sisk, Heise and Morriss indicated that the 
personal attributes of judges shape social policy that directly influences judicial 
                                                 
68 Jack Knight and Lee Epstein, ‘The Norm of Stare Decisis’ (1996) 40 (4) American Journal of Political 
Science 1021. 
 
69 Jason J. Czarnezki and William K. Ford, ‘The Phantom Philosophy An Empirical Investigation of 
Legal Interpretation’ (2006) 841 (65) Maryland. Law Review 841 – 906 at 842. 
 
70 Jack Knight and Lee Epstein, ‘The Norm of Stare Decisis’ (1996) 40 (4) American Journal of Political 
Science 1021 declared that: (“Precedent can serve as a constraint on justices acting on their personal 
preferences. On this account, justices have a preferred rule that they would like to establish in the case 
before them, but they strategically modify their position to take account of a normative constraint in 




decision.71  This in reality is applicable to the concept of the attitudinal model which 
validates the principle that judges can make law.72  
 
In support of this theoretical perspective Kornhauser indicated that courts do play a 
law making function as well.73 More recently a similar sentiment was echoed by 
Burbank who said that Judges are bound to have beliefs about the appropriate role of, 
and appropriate policies or goals for government, some of which they are bound to 
translate into law.74  It is proposed to demonstrate such an idea in this research through 
the medium of judicial politics. This concept of judicial politics is therefore the 
environmental factor or stimulus that has engulfed the death penalty in constitutional 
matters.  The threshold of this investigative research is the presentation of the 
abolitionist ideology for the death penalty, subtly gaining inroads into the judiciary 
                                                 
71 Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise and Andrew P. Morriss, ‘Charting the Influences on the Judicial 
Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning (1998) 73 (5) New York University Law Review 1377 
– 1500 at 1385. 
 
72 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Hard Cases’ (1975) 88 (6) Harvard Law Review, 1057 – 1109 at 1058 indicated 
that: (“Theories of adjudication have become more sophisticated, but the most popular theories still put 
judging in the shade of legislation. …. Judges should apply the law that other institutions have made; 
they should not make new law. That is the ideal, but for different reasons it cannot be realized fully in 
practice. Statutes and common law rules are often vague and must be interpreted before they can be 
applied to novel cases. Some cases, moreover, raise issues so novel that they cannot be decided even 
by stretching or reinterpreting existing rules. So judges must sometimes make new law, either covertly 
or explicitly.”).    
 
73 Lewis A.  Kornhauser, ‘Judicial Organisation and Administration’ (1999b) New York University   
School of Law 27 – 44 at 28. 
 
74 Stephen B. Burbank, ‘On the Study of Judicial Behaviour of Law, Politics, Science and Humility’ 




and exhibiting itself in judicial opinion in what is described in this research as judicial 
politics.75  
 
1.1.1: Statement of Problem  
The research problem entails a classical societal problem which is reflected in a 
statement made in 2007 by Mr. Patrick Manning, the then Prime Minister of Trinidad 
and Tobago, who said in part that Trinidad and Tobago’s inability to carry out the 
death penalty stems largely from the position adopted by the Privy Council.76 
 
This research on judicial politics has evolved through this statement which suggested 
certain identifiable theory on judicial decision-making in the Privy Council as regards 
the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Therefore this research focuses on 
exploring, understanding and explaining the reality of Mr. Manning’s suggestion 
which stated in part that the Privy Council has put one impediment after the next in 
the way of the execution of capital punishment in this country.77 This pronouncement 
is suggesting that there is the presence of the concept of judicial politics existing in 
                                                 
75 Brian D.  Tittemore, ‘The Mandatory Death Penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean and the Inter-
American Human Rights System: An Evolution in the Development and Implementation of 
International Human Rights Protections’ (2004) William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 445 – 520. 
 
76 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Consultations on Crime in Trinidad and Tobago (Ministry 
of the National Security Trinidad 2007) 79, Mr. Patrick Manning the then Prime Minister of Trinidad 
and Tobago said: (“Capital punishment; that has been the subject of a lot of discussion in Trinidad and 
Tobago, and our inability to carry it out stems largely from the position adopted by the Privy Council.  
It has been particularly accentuated with the advent of Britain to the European Union and the attitude 
of the European Union to this whole question of capital punishment.  The law lords in London, the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which, as you know, is the highest court for Trinidad and 
Tobago, are taking the position that they put one impediment after the next in the way of the execution 
of capital punishment in this country.”). 
 
77 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Consultations on Crime in Trinidad and Tobago (Ministry 




the Privy Council with the interpretation of issues relative to the application of the 
death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  
 
It is worth noting that in 1982, the Privy Council decided in favour of carrying out the 
death penalty in the Jamaican case Riley and Others v Attorney General.78 In that case 
the Privy Council held that whatever the reasons for or the length of any delay in the 
execution of a sentence of death lawfully imposed, the delay could afford no ground 
for holding the execution to be inhuman or degrading or other treatment.79  
 
It is evident from that decision that the institutional model was the pattern of judicial 
behaviour that the Privy Council followed. In this regard it embraced and adopted the 
binding precedent which was demonstrated in the Abbott case.80   In Abbott case the 
pattern of judicial behaviour of the Privy Council was to follow the binding precedent 
illustrated in the De Freitas case.81 
 
An important point to note in the De Freitas case82 was that the Privy Council noted 
that the issue of delay in execution measured in years was not overcome by the human-
rights issue of delay of execution rendering invalid the actual execution itself which 
                                                 
78 Riley and Others v Attorney General [1982] 35 WIR 279, PC.   
 
79 Ibid.    
 
80 Abbott v.  Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago and Others [1979] 1 WLR 1343, PC. 
 
81 De Freitas v Benny [1975] 27 WIR 318, PC. 
 




would have made it ‘inhuman and degrading punishment.’83 However, eighteen years 
later the issue of delay in execution arose in the Privy Council in the Pratt case.84 In 
that case the Privy Council deviated from the precedent in the De Freitas case85 and 
held that in execution which takes place more than five years after sentence there will 
be strong grounds for believing that the delay is such as to constitute inhuman or 
degrading punishment or other treatment.86 
 
In an objective review of the decision in Pratt’s case, and in particular, the statement 
of law which evolved from it there seems to be judicial politics which is the obvious 
approach of the Privy Council.87 Preliminarily, that statement seems to validate the 
problem which was articulated by Mr. Patrick Manning, the then Prime Minister of 
Trinidad and Tobago, in his 2007 statement.88 It was noticeable in the Pratt’s case that 
the justices through the attitudinal model approach ignored the institutional model 
approach of following the precedent in the De Freitas’ case89 and gave total 
                                                 
83 Abbott v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago and Others [1979] 1 WLR 1343, PC. 
 
84 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC. 
 
85 De Freitas v Benny [1975] 27 WIR 318, PC. 
 
86 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC Lord Griffith  
said (“If capital punishment is to be retained it must be carried out with all possible expedition. Capital 
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treatment.”).        
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recognition to the dissenting judgement of Lords Scarman and Brightman in the 
Riley’s case.90 
 
The Privy Council also applied the observation made in the De Freitas’ case91 in terms 
of delay measured in years. This is a clear demonstration how precedent can serve as 
a constraint to the development of law and more specifically how dissention trumped 
friendly precedent. Pruksacholavit and Garoupa explain dissention as a theory of 
judicial behaviour. In their article on patterns of judicial behaviour they said that it is 
an attitudinal perspective which explains the ideological or partisan differences in 
decision making.92 
 
However, in Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Cassey the Supreme Court 
of the United States warned against this very view when it said that no judicial system 
could do society’s work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it.93 By 
applying this opinion to the position of the Privy Council whereby on several 
occasions it interpreted several constitutional issues, in particular, the issue of delay 
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91 De Freitas v Benny [1975] 27 WIR 318, PC. 
 
92 Panthip Pruksacholavit and Nuno Garoupa, ‘Patterns of judicial behaviour in the Thai Constitutional 
Court 2008–2014: an empirical approach’ (2016) 24 (1) Asia Pacific Law Review 16 – 35 at 24. 
 
93 Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Cassey (1992) 505 US 833 the Supreme Court of the 
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in execution then such would present the apparent danger of the disrespect for 
continuity of precedent. 
 
            On the contrary in Hunter v. Southam, Inc.,94 Justice Dickson in Supreme Court of 
Canada described the role of the judiciary and, in particular, courts of last resort as it 
relates to the Constitution as the guardian of the constitution and must, in interpreting 
its provisions, bear these considerations in mind.95 
 
The central theme identified within the difference of opinion in the political statement 
made by Mr. Patrick Manning the then Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago and 
the decided cases in the aforementioned jurisdictions is the presence of the legal 
doctrine of judicial politics. Accordingly, Birdsong indicates that it is the belief in the 
region that the Privy Council rulings have hampered the imposition of the death 
penalty in the English Speaking Caribbean.96  
 
This seems to be the idea presented in Manning’s statement above.97  It is for such 
reason that it is proposed to conduct a case law study on the death penalty and legal 
                                                 
94 Hunter v. Southam, Inc. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, Can. Justice Dickson said: (“It must, therefore, be 
capable of growth and development over time to meet new social, political and historical realities often 
unimagined by its framers. The judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and must, in interpreting its 
provisions, bear these considerations in mind.”).  
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96 Leonard Birdsong, ‘The Formation of the Caribbean Court of Justice: The Sunset of British Colonial 
Rule in the English Speaking Caribbean’ (2005) University of Miami Inter – American Law Review 
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analysis on the constitutional appeals of the death penalty matters decided by the Privy 
Council. The objectivity is to present an understanding of this institutional ideology 
on the subject matter and to describe the impact that such ideology exhibited on the 
Commonwealth Caribbean society.    
 
1.1.2: Research Purpose  
Research Aim: The aim in this research is the examination of key constitutional 
issues which are necessary for the evaluation of the legal model, the institutional 
model and the attitudinal model to illustrate and explain the patterns of judicial 
politics in the decision-making of the Privy Council on the issue of the 
constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean.   
 
Nutshell of the present research. In effect the aim entails a presentation of data 
necessary for an understanding of law, justice and policy in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean society as they intersect to inform on the death penalty constitutional 
judgements of the Privy Council.  In reality this research is applicable to the criminal 
justice discipline which focuses on the classical theory of society that was made 
famous in 1764 by Cesare Beccaria.98 In his essay: ‘On Crimes and Punishments’ 
which was published in July of that year Beccaria called for a rethinking of the 
prevailing concepts of law and justice.99 This rethinking was necessary to roll back 
the nature of injustice then where the accused once arrested, had few legal protections, 
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virtually no legal assistance, is subjected to torture, kept in secret from their family 
and friends and the accusers testified in secret.100  
 
Such is the nature of the present research which involves an evaluation into judicial 
opinion on the death penalty to understand and explain its impact on the 
Commonwealth Caribbean.  It would be revealed in this exploratory research that in 
the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados, the death penalty is the 
punishment mandated for persons convicted of murder.101  The extent of the 
mandatory nature of this punishment has been reflected in statute102 and also in several 
judicial interpretations on the issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty.103 
 
For instance, in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago the Offences Against the Person 
statute proclaims that:  “Every person convicted of murder shall suffer death.”104  This 
legislative provision seems to suggest that the death penalty is mandatory for persons 
convicted of murder in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.105  By necessary 
implication this provision also means that the judges of the High Court have no 
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101 Offences Against the Person Act, Republic of Trinidad and Tobago Chapter 11: 08, s. 4 and 
(Constitution (Amendment) Act of Barbados 2003. 
 
102 Ibid.  
 
103 De Freitas v Benny, [1975] 27 WIR 318. PC; Guerra v Baptiste and others [1995] 3 All ER 583, 
PC and Matthew v The State of Trinidad and Tobago [2005] 1 AC 433, PC.   
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discretion where the passing of sentencing is concerned for a person convicted of 
murder.106  
 
Despite the obvious meaning ascribed to this statutory provision there have been 
several constitutional challenges to the death penalty as the punishment for persons 
convicted of murder.  Those challenges were based on the fact that the death penalty 
is considered by some as a cruel and unusual treatment or punishment and as such it 
is contrary to section 5(2) (b) of the Constitution which prohibits Parliament from 
imposing cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.107   
 
While this constitutional provision gives protection to persons from Parliament 
imposing any punishment that is cruel and unusual, it cannot be looked at in isolation.  
In other words this section must be identified along with section 2 of the Constitution 
which clearly reinforces the supremacy of the Constitution.108 That constitutional 
provision clearly indicates that the Constitution is supreme to any law which gives the 
authorisation for the imposition of a punishment that is cruel and unusual.    
 
                                                 
106 Matthew v The State of Trinidad and Tobago [2005] 1 AC 433, PC.   
 
107 Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, s. 5(2) (b) in principle states that: (“Without 
prejudice to subsection (1), but subject to this Chapter and to section 54, Parliament may not – impose 
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108 Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, s. 2 declared that: (“This Constitution is the 
supreme law of Trinidad and Tobago, and any other law that is inconsistent with the Constitution is 




However, the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean has been challenged as 
a cruel and unusual punishment.  A key constitutional matter which challenges the 
death penalty in terms of the issue of delay in execution, was the Pratt case. In that 
case it was noticeable that the Privy Council presented a statement of law which seems 
to illustrate a major problem associated with the death penalty in the region. That 
statement indicates that if an execution is to take place more than five years after 
sentence there will be strong grounds for believing that the delay is such as to 
constitute inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment.109 
   
It is proposed to explore in this research the policy issues raised in this statement.  
Primarily it revolves around the classical scientific research embracing an aspect of 
the death penalty system of justice within the Commonwealth Caribbean Society. This 
classical research type is undertaken in order to illustrate and address an immediate 
social phenomenon within this region’s criminal justice system.   
 
That social phenomenon is concerned with the manner in which persons are punished 
on conviction for murder in the Commonwealth Caribbean region.  Berman looking 
at the American criminal justice system on this same issue, suggested that it may be 
appropriate to provide critical means to engineer remedies through a broader 
legislative reform effort for improving the death penalty administration.110 
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110 Douglas A. Berman, ‘The Challenges of “Improving” The Modern Death Penalty’ (2016) 11 (1&2) 
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law and Public Policy 35 – 49 at 49 suggested (“concern for capital 
punishment’s administration may ensure that our legal institutions do not get complacent about 
problems that pervade our criminal justice systems, and may even provide a critical means to engineer 
remedies to system-wide problems through broader legislative reform efforts. In other words, even if 
efforts to improve the modern administration of capital punishment may, more often than not, constitute 
29 
 
It is in this regard that it necessitates the acquisition of new knowledge to explain 
scientifically the concept of judicial politics which has engulfed the Privy Council in 
deciding the issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean.  Such knowledge would be acquired herein through the research methods 
of content analysis and secondary data analysis.111  
 
 Moreover, it is proposed to commence this research goal by articulating some aspects 
of it through the evaluation and analysis in the literature review.  This will be 
demonstrated through the legal, institutional and attitudinal approaches of the Privy 
Council in death penalty cases.  The focus is to illustrate that this institution has 
vigorously adopted the legal doctrine of judicial politics which creates a general 
restriction of the death penalty in the region.  This research will make a difference in 
the society by identifying judicial politics as an element within the regional justice 
system.  
 
For the Commonwealth Caribbean Society, this type of research effort, necessitates 
the making of a significant contribution in the legal administrative criminological field 
and in particular the area of criminal justice.  Moreover, it would scientifically add to 
the growing body of knowledge on the death penalty specifically in the area of judicial 
                                                 
something of a fool’s errand, this foolishness still can foster an enhanced understanding of, and an 
enduring commitment to always taking on, the challenges of seeking “too much justice” throughout our 
criminal justice systems.”).    
 




politics.  This aspect of the research will be channelled through the research evaluation 
method.112  
 
An important objective in this regard entails the presentation of data on the application 
of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean to illustrate the judicial politics 
in the Privy Council.  Research in this area requires an analysis of data on judicial 
opinions and statutes to present the nature of the death penalty in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean.  The objective is to evaluate judicial opinions on the death penalty at the 
level of the Privy Council to illustrate the concept of judicial politics through its 
institutional and attitudinal approaches.  This would be explained by showing the use 
of the judicial process to restrict the application of the death penalty.  It will be seen 
also that the Privy Council is engaging in human rights norms by applying the 
fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution to the existing law of the 
Commonwealth countries.   
 
Thus, in such a pursuit it would be necessary to show that unlike the Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago113 and Barbados,114 there is no mandatory death penalty in 
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Jamaica,115 the Eastern Caribbean States116 and in Belize.117 In the case of the 
Cooperative Republic of Guyana there is a limitation to the mandatory death penalty.  
That is to say it is mandatory only for persons convicted of murdering law enforcement 
officials, prison officers and members of the judiciary.118 According to the statutory 
provisions in the Commonwealth Caribbean States the death penalty is carried out by 
hanging by the neck.119  
 
However, despite its apparent legality, the death penalty is an issue that has been given 
significant attention over the last two decades.120 This is as a result of several common 
problems associated with it, primarily in the area of its mandatory nature.  Harrington 
in an article described the mandatory death penalty as a colonial legacy and it was the 
only punishment that could be pronounced by a judge upon a person who was 
convicted of murder. 121 
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It was indicated by Bagaric that mandatory punishment is considered a fixed penalty 
and it should be rejected.122  This idea by Bagaric seems to be a widely held sentiment, 
since prior to this publication Tonry in a similar comment indicated that the greatest 
gap between knowledge and policy in American sentencing concerns mandatory 
penalties.123 
 
The depth of such feelings against the mandatory death penalty can be gleaned from 
the constitutional provisions within the region that outlaw cruel and unusual treatment 
and inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment or punishment.124 In the 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, the Constitution prohibits such punishments.125 
That constitutional provision seems to be in direct conflict with the penal provisions 
that authorise the application of the death penalty as the punishment for murder.126 
 
It should be noted that the law on the death penalty for murder in the Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago was in existence before the 1976 Republican Constitution.  Of 
utmost judicial significance in this area is the Privy Council’s decision in the Pratt 
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case.127  That case did address the conflict which permeates both principles of law. 
Since the decision in that case, the Commonwealth Caribbean region has seen limited 
success in executing convicted murderers.  The situation which accounts for the lack 
of execution in the region is attributed to the legal doctrine that arose in the Privy 
Council’s decision in Pratt case.128   
 
This has been a profound and far-reaching judicial pronouncement that was made by 
the Privy Council.  However, in a deeper evaluation of it, one can suggest that it was 
a judicially contrived political statement which illustrates the concept of judicial 
politics.  In practicality, this statement contains several principles, the effect of which 
has serious implications as it relates to the implementation of the death penalty in the 
region.129 
 
Firstly, the Pratt decision illustrates the reinforcement and confirmation of the law on 
delay in the application of the death penalty in the region.130  However, there is 
evidence that this principle was earlier advocated by the Privy Council in 1979 in 
Abbott v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago and others.  In that case Lord 
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Diplock said that where the delay measured in years, rather than in months, it might 
be argued that the taking of the condemned man's life was not by due process of law.131 
 
This statement clearly suggests that Lord Diplock left the door open on delay in 
carrying out of the death penalty measured in years.  However, it seems that he was 
telegraphing that, such delay might be deemed intolerable.  Moreover, that statement 
was clearly a judicially contrived political statement in the sense that it suggests that 
the delay measured in terms of years, although it did not arise in this present case, may 
arise in the future and would be unconstitutional.132 
 
The principle on delay in execution in terms of years remained a lingering issue and 
it was decided by a 3 to 2 majority in the Riley case.133  In that case the Privy Council 
held that whatever was the reasons for or the length of any delay in the execution of a 
sentence of death lawfully imposed, the delay could afford no ground for holding the 
execution to be inhuman or degrading or other treatment.134 
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This pronouncement was made by Lord Bridge to which Lord Hailsham and Lord 
Diplock agreed.  Here the Privy Council formally demonstrated that delay cannot be 
used as a bar to the implementation of the death penalty.  However, the issue of delay 
in carrying out the death penalty remains a thought provoking one and in the Pratt 
case the Privy Council was responsible for a policy change in the death penalty law in 
the Commonwealth Caribbean particularly in the area of delay in execution defining 
it in terms of years.135  
  
It seems clear that Pratt decision136 have been made rejecting the majority opinion and 
totally embracing the minority opinion in the Riley precedent137 on the one hand and 
also by overlooking or ignoring legislation in the region with an opposing position on 
the other hand.138  In fact the Privy Council decision in the Pratt case139 ignored the 
precedent in the Riley case and gave total recognition to the dissenting judgement of 
Lord Scarman and Lord Brightman in that case.140 
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The Privy Council had judicially contrived this policy statement to articulate its new 
judicial ideology. Thus, the minority judgement in the Riley case141 and later the Pratt 
decision142 clearly articulate the research problem herein. In fact, this is the crux of 
the judicial politics argument in this research. These cases clearly demonstrate the fact 
that the Privy Council is now championing the human rights cause against the death 
penalty, in this instance, on the ground of delay of execution and not on the ground of 
the nature of the punishment itself.  
  
The dehumanising effect of the death penalty was previously articulated in the 
Supreme Court of California in the case the People v Anderson. In that case the court 
emphasises the dehumanizing effects of the lengthy imprisonment prior to execution.  
It is clear that the court was of the view that the inordinate length of time the prisoner 
is incarcerated awaiting execution, amounts to cruelty even though judicial and 
administrative procedures are essential for the due process of law to be carried out.143  
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In the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago there is a statutory provision that implicitly 
authorises delay in the circumstance of the application of the death penalty.  
Accordingly, section 51 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act Chapter 4:01 
indicates that all appeals in the case of a conviction involving the sentence of death 
shall be heard before the sentence is executed.  This statutory authority specifically 
authorised delay.144  
 
By necessary implication there appears to be conflict in the content of the judicial 
statement of law in the Pratt case145 when compared with both the majority judicial 
position taken in Riley case146 and also the legislative position illustrated in section 51 
of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act Chapter 4:01.147  It is an important point to 
note that from an evaluation it therefore means that section 51 of the Supreme Court 
of Judicature Act Chapter 4:01 also implicitly legislated delay in the application of 
the death penalty in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.148    
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While the Privy Council can overrule its earlier decisions and in fact has done so with 
respect to the principle of delay in execution in the Riley case149 there can be serious 
danger in doing so.150 On a deeper evaluation it may have been that the Privy Council 
decision in the Pratt case151 was made by either overlooking such statutory provision 
within the region or forcing a re-interpretation of the issue of delay in execution.  As 
a consequence one can validate as credible the idea that the Privy Council has re-
interpreted the laws within the Commonwealth Caribbean in its decision in the Pratt 
case and as such it was driven by judicial politics.152  
  
Secondly, the Pratt decision was indeed a major victory for the abolitionist cause.153 
Naturally the statement of law in that case is a factor that grinds to a halt the 
application of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean region.  It is evident 
from the decision in Pratt’s case,154 that the Privy Council was deeply concerned with 
the treatment meted out to convicted murderers.  Thus, such a concern has accounted 
for the judgement which demonstrates a move in the direction of the abolition of the 
death penalty.155  
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155 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC 343 such a 
position can be deduced from an evaluation of the part of the judgement which indicates: (“The 
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This statement is also evidence of judicial politics since it demonstrates a significant 
advancement of the cause of human rights as a rationale to stop the death penalty.  
Primarily, it seems from an assessment of this statement that the Privy Council 
proceeds to restrict the death penalty in the region on the grounds of an interpretation 
of inhumanity or cruelty.  By doing so the Privy Council made the statement in the 
Pratt case156 which was a judicially contrived policy to both discourage and dismantle 
the death penalty in the region. 
 
Thirdly, the Pratt decision157 was responsible for policy changes in the region’s justice 
system.  The legal doctrine in the Pratt case158 has brought about both legislative159 
and administrative reforms within the Commonwealth Caribbean States as regional 
governments took measures to stymie its effect.160 These changes were necessary to 
ensure that there is a strict compliance of the principle and concepts in the Pratt legal 
doctrine.161  
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Fourthly, the statement in the Pratt case has brought to the fore several constitutional 
issues that were unprecedented and those issues evoked controversy of a constitutional 
nature.162 Paramount among these issues is the negative response towards the Privy 
Council and in particular its role as an appellate institution for the Commonwealth 
Caribbean region.   
 
Finally, it was proffered that the position taken by the Privy Council in the Pratt case 
exhibited a distinct erosion of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty within States 
in the region.163 That is to say, the Pratt legal doctrine is an indication that the Privy 
Council through subtle means gained inroads into the legislative realm of regional 
governments.164 The reality is, that statement is a directive from the Privy Council for 
the regional governments to follow rather than an interpretation of the Constitution.  
Thus, by necessary implication it has brought into sharp conflict the role of the Privy 
Council as a judicial tribunal as against the role of Parliament as a legislative body.165  
  
It has been suggested that the immediate effect of those implications is that 
notwithstanding, that the death penalty is mandatory for a murder conviction in the 
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Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, any calculated or unconscionable delay in carrying 
it out that can be measured in years, would render it to be deemed unconstitutional.166   
Thus the Pratt’s decision exposes the reality of the mandatory death sentence for 
murder to the fact that it has an expiry date.  This expiry date may be in the first 
instance, two years after the sentence was passed in which case the entire domestic 
appeal process must be completed or in the second instance, five years after the 
sentence of death has been passed in which case all appeals processes and petitions to 
international human rights bodies should be completed as outlined in Pratt’s case.167 
 
That expiry date has been recognised as an element of the paradox of the 
constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean.168  
It should be noted that this factor has been described as the main feature in the Pratt 
case.169  This is the major reason why this Pratt legal doctrine is worthy of 
investigation.170 Such an investigation will expose another element of the death 
penalty which in this exploration entails the concept of judicial politics.  This is 
evident from a criminal justice standpoint, to provide a greater understanding of the 
concept of judicial politics which is immersed within that statement of law.171   
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It is proposed in this investigation to capture all the issues raised in this section along 
with the fact that the Privy Council through its doctrinal-politics models has done what 
the Parliaments in the region have failed to do.  That is it reversed itself on the issue 
of delay in carrying out the death sentence and then created a judicial time limit which 
is measured in years and which has a negative effect on the majority decision in the 
Riley’s case172 and also on the provision of section 51 of the Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act Chapter 4:01.173   
 
It is also proposed to present this description as a leading indicator of judicial politics 
in the constitutionality of the death penalty in the region.  Here the existing precedent 
in the Riley case174 has been trumped by judicial politics through the re-interpretation 
of the issue of delay in execution in the Pratt case.175 It is also worth noting that 
another objective of this research is to focus on the presentation of data on the death 
penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean. This would be done in chapter four and it 
would complement the other issues mentioned in this research regarding the Privy 
Council rulings on the constitutionality of the death penalty and presented in chapter 
five.  
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However, the ultimate objective of evaluating judicial decisions of the Privy Council 
is to demonstrate the influence of judicial politics in the death penalty decisions.  The 
specific purpose of this research is to increase our understanding of three factors 
namely - original intent, precedent and judicial ideology – that influence the Privy 
Council decision on the constitutionality of the death penalty.   
 
These specific factors would be defined in this research in terms of the legal and 
institutional approaches of the Privy Council and also in terms of the judges’ 
attitudinal approach of judicial decisions.176 Such approaches will further explain the 
decision making of the Privy Council in constitutional decisions in death penalty 
cases. It is worth noting that in this research there will be no focus on the merits of the 
death penalty but primarily an analysis of judicial ideologies.177 However, the 
illustrative information and data unearthed and presented herein have caused the 
researcher to comment on the merits of the death penalty in his personal statement in 
the section on recommendations in chapter seven.  
 
In reality, this research will present the sort of behaviour by the Privy Council where 
its members implicitly developed an agenda relative to the death penalty.  That agenda 
is synonymous with the abolitionist movement against the death penalty which is now 
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clearly visible in the judiciary and is presented in this research in the aspect of judicial 
behaviour – the attitudinal approach.178 
 
The attitudinal model approach is observed whereby the members of the Privy Council 
exhibit a liberal stance and decide matters according to judicial preferences or 
ideologies.  With this approach it is noticeable that the justices of the Privy Council 
were liberal in nature and depart from following the binding authority of judicial 
precedents and focus on their attitudinal role of overruling precedents.179       
 
In this research, the attitudinal approach of judges is pitted against the institutional or 
the legal approach of the Privy Council. The attitudinal model claim that judges’ 
decisions reflect their unconstrained policy preferences or ideologies.180   Thus, the 
common thread which is visible in this model is the concept of judicial politics.  Strong 
anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a relationship between judicial politics and 
the constitutionality of the death penalty.  This was embedded in the pronouncements 
made by the Privy Council in the statement of law in the Pratt case181 and the 
dissenting judgement by Lord Hoffman, in the Lewis case.182  
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This dissenting statement is a denunciation of the vigorous attempt made by the Privy 
Council to restrict the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean. It also on the 
other hand, depicts the lack of certainty within the justice system where the evidence 
illustrates instability in the administration of justice in the Caribbean. Moreover, it is 
an acknowledgement of the doctrine of judicial politics which is promoted in the Privy 
Council.183  
 
This concept of judicial politics was articulated by Shapiro who said that the Court 
was part of politics even though it was a court of law, because all law, including 
constitutional law, was a part of politics.184  Therefore, for the purposes of this 
investigation, the research on judicial politics shall embrace an assessment of the 
general theory of judicial behaviour by the Privy Council in constitutional appeal cases 
on the death penalty and those appeal cases that have a Commonwealth Caribbean 
slant.   
 
It is proposed in this research exploration to evaluate and assess constitutional appeal 
cases on the death penalty in order to demonstrate that judicial statements have been 
somewhat contrived and that the Privy Council has engaged in a quest to reverse itself 
on its interpretation of the word “cruelty” used in the Constitution as it relates to the 
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death penalty.  This reversal saw a development of the concept of cruelty of the death 
penalty by the Privy Council.  It was argued that this judicial development, in relation 
to the cruelty of the death penalty, has resulted in the limitation of the application of 
the death penalty in the region.185 
 
There is evidence to suggest that the Privy Council has been restricting the 
implementation of the death penalty in the region through the interpretation of the 
terms cruelty used in the Constitution.   Thus, it is apparent that the Privy Council 
deviated from applying existing law when matters dealing with the issue of cruelty 
came before it.186  
 
For instance the cases of Thomas and Another v  Baptiste,187 Reckley v Minister of 
Public Safety and Immigration and others (N0. 2),188 Fisher v Minister of Public Safety 
and Immigration189 and Lewis et al v Attorney General of Jamaica and another190 are 
of notable significance here and are used to at best illustrate the legal doctrine of 
judicial politics.  Those cases present evidence of the attitudinal and the institutional 
approaches both of which are characteristics of the judicial politics of the Privy 
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Council. They specifically dealt with the issues of prison conditions, ministerial 
advice prior to execution and opinions of International Human Rights Bodies on the 
petition for reprieve.   
    
In the case Thomas and Another the Privy Council held that prison conditions could 
not amount to cruel and unusual punishment.191 However, three years later the Privy 
Council deviated from this position and held in the Lewis case that prison conditions 
could amount to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.192 In relation to ministerial 
advice prior to execution the Privy Council in the Reckley case (No. 2) held that the 
appellant had no right to make a representation before the Mercy Committee.193   
 
However, five years later in the Lewis case the position of the Privy Council on that 
issue was overturned.194 Similarly in the Fisher case, the Privy Council held that it 
was not necessary to have the report of International Human Rights Bodies before an 
execution can be carried out.195  This position was also overturned one year later by 
the Privy Council in the Lewis case.196    
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When an evaluation was made on these judgements it was discovered that the Privy 
Council in the Lewis case had ignored and deviated from its own previous decisions 
on the three issues.197 Moreover, there has been no indication that any new situation 
has developed to warrant overturning or deviating from the earlier decisions in the 
Lewis case.198  It therefore stands to reason that this later judgement was not based on 
an application of the rule of law that was in existence at the time but was clearly driven 
by judicial politics. 
 
The action by the Privy Council in the Lewis case signals that the justices of the Privy 
Council have taken on the judicial role to restrict the death penalty in the region.199 
This was strongly criticised by one of its own members, Lord Hoffman, who criticised 
the justices for coming out differently. In effect Lord Hoffman was alluding to the 
attitudinal approach of the liberal justices of the Privy Council.200  
 
Preliminary this is the description of the research hypothesis that the concept of 
judicial politics does exist in the Privy Council decision on the death penalty.  It is this 
said perspective that this research has been articulating, when it was suggested that 
the Privy Council exhibits a liberal stance and decides matters according to judicial 
preferences or ideologies.  The cases reviewed indicate that the Privy Council 
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articulated the concept of judicial politics through its interpretation of the following 
terms used in the Constitutions in the Commonwealth Caribbean: 
1.  Inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the Constitution of Jamaica    
and the Eastern Caribbean States. 
       2. Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in the Constitution of the Republic 
of Trinidad and Tobago.  
The important factor here is that the Privy Council interpretation of the issues 
surrounding cruelty have resulted in the restriction of the implementation of the death 
penalty on the basis that it has ascribed cruelty in terms of: 
1. Delay of execution 
2. Swiftness of execution 
3. Mandatory death sentence 
4. Prison conditions 
5. Ministerial advice prior to execution and 
6. Opinions of International Human Rights Bodies on the petition of reprieve. 
It is proposed to evaluate and analyse the paradigm of the Privy Council on each of 
these forms of judicial expression of cruelty.  This is the research objective and the 
evaluation would be necessary in order to have a greater understanding of the concept 
of judicial politics through interpretation of constitutional provisions.   
 
However, it is important to note that evolving from the six aspects of judicial 
expression of cruelty is the conscious denunciation of the death penalty at the level of 
the judiciary.  That is to say the Privy Council, through the influence of judicial 
politics, has demonstrated a vigorous negative attitude towards the death penalty in 
50 
 
the region.201  In so doing that judicial institution expanded the interpretative scope in 
dealing with death penalty matters. This is achieved by the broadening of the 
interpretation of cruelty and thus resulted in the restriction of the death penalty.     This 
approach of judicial politics in the Privy Council is presented in chapter five of this 
research. 
  
The final objective of this research is to contextualise and critically analyse a variety 
of human rights issues that impact on the death penalty in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean. This is complementary to the analysis on the approach of the Privy Council 
on judicial politics and would be presented in detail in chapter six. Thus the main 
argument in this research is that while it is accepted that the Privy Council has an 
important role in making policy, its policy-making role in death penalty matters is 
largely within a framework of a constitutionally restrictive one.  It is this restrictive 
approach of the Privy Council that reflects directly on the human rights issues.202  
 
1.1.3: Research Problem     
Research thesis.  The essence of this thesis revolves around Judicial Politics in the 
Privy Council and its impact on the Constitutionality of the Death Penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean.  Its primary purpose is to search for a criminal justice 
understanding of the judicial politics demonstrated in the Privy Council on the 
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constitutional appeals of the death penalty from a Commonwealth Caribbean 
perspective.  The geographical focus of this research is ideal since it embraces the 
States in the region that have the mandatory death penalty and also have the Privy 
Council as their final judicial arbiter.  This research effort will contribute to the 
building of Caribbean legal and administrative criminological solution in the sphere 
of criminal justice.  
 
Interestingly St. Jean defined this type of research effort as: “the scientific study of 
the legal and social construction of criminal and deviant behaviors, efforts at 
regulating such behaviours, and the social impacts of those behaviors as they relate 
to the Caribbean region or members of the Caribbean Diaspora.”203 The reality of 
this statement is that it describes the nature and relation of a research of the justice 
system in the Caribbean society.  By applying St. Jean’s perspective204 herein, one 
will see an investigation of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean society.  
Special emphasis shall be placed on the approach of the Privy Council in terms of 
judicial politics and the constitutionality of the death penalty.  
    
This purpose is achieved by navigating through a qualitative methodology.  This 
necessitates a case law study and a legal analysis in order to isolate the concepts, 
define the hypothesis and explain the variables in order to understand and predict the 
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underlying nature or paradigm of the reality of the death penalty in the region. This 
reality or paradigm presents the picture which demonstrates that there is the influence 
of judicial politics on decisions of the constitutionality of the death penalty in the 
region.  
 
In light of the conflicting decisions in the Riley case205 and in the Pratt decision,206 
this research seeks to provide and analyse data to understand and explain the presence 
of judicial politics in the decisions of the constitutionality of the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. It is in this regard that the undermentioned research 
question has been isolated for investigation. 
 Whether in light of both the majority and minority decisions of the Privy 
Council in the Riley case207 and the subsequent ruling in the Pratt case,208 
which adopted and embraced the said minority or dissenting decision in the 
Riley case,209 the constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean is influenced by and correlated to judicial politics. 
 
This is a public policy issue which demands investigation to discover whether or not 
there are impacts on the public interest. An important point to note here and stemming 
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from the examination of the Pratt decision210 is that it seems plausible and indeed 
credible that the constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean depends on an environmental determinant.  Thus, this research will 
demonstrate that the Privy Council is the environmental determinant which impacts 
on the death penalty in the region. It therefore means that institutional and structural 
determinants of the Privy Council stimulate the legal doctrine of judicial politics that 
impacts on the constitutionality of the death penalty in the region.                     
                   
1.1.4: Scope and Significance  
 
The overall significance in the scope of the research is governed by the fact that in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean the only area in which the death penalty has had any reform 
is in the arena of judicial opinion, and more specifically through the perspective of 
judicial politics in the Privy Council.  It is in this light that the significance of this 
research can be illustrated in three ways.    
 
Practical significance.  Firstly, this research is in general of practical significance to 
this region.  From this standpoint it will be seen that this research will be adding to the 
current debate on the death penalty. The debate on this subject continues unabated in 
the Commonwealth Caribbean region where the Constitution in some states recognises 
the death penalty as the punishment for persons convicted of murder.  The intensity of 
this debate is evident from a number of cases which are dealt with by the Privy 
                                                 





Council, one of which is the Pratt case211 and also through academic criticism.212   In 
this regard, this research by adding to the debate will generate a new idea of judicial 
politics in the Privy Council which has helped to further explain the constitutionality 
of the death penalty in the region. 
 
Scientific significance.  Secondly, this research is of scientific significance.  As regard 
to the area, this research has brought to the fore the new social science idea of judicial 
politics, as an element of the constitutionality of the death penalty.  It should be noted 
that the concept of judicial politics is a dimension that engulfed judicial opinion on 
issues dealing with the constitutionality of the death penalty.  It is not an isolated issue 
but is an entrenched judicial behaviour which is inherent within judicial rulings on the 
death penalty.  
 
Contribution to knowledge.  The third significance of this research is based on its 
scientific contribution to knowledge.   It is worth noting that this research has shown 
that there is no other known project in this region which presents the element of 
judicial politics in the constitutionality of the death penalty.  Thus, in this regard this 
research has provided an understanding of the dynamic relationship between judicial 
politics and the death penalty.  In so doing it also provides the opportunity to occupy 
a part of the vacuum in the research context of judicial behaviour on issues revolving 
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around the death penalty in the region.  In addition, it will place the perspective of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean region alongside the considerable body of jurisprudence 
and literature relating to the death penalty worldwide.   
 
It should be noted that there is a paucity of similar research in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean, examining judicial politics within the context of the constitutionality of the 
death penalty.  This opinion evolved from the current debate, that the death penalty in 
the region is influenced by judicial politics.  In this regard the mere fact that this 
research exhibits a scientific contribution to knowledge will most definitely be 
significant for its originality. 
 
1.2: Conclusion   
This chapter presents a synopsis of the research purpose, problem and scope to be 
developed in the context of this research. From the background study presented, there 
is no doubt that the present debate surrounding the implementation of the death penalty 
in the Commonwealth Caribbean is as a direct result of the Pratt’s legal doctrine.213  
It should be noted that there are concealed issues embedded within that doctrine, some 
of which were enumerated in the background study of this research.  
 
In essence, the primary research focus to be presented is the nature of the judicial 
politics at the Privy Council.  It is demonstrated during the judicial process of the Privy 
Council producing public policy decisions in judicial appeals on the constitutionality 
                                                 




of the death penalty.  It seems from the synopsis presented in this chapter that the 
Privy Council’s judicial reasoning on the death penalty is not on the basis of the legal 
model or the rule of law.  The reality is that the Privy Council through its attitudinal 
approach has taken up the mantle to impose public policy standards as it relates to the 
death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  This was achievable under the guise 
of statutory interpretation in the application of constitutional provisions and not 
through the parliamentary original intent which is through the legislative process. 214               
 
These issues along with other complementary factors such as the policy perspective 
of the death penalty and human rights issues will be pragmatically explored and 
evaluated in more detail later in this research.   Such exploration is needed to satisfy   
the research objective of investigating the extent to which the decisions in the 
Commonwealth constitutional appeals impact on the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean.   
  
In essence the issues illustrated in this chapter were presented in a nutshell and will be 
further developed in this research. In the next chapter a review of the literature on 
judicial politics and the death penalty characteristics will be presented. The aim of this 
literature review is to have an understanding of the approach of other scholars in the 
field of judicial politics and the death penalty. This will lend support to the objective 
of this research, which is to confirm the hypothesis that there is the influence of 
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judicial politics in the Privy Council decision making on the constitutionality of the 



























In some regions of the world such as Europe, Asia and North America there has been 
a significant amount of literature surrounding the constitutionality and morality of the 
death penalty.  These are noticeable both in the academic field and also more 
significantly in judicial opinions in constitutional appeal cases.215  To complement 
these scholarly sources there are also some international instruments such as treaties, 
resolutions and in some cases directives from varying organisations and institutions 
that illustrate their doctrinal position on the death penalty.216  Of notable importance 
is the United Nations Resolution 61/199 calling for a worldwide moratorium on the 
death penalty.217 Primarily it is proposed to present in this chapter, literature to 
understand and explain the policy decision of the Privy Council on the death penalty 
and its effect on the Commonwealth Caribbean.    
 
In most instances the literature presented is reflective of the current thinking and 
debates on the death penalty.  Most importantly, the literature identifies varying issues 
that affect the application of the death penalty in some regions.  From an academic 
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standpoint there has been an illustration of two images of the picture presented in the 
literature. On the one hand they focus on those in support of the death penalty and on 
the other hand there are those who are against it.218  
 
Therefore, literature on the classical scientific theory will be explored in order to 
present an understanding of law, justice and policy.   In this regard it provides a literary 
discourse on the subject matter mainly from a Commonwealth Caribbean perspective.  
The aim here is an attempt at understanding the death penalty phenomenon in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean by examining both the historical and current thinking of 
the death penalty in the region.   
 
It is in this vein that a review of literature will be approached and it is proposed to do 
so in two parts.   The first part entails the placing of the death penalty articles and or 
the judicial reasoning in a light that is reflective of the researcher’s analytic model of 
judicial politics in the Privy Council. That is to say in the context of the legal, 
institutional and attitudinal models.  
 
The second part compares how different theories and models were used in order to 
illustrate the issue of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  In essence 
this review of literature on the death penalty would entail giving a summation of the 
author’s research reflective of the legal, institutional and attitudinal theories and 
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models. This necessitates reviewing the work of other researchers and also comparing 
their researches to the present project.219   
 
There are two goals to be achieved from approaching the review in this manner.  The 
first goal in reviewing the literature relevant to the topic is to demonstrate familiarity 
with the body of existing knowledge on the death penalty. This would be from the 
Commonwealth Caribbean perspective.  To some extent this will establish the 
credibility in the present research project in terms of original knowledge in the subject 
area. 
 
 The second goal to be achieved from this review is to learn from other researchers in 
order to understand their thinking on the death penalty in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean, and to some extent to put forward a new idea on this subject.220   That new 
research idea suggest that the constitutionality of the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean is influenced by and correlated to judicial politics in the 
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2.1: Policy Decisions in the Privy Council  
 
In this regard Feeley and Rubin asserted that the Supreme Court resembles other 
policymaking bodies in the way they fashion rules and codes of conduct.221 In their 
assertion they argued that policy making is a standard and legitimate function of 
modern courts. This said standard is generally achieved through well-accepted fact-
finding or through interpretation of the Constitution or authoritative texts.222   
 
Such is an illustration of the nature of this research. It is indeed a research of the Privy 
Council, a unique policy decision-making institution for the Commonwealth 
Caribbean jurisdiction based on Commonwealth appeals. Amaral-Garcia, and 
Garoupa further emphasised that, Commonwealth appeals are from Commonwealth 
jurisdictions and the vast majority of such appeal cases are disposed by the Privy 
Council.223  
 
In order to understand the Privy Council Commonwealth Caribbean jurisdiction and 
its significance as a policymaking institution it is necessary to explore its origin.224 
The Privy Council is one of the oldest parts of the United Kingdom’s constitutional 
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arrangements, with its origins dating back to at least the thirteenth century225 and it is 
the effective court of last resort for the British Empire that is part of the 
Commonwealth.226 It is also the final judicial body, which makes up the justice system 
in some countries such as the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica. It also 
sits in the United Kingdom and most of all it is an inheritance from colonial times.227 
 
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is an institution which has often been 
misunderstood.  Such a misconception stems from the fact that most lay persons very 
often refer to this body as the Privy Council.  Mohr said that the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council is usually called by its shorter, although not entirely accurate, 
name the Privy Council.228    This means that it is a myth for one to describe this 
judicial body as the Privy Council although it is a fact that the Privy Council is 
associated with this judicial body.229  
 
In fact the Privy Council is an ancient institution within the United Kingdom and it is 
endowed with the authority to formalise certain government functions.230  Today it 
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consists of over four hundred members who are appointed by the Queen of England 
on the advice of the Prime Minister.  The members hold the distinction of being 
addressed as The Right Honourable.  Over the years, it has become necessary for these 
members to meet when it is most appropriate to formally approve policies in the 
presence of the Sovereign.  These policies can also be approved in the absence of the 
Sovereign but this is done in the presence of a Counsel of State.231  
 
In order to ensure the efficiency or smooth functioning of the Privy Council, various 
committees are set up at different intervals to manage the wide range of issues, which 
will inevitably develop.232  One such committee is the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council.233 This Judicial Committee deals solely with final appeals in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean countries with the exception of the Cooperative Republic 
of Guyana,234 Barbados235 and more recently, Belize.236  
 
This Committee consists of the Lord President of Council and other persons of high 
judicial office within the United Kingdom.  It also includes leading members of the 
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judiciary in Commonwealth countries.237 Barrett in 2000 indicated that there are nine 
Privy Councillors who have been appointed from the ranks of foreign judges and are 
eligible to sit on the Judicial Committee.238 
 
It should be noted that the Privy Council’s central function is to act as the final appeal 
court of: (a) the British Overseas Territories (including those in the Caribbean, such 
as the Cayman Islands, but also others such as Gibraltar), (b) the Crown Dependencies 
and (c) certain Commonwealth states, now located solely in the Caribbean but until 
2004 also including New Zealand.  While it is true to say that in some cases the Privy 
Council hears certain appeals stemming from decisions of professional bodies within 
the United Kingdom, this institution is basically a Commonwealth Court.239    
 
There are some Commonwealth nations which have achieved Republican status and 
have severed political ties with the United Kingdom but they continue to use the 
Judicial Committee as their final appellate body.240  One such Commonwealth nation 
is the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, which gained Republican status in 1976 and 
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which to date, accepts the Privy Council as its final judicial arbiter.241 As a result of 
this, it can be represented that the Privy Council is one of the last bastions of 
colonialism which was effected through statutes242 when Great Britain sought to 
expand, control and adjudicate in the British Empire.243 Hence, it is still one of the 
indispensable legacies which remain in the Commonwealth Caribbean, although there 
have been numerous calls for its replacement.244  
 
Le Sueur and Cornes in their research paper on what the top courts do, indicated that 
the role of such courts was that of hearing second appeals.245 Therefore, the 
jurisdiction of the Privy Council is to hear appeals, both civil and criminal, in cases 
arising out of decisions made by the Court of Appeal in Commonwealth Caribbean 
countries.246   
 
The ruling of the Privy Council is persuasive in some jurisdictions.  Except for the 
ruling in appeals from courts in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago,247 the Privy 
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Council never delivers a judgment but its rulings are in the form of an advice or an 
order given to Her Majesty, who informs the local Court of Appeal from which the 
appeal emanates.248 When such an order is given by the Privy Council, it is very often 
done by three judges who sit to hear the appeal.249   
 
However, there are instances, which may warrant the sitting of five judges as in Pratt 
case,250 or nine judges as in Matthew case,251 to hear and determine the appeal. 
Formerly, such an advice was unanimous but since 1966, the ruling of the Privy 
Council has been accepted on a majority basis. This allows for dissenting opinions to 
be given in accordance with the Judicial Committee (Dissenting Opinions) Order.252 
 
It must be clearly noted that not all countries which were once governed by the British 
and which have subsequently achieved independence, still accept the Privy Council 
as their final court.  This is because by virtue of the Statute of Westminster (1931), 
independent Commonwealth countries were afforded an opportunity to terminate 
appeals to the Privy Council.253  A number of independent Commonwealth countries 
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such as the Cooperative Republic of Guyana,254 Barbados255 and Belize256 have opted 
for the abrogation of appeals to the Privy Council.  However, there are several 
countries in the Commonwealth Caribbean region including the Republic of Trinidad 
and Tobago257 and Jamaica,258 which have not yet relinquished the service of the Privy 
Council. 
 
It is interesting to note that in September 2004, Jamaica’s Parliament sought to 
dissolve its constitutional arrangement with the Privy Council by enacting three Acts.  
These Acts of Parliament were the Constitutional (Amendment) Act No. 20 of 2004, 
the Judicature (Appellate Jurisdiction Amendment) Act 2004 and the Caribbean Court 
of Justice Act 2004.  The effect of those pieces of legislation was to abolish the right 
of appeals to the Privy Council and to substitute it with right of appeals to the 
Caribbean Court of Justice.  
 
Despite the effort by that State to relinquish the Privy Council as its final court, there 
were challenges to the constitutionality of those Acts. Incidentally it was the very 
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Privy Council which finally declared that the Acts were not enacted in the Jamaican 
Parliament according to the constitutional procedure, and were therefore void.259  
 
In order for an appeal to be filed in the Privy Council, a request has to be made for 
leave to file such an appeal.  This request commenced by way of a petition to the 
Crown and such a petition is made possible by the rule of practice, which exists under 
the Judicial Committee Act (1833).260  Having made the petition, the Judicial 
Committee Act (1844) authorises the Queen by an Order in Council to admit any 
appeal to the Privy Council from any Court within the Commonwealth Caribbean.261  
This therefore means that the petition can be made even if the appeal does not originate 
from a Court of Appeal.262 
 
The Privy Council, as it is today, is also an advisory body.  It does not form part of the 
Supreme Court in some Commonwealth States although it is an integral part of their 
justice system.  In the Commonwealth Caribbean, there is an abundance of evidence 
to show that the Privy Council gives advice on a wide range of issues. In this regard 
Joseph said that there is no higher calibre of judge in the common law world than their 
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Lordships in the Privy Council and this is a good reason for retaining Privy Council 
in appeal matters so that we can avail ourselves of their expertise.263 
 
As recently as July 1985 an advice was given on whether the Privy Council had 
jurisdiction to hear an appeal from Grenada.  This issue arose out of the infamous case 
of Mitchell and another v.  Director of Public Prosecutions for Grenada and 
another.264  In that case, the appellants petitioned the Privy Council for special leave 
to appeal against the sentence of death which was imposed upon them by the High 
Court of Grenada and confirmed by that country’s Court of Appeal.   
 
In a brief look at the facts of that case which gave rise to the said petition, one would 
find the issues very intriguing.  Some of the petitioners were members of the People’s 
Revolutionary Government, which gained office in Grenada following the 1979 coup 
in that country.  Subsequent to the taking of office, the then government passed the 
People’s Law (1979), the effect of whose provision was made in Section 2 (1) for the 
abolition of appeals to the Privy Council.   
 
Subsequently, the People’s Law, Interim Government Proclamations and Ordinances, 
Confirmation of Validity Act No. 1 of 1985 was enacted in Grenada. The effect of its 
provision was to validate all the laws of the People’s Revolutionary Government, the 
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Resolutions of the interim government and the Orders of the Governor General. Some 
members of that group were eventually convicted of murder and sentenced to death, 
following which they sought to challenge the constitutionality of the said People’s 
Law (1979).  The Privy Council quite rightly advised that they did not have the 
jurisdiction to even hear the petition for the special leave and this was on the basis of 
the interpretation of the People’s Law, Interim Government Proclamations and 
Ordinances, Confirmation of Validity Act No. 1 of 1985 Act.265   
 
 While this case is interesting as far as its facts are concerned, the point to note is that 
the Privy Council does not exist only to give judicial rulings as a final judicial 
institution for the Commonwealth Caribbean States but it also gives advice that is 
sought on any judicial issue and in this case, in its own jurisdiction to hear and preside 
over a matter.  This is interesting from a Commonwealth Caribbean perspective since, 
although the Grenada People’s Law No. 84 of 1979 made it clear that that country had 
abolished appeals to the Privy Council, it still took advice from that body to determine 
the constitutionality of the legislation.266  
 
The Commonwealth Caribbean States have openly expressed their intention to abolish 
appeals to the Privy Council.267  One signal in that direction occurred in January 1997 
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when a special meeting comprising representatives of fourteen Caribbean countries 
was convened in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.  These countries, including 
Guyana, Barbados, Jamaica, the British Virgin Islands, Dominica and Saint Kitts and 
Nevis had as the main topic on their agenda, the intention to put an end to appeals 
from this region to the Privy Council.268 
 
The participants of that meeting faced no difficulties in deciding that a Caribbean 
Court of Appeal should be the established institution to be used as an alternative to 
the Privy Council in this region.  The establishment of an alternative to the Privy 
Council by the Commonwealth Caribbean nations could be a significant blow to the 
future of the Privy Council as an appellate institution.269 
 
A survey conducted by the ANSA McAL Psychological Research Centre of The 
University of the West Indies, St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad (1994-1999) provides 
excellent secondary data on the issue of the replacement of the Privy Council as the 
final Court of Appeal and the data shows significant public support for the abolition 
of appeals to the Privy Council.  Further, the data also indicates that in 1994 there was 
a forty nine percent support for the replacement whereas in 1999 the figure rose 
significantly to sixty one percent.270    
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Clearly, there is general support for the replacement of the Privy Council across the 
Commonwealth Caribbean and there is the need for the region itself to have its own 
final Court of Appeal.271 This is based on the premise that there is the dichotomy of 
the Privy Council decisions on the issues of the constitutionality of the death penalty 
in the Commonwealth Caribbean. According to the survey the public in the region 
voiced their disagreement with the Privy Council five-year limitation to carry out 
executions. In 1994 the 96% of the persons poled in this survey in Trinidad and 
Tobago supported the death penalty for a person convicted of murder and this was 
despite the objections by international human rights bodies.272  
 
An important issue in this research is concerning the basis upon which the judges of 
the Privy Council construct their decisions on the death penalty. Lord Haldane 
illustrated quite accurately this basis in an address to the Cambridge Law Society in 
November 1921 on the topic: ‘The work for the Empire of the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council.’273 It should be noted that this address also encompasses the ideals 
of this research. In that address Lord Haldane argued that the primary role of the Privy 
Council is a legal one and more specifically a judicial role whereas its ancillary role 
is a political one. In the said speech he suggested that the application of these roles 
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will present a higher principle of justice. However, Beaudry suggests that the principle 
of higher justice will be expressed through an institution rather than a set of rules.274  
Whereas Gillman suggests that appellate court decision-making is incontrovertibly 
influenced by a judge’s ideology and political identity.275 
 
It is proposed in this research to analyse data on the Privy Council constitutional 
decisions to present an understanding of how it arrives at a principle of higher justice. 
In this regard Posner takes this argument further by identifying factors of judicial 
decision makings such as judge’s political preferences, personal characteristics and 
personal and professional experiences.276  Thus by extension, judicial decisions 
partially revolve around the interest of justices rather than the court itself. Armstrong 
added that the social and psychological origins of judicial decision is really judicial 
attitudes that exhibit the influence of individual predilections on the development of 
law.277  
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Clearly this demonstrates that the development of law is partially based on the 
ideological preferences of the institutional actors. Yates and Coggins suggest that it 
was the Justices’ ideological inclinations that essentially drive in judicial decision-
making.278 It seems from an analysis of the position taken by Yates and Coggins, they 
are suggesting that theories of precedent, original intent and judicial ideology are three 
factors that have been the driving force in judicial decision-making.279 In essence such 
is the nature of the present research. It is proposed to apply those factors in the current 
research in order to present a better understanding of the legal, institutional and 
attitudinal models used by Justices of the Privy Council in the Commonwealth 
constitutional decisions on the death penalty. 
 
2.1.1: The Concepts of the Legal Model: Death Penalty Characteristics 
 
Retributive Theory: It is proposed to apply the retributive theoretical approach to the 
legal model research framework to illustrate this perspective which has been exhibited 
by the Privy Council. Aboluwodi in a research on this theory indicated that there is the 
notion that the retributive punishment is usually associated with the idea of 
retaliation.280  On the other hand, Beccaria’ advocates a rethinking of this prevailing 
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concepts of law and justice in his study.281 Theoretically he indicated that punishment 
should be based on retributive reasoning because the guilty person had attacked 
another individual’s rights.282 
 
This classical theoretical perspective which advocated retribution is reflective on 
making the punishment fit for the crime committed. In essence this idea is based on 
the criminal law concept of just desert. The effect of this concept is that sanctions 
should be commensurate with the nature of the wrongfulness of the act. In this research 
it epitomises the application of the legal model towards the mandatory death penalty 
in the Commonwealth Caribbean. The term legal model is described by Epstein and 
Walker in terms of positivist jurisprudence. This model or theory centres on the 
assumption that judicial decision making revolves around judges adhering to the rule 
of law.283  
 
Moreover, Epstein and Walker also labelled the legal model as mechanical 
jurisprudence because of the highly structured process by which judges reach their 
decisions.284 However, some scholars on judicial behaviour have been arguing that the 
legal model is a term that is ill-defined in political science. In addition, it is important 
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that judges interpreted the law correctly and in deciding cases the judges are guided 
by rules that lead them to the single correct answer.  
 
In this regard Posner posited that legalists using this approach generally apply pre-
existing rules in deciding cases.285  This would suggest that the legal model concept 
presents judicial decisions without judicial discretion.  Referencing the legal model, 
Segal, and Spaeth in their writing on the Supreme Court said that the decisions of the 
Court are substantially influenced by the facts of the case in light of the plain meaning 
of statutes and the Constitution, the intent of the framers and/or precedents.286  
 
In view of the legal model approach there has been a strong element of ambivalence 
referencing its application to the death penalty law in the Commonwealth Caribbean. 
However, it is necessary to incorporate the death penalty law into the analysis of the 
legal model of judicial behaviour to illustrate the impact that this model has on the 
death penalty as a punishment.  
 
Accordingly, Harrington discussed the involvement of foreign courts and quasi-
judicial international tribunals in limiting the actual use of the death penalty in the 
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Caribbean due to the rising crime situation in the region. Thus, Harrington indicated 
that the death penalty is a subject that invariably elicits passionate comment in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean which is witnessing rising rates of violent crime.287 In this 
regard the main issue which creates international attention and passionate comments 
is the constitutional significance of the mandatory nature of death penalty as the 
punishment for murder.   
 
In the Privy Council the issue of the mandatory death penalty was earlier argued as 
being unconstitutional in the Singapore case Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor.288   
However, Lord Diplock in the Privy Council in rejecting the argument against the 
mandatory nature of the death penalty, said that there was nothing unusual in a capital 
sentence being mandatory and that its efficacy as a deterrent might be to some extent 
diminished if it were not. Naturally this is an instance of the unwavering application 
of the legal model by the Privy Council.289 
 
There was a comprehensive research on ‘The Death Penalty in Trinidad and Tobago’ 
by the Prescott Commission of Enquiry.  The specific aim of that enquiry was to 
determine whether the death penalty should be retained for any offence or offences 
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under the criminal law.  After holding public enquiries and engaging in much 
deliberation, the Commission submitted its report on September 27, 1990.290  
 
It is evident from the review that the Prescott Commission relies heavily on the 
public’s comments and written submissions to explain the death penalty in the 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.  In essence, the Commission’s theory seems to 
suggest that the death penalty was accepted as a just punishment, when it articulated 
the legal approach or model that the law and the legal system should reinforce the 
main objective of protecting society and preserving the peace.291    
 
This theory of just punishment was proffered in the Commission’s recommendation 
and the evidence presented in the report suggests that the attitude of the public is in 
support of the retention of the death penalty law which was in existence.  This measure 
of support was also subscribed to by the members of the Commission.  It seems that 
their objective for deeming the death penalty appropriate was to ensure the protection 
of the society.  Moreover, the mere presence of this punishment in the penal code has 
made this objective achievable.292  
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It is clear that the Commission’s research was skewed towards the theory of just 
punishment or theory of retribution.  The evidence indicates that the Commission was 
in favour of the resumption of the carrying out of the death penalty.  This should follow 
after the legal remedies of each death row inmate have been exhausted.  However, a 
significant feature of the report was one of the Commission’s recommendations which 
stated that a prisoner, who was sentenced to death for more than ten years prior to the 
submission of the report, should have that death sentence commuted to life 
imprisonment.293   
 
This recommendation seems to be diametrically opposed to the Commission’s theory 
of just punishment, the objective of which is geared towards the protection of society.  
Such a critical discrepancy between this Commission’s recommendation of life 
imprisonment for persons sentenced to death for ten years or more and its support for 
the death penalty seem conflicting.294    
 
In summary it seems, that the objectives of the Commission have been achieved given 
their research mandate.  However, their research method was based strongly on 
theoretical assessment of public opinion on the death penalty and the evaluation of 
secondary data.  Thus, the enquiry of the death penalty by the Commission lacks depth 
in terms of evaluation of judicial opinion to scientifically present criminal justice 
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explanations for the death penalty given the theoretical reasons advanced in the report 
for the retention of this punishment.295   
 
The discrepancy outlined in that report has paved the way for further research on the 
death penalty in the region.  It is proposed that this present research would remedy the 
identifiable deficiency. It would explore the death penalty in the region in order to 
evaluate and assess the judicial behaviour of the Privy Council towards it.   
 
It is worth noting that McIntosh in his article considers whether the death penalty 
shows respect for human value.  This literature explains that the legal theory, in terms 
of the death penalty, is a just punishment. In this article he postulates that a theory of 
just punishment must essentially be in the nature of a retributive theory of punishment 
since the argument for retribution is in essence a moral argument.296 
 
It is clear that this author has adopted both a historical and a theoretical style during 
his presentation on the development of the theory.  He traces the historical 
development of the death penalty by presenting a moral standpoint and linking it with 
the academic standpoint.  These include, comparative reflection of the literary work 
of Shakespeare and the government’s legislative policy.297  
                                                 
295 Elton Prescott, The Death Penalty in Trinidad and Tobago (Commission of Enquiry into the Death 
Penalty in Trinidad and Tobago Government Printer Port of Spain 1990) 1 - 59.  
 
296 Simeon C. R. McIntosh, ‘Fundamental Rights, Governance and the Death Penalty’ (1996) 1 (1) 






In dealing with the moral aspect of punishment the evidence presented, suggested that 
any punishment that reduce the individual to a terrified, defecating, urinating, 
screaming animal is cruel and inhumane and unjust.298  McIntosh also suggested that 
this scenario would render that punishment a violation of humanity.  However, he 
went on to point out that the death penalty was not inhumane, but what is seemingly 
inhumane is the method of execution that is, the process of hanging by the neck until 
death.299 
 
McIntosh then presented academic evidence to substantiate this argument.  Here he 
was able to link the moral argument in the project with three events in time.  These 
include the academic literary work of Shakespeare, the system of execution in the pre-
independence in Jamaica and the system of execution in England.  The moral and 
academic evidence he presented indicated that the death penalty was the appropriate 
punishment for persons convicted of murder since it was accepted with or without the 
concept of delay. 300 
 
Clearly, he was of the view that although the character of the death penalty through 
the process of hanging is cruel, it was considered by the western society as a just form 
of punishment.  Reference was made to the earlier acceptance of western society of 
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the death penalty through the process of hanging as a just form of punishment and that 
the death penalty is not inhumane. These arguments would demonstrate the legality of 
the death penalty since it was based on the retributive theory of just punishment. 301 
 
The use of this theory clearly exhibits the author’s attitude towards the death penalty 
which to him seems to be an ethical issue.  In this regard he proceeded to link his 
perspective to a retributive theory of punishment.  He supported this linkage with 
Murphy’s work on retribution.302   
 
In summary it is worth noting that McIntosh in his article suggests that the death 
penalty is indeed a moral one and should not be used for the benefit of others.  Clearly 
this literature validates the credibility of the theoretical concept in the present research 
which indicates that the death penalty as a punishment should not be used as a benefit 
to anyone.  It is also a reflection of a perspective of Beccaria’s theory of society that 
indicated that punishment must be a certainty, inflicted quickly, and should not be 
administered to set example; neither should it be concerned with reforming the 
offender.303  Moreover, it would be in this light that it is proposed to conduct further 
research evaluation on the judicial perspective to better understand and explain the 
Privy Council’s ideology on the constitutionality of the death penalty. 
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In November 2000, the Ministry of the Attorney General and Legal Affairs in the 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago published a booklet on ‘Implementing the Death 
Penalty in Trinidad and Tobago.’  It details the struggle that Trinidad and Tobago 
encountered with the Privy Council in its bid to carry out the death penalty. It also 
gives recognition to the theory of retribution or just dessert by suggesting that capital 
punishment, the lawful infliction of death as a punishment, has been part of the 
Trinidad and Tobago criminal justice system from its beginning.304  
 
Thus, the purpose of the review is to show the development of this theory by 
evaluating the major documentary contribution to the issue of the death penalty in the 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago for the period 1995 to 2000.  This focuses principally 
on identifying with the death penalty laws in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.  In 
so doing it was advanced that the death penalty is a mandatory punishment authorised 
by the law of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.  It also signals that this punishment 
is prescribed for persons guilty of the crime of murder.305  
 
Space was allocated in the said booklet to address the recommendations of the Prescott 
Commission of Enquiry into the Death Penalty in the Republic of Trinidad and 
Tobago.  Time was also spent exploring judicial reasoning on the death penalty.  The 
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booklet focuses on addressing both the legal and socio-legal aspects of the death 
penalty in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.306   
        
In this booklet the impact of the Pratt decision307 on the death penalty in the Republic 
of Trinidad and Tobago was also addressed.  The first and obvious implication is 
intrinsic to the law.  That is, the decision facilitates the change of the law on delay in 
the execution of the death penalty from thenceforth.  The evidence suggests that prior 
to this ruling, the law on delay in carrying out the death penalty was stated in the De 
Freitas case.308  The situation in that case was that any delay between sentence and 
date carded for execution could not render the death penalty unconstitutional.309  
 
The evidence presented would suggest that the opposite is now true.  This is due to 
the Pratt case310 which determined that it is now unconstitutional to carry out the death 
sentence where there was a delay of five years or more between the date of sentence 
and the date scheduled for execution.311  
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In order to meet the challenges created by the Pratt case312 there were changes in the 
policies of the government to satisfy the requirements in the ruling. The changes 
embrace both legislative and administrative reforms.  Those changes were geared 
towards getting rid of delay within the system of the judiciary and at the same time 
facilitating the carrying out of the death penalty.313      
 
This booklet also illustrates the challenges experienced in the Republic of Trinidad 
and Tobago following the decision in Pratt case,314 the political will of the then 
government to enforce the death penalty as a crime fighting tool and the response that 
would ensure the implementation of the death penalty.  Thus, the assumption of 
judicial politics and its correlation to the death penalty in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean is not only credible but real.315   
 
Such is the influence of the Pratt ruling,316 the reform of the State judicial and 
administrative process and the signal of the actual execution of persons or of the 
warrants read to others for their execution. In other words, whatever legislative and 
policy changes that were implemented towards the death penalty came as a result of 
                                                 
312 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC. 
 
313 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Implementation of the Death Penalty in Trinidad and Tobago  
1995-2000 (Ministry of the Attorney General and Legal Affairs Trinidad 2000).   
 
314 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC. 
 
315 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Implementation of the Death Penalty in Trinidad and Tobago  
1995-2000 (Ministry of the Attorney General and Legal Affairs Trinidad 2000).   
 




the judicial politics concept which was featured in the Pratt case.317 It was not because 
of any initiative taken independently by any Commonwealth Caribbean State to 
abolish or restrict the death penalty outside of judicial opinion.  
 
This approach has demonstrated that the death penalty has evolved into a disparate 
specialist field within the field of criminal justice. It certainly subscribes to the 
theoretical concept of this research dealing with the constitutionality of the death 
penalty.  It also addressed the concept that suggests that the death penalty must be 
consistent with the current debate within contemporary jurisprudence. Moreover, the 
representation adopted by the Ministry of the Attorney General and Legal Affairs 
suggests that the presentation is of practical significance to this research.318 
   
Further, it demonstrates the measurable value that it is plausible that the death penalty 
in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago is influenced by judicial politics.  However, 
the major weakness of this project is that it is not of any major scientific contribution 
to knowledge.  On that basis alone there would be the need for research to explore and 
evaluate the death penalty in terms of judicial politics.  It is instructive to note that this 
position will be achieved through the present research. 
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In a critique of the application of the doctrine of retribution to the death penalty, Gibbs 
indicated that a host of critics have condemned retribution as barbaric.319 A similar 
criticism was made by Ban Ki-moon, the former United Nations Secretary-General 
who said that the death penalty has no place in the 21st century.320 In addition, 
Mohammadu Buhari, then President of Nigeria’s criticism of the retributive 
perspective of the death penalty was more pronounced as he opined that it does not 
aim at any meaningful restorative justice.321 
 
 
As recent as 2007, the Ministry of National Security published its Final Report on the 
Public Consultations on Crime in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.  The 
consultations took place in seven communities in that country during the period April 
18, 2007 to May 18, 2007.  The primary objective of those consultations was for the 
government to share with the public its strategies in the fight against crime.322  
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Although the government as well as the general public was concerned with rising 
crime, in particular the murder rate, the government did not give a firm commitment 
on the implementation of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder. Four 
direct questions were asked by the general public throughout the consultations as to 
when the government will implement the death penalty as a strategy in the fight 
against crime.323  
 
 Unfortunately, there was no direct answer from the government and in particular the 
Prime Minister and the Minister of National Security to that issue. Instead, both in 
their responses placed the blame on the Privy Council for the government’s failure in 
the implementation of the death penalty. Particularly, Mr. Patrick Manning, the then 
Prime Minister indicated that the Privy Council put one impediment after the next in 
the way of the execution of capital punishment in this country.324  
 
Ironically, this statement is a clear validation from the government that the concept of 
judicial politics exists and it affects the application of the death penalty.   In addition, 
this response has illustrated the plausibility of the research hypothesis of the influence 
                                                 
323 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Consultations on Crime in Trinidad and Tobago (Ministry 
of the National Security Trinidad 2007) 79. 
 
324 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Consultations on Crime in Trinidad and Tobago (Ministry 
of the National Security Trinidad 2007) 79 Mr. Patrick Manning the then Prime Minister indicated that: 
(“Capital punishment; that has been the subject of a lot of discussion in Trinidad and Tobago, and our 
inability to carry it out stems largely from the position adopted by the Privy Council.  It has been 
particularly accentuated with the advent of Britain to the European Union and the attitude of the 
European Union to this whole question of capital punishment.  The law lords in London, the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council which, as you know, is the highest court for Trinidad and Tobago, are 
taking the position that they put one impediment after the next in the way of the execution of capital 




of judicial politics in the application of the death penalty as plausible because of the 
clear dichotomy between judicial politics, on the one hand, and the political intent of 
the government to retain the rule of law on the death penalty, on the other hand.   
Moreso this statement also illustrates the present research problem which engages the 
current legal analysis.  
 
2.1.2: The Theories of the Institutional Model: Death Penalty Characteristics 
 
Rational Choice Theory: It is proposed to align the rational choice theoretical 
approach with the institutional model research framework of the Privy Council on the 
death penalty. Writing on this theory Lovett described the rational choice theory as a 
set of tools that sometimes help social scientists in their efforts to understand and 
explain social phenomena.325 Within this model the core assumption is that the rational 
choice perspective as enunciated by Beccaria suggested that the criminal is rational 
and that crime could be prevented through increased certainty, severity and celerity of 
the punishment.326  
 
It should be noted that during the early 20th century it was clear that the legal doctrine 
of stare decisis was a determinant in the way judges of an institution operate. Epstein 
and George indicated that the core of the legalism model centres around a rather 
simple assumption that the legal doctrine, generated by past cases is the primary 
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determinant of case outcomes which is the doctrine of stare decisis.327 Knight and 
Epstein defined the principle of stare decisis and illustrate its concept as the norm of 
judicial behaviour that structures judicial decisions making. In their theory they 
suggested that precedent might affect Supreme Court decision making in a number of 
ways.328 
 
However, in recent history this concept of strategic modification becomes more    
apparent. It appears in the form of the legal doctrine of judicial politics which impacts 
on the Privy Council decisions on the constitutionality of the death penalty. Thus, the 
nature of the judicial politics framework which is presented and aptly described by 
Lax in terms of legal model versus attitudinal model is applicable to this research. This 
entails a reflection of a doctrinal-politics approach between a study of the attitudinal 
model of judicial behavior and the institutional model which is the actual legal 
practices of the Privy Council as an institution.329  
 
In reviewing the literature for this section it was noticeable that there is no published 
regional work available that directly exhibits the Commonwealth Caribbean 
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perspectives on judicial politics in the Privy Council and the constitutionality of the 
death penalty.  However, to some extent there are existing published works embracing 
other aspects that are relevant to the death penalty and which are largely in support of 
the research theory.  That is to say, they suggest a correlation between the 
constitutionality of the death penalty and the influence of judicial politics.   
 
It was further observed that to a large extent the body of literature on the death penalty 
in the region was pursued by Ghany and thus this aspect of the review would embrace 
some of his work in that field.  One of his published articles that is of interest dealt 
with ‘The Privy Council and Judicial Indifference to Terrorism in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean.’330  The evidence unearthed from this article indicates that it closely 
resembles the nature of the topic under research. 
 
In that article, the author reserved a section to address the issue of the constitutionality 
of the death penalty which touched and concerned the Commonwealth Caribbean 
region.  It is interesting to note, that from a contextual approach, the author, in this 
article took a historical journey of the death penalty commencing from the era of pre-
independence, followed by the situation that presents itself at post-independence.  In 
the article, he presented evidence to show that the death penalty was available in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean during the colonial era, a period when Great Britain was 
in occupation of the region.  After the States in the region gained their independence 
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the death penalty law was retained.  This was made possible through the saving 
provisions in their written Constitutions which saved all the existing laws.331  
 
The article explains that the challenge to the law on the death penalty was brought 
about by the very post-independence constitutional provision that despises cruel and 
unusual punishment.  In this regard, the author explored a series of constitutional cases 
from the pronouncement of the De Freitas case332 where challenges to the death 
penalty were made on the basis that it was a cruel and unusual punishment.  Other 
cases in that study include, the Abbott case,333 the Riley case,334 the Pratt case,335 the 
Guerra case336 and the Henfield and Farrington case.337   
 
It was seen from the evidence presented in each of those cases that the Privy Council 
was only concerned with the issue of delay as a ground for declaring that the death 
penalty was unconstitutional. For instance, the Privy Council in the De Freitas case338 
did not declare that the death penalty was unconstitutional based on the issue of delay.  
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However, it was observed from the article, that the Privy Council left that issue of 
delay open for further analysis.  It was also observed that the Privy Council did in fact 
accept such a proposition in the Pratt case,339 a proposition which was further 
developed in the Guerra340 and Henfield and Farrington cases.341  
 
In the last paragraph of the article the author illustrates a variation in the manner in 
which the Privy Council addresses the issue of delay.  That variation demonstrates a 
pattern of indifference by the Privy Council.  It was further suggested that this 
institution had a hidden agenda in relation to the death penalty in the region.  In fact, 
it was considered through its ruling that this institution has legislated against the death 
penalty in the region.  It was surmised that the Privy Council’s agenda was to capitalise 
on the issue of delay to make it difficult for the region to carry out the death penalty.  
Thus, the article concluded that there was a move by that institution to circumvent the 
powers of the Head of State to order the carrying out of the sentence of death.342    
 
The review of this literature has shown a methodology that fails to adopt a research 
method to collect and adequately evaluate the qualitative data from a judicial 
standpoint on the death penalty in the region. This data will be significant in that it 
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would define the judicial attitude towards this punishment which will put in context 
the illustrative information alluded to in the article.343   
 
It was also observed that the method of analysis in this literature on the death penalty 
does not carry depth and is structured mainly around the content analysis data 
collection of constitutional matters evolving from the Privy Council.  An in-depth 
evaluation of such data would most definitely put the qualitative information in the 
context of judicial politics.  However, the failure of Ghany in the article to do so could 
be attributed to the lack of evidence on judicial politics which has demonstrated both 
the legitimacy and originality of the present exploration.  
 
Moreover, the review of Ghany’s literature on ‘The Privy Council and Judicial 
Indifference to Terrorism in the Commonwealth Caribbean’ has provided a useful 
contextual point for this exploration of the topic. That is to say, the literature has 
reviewed the paradigm which addresses the constitutionality of the death penalty as a 
punishment in the Commonwealth Caribbean. It exhibited the theoretical perspective 
of the Privy Council in death penalty cases which is an essential aspect of this research.  
Moreover it demonstrates that the Privy Council approach is not based directly on the 
interpretation of the rule of law but on the makings of public policy.344   
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Hatchard in the article on ‘A question of humanity, delay and the death penalty in 
Commonwealth Courts’ explains the approach of that institution through an analysis 
of two landmark rulings by the said Privy Council.345  They are the cases the Catholic 
Commission For Justice and Peace346 and the Pratt decisions.347  The decisions in 
both cases are unique for their time, but in this review focus will be made on that part 
of the article which addresses the Pratt issue of delay.348  The purpose is to show the 
discussion on the issue of the judicial reasoning in death penalty cases for the region.   
 
 Hatchard considers the approach of the Privy Council on the issue of delay and in 
particular the setting of a clear rule for a State wishing to retain the death penalty.  
This aspect of the punishment he classified as being attractive.  He suggested that the 
laying down of this specific rule may be inappropriate given the fact that national 
procedure and circumstances may vary within the regional States.  An interesting 
aspect in this analysis is that it was suggested that the only remedy that should be 
available in a constitutional case where there was delay is an order terminating the 
delay.349  
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The summation of this article is indicative of the fact that not only was the approach 
of the Privy Council attractive but it has made inroads into the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty.  The evidence presented shows that the Privy Council 
usurped the role and function of Parliament when it made a specific rule of a five year 
time-limit for delay.  In doing so, it has abdicated its own role as interpreter of the law 
and took on the mantle of a legislator.  This is a leading indicator that the Privy Council 
has adopted public policy approaches and it deviated from following precedent and 
has entered the arena of the parliamentarian through the window of judicial politics.350 
 
However, Geyh presents an opposing view of judicial decision making in terms of 
judicial independence. This to him revolves around the theme where judges decide 
matters according to law and not according to their own whims or external 
interference.351 By following the law Geyh was also articulating the institutional 
model of judicial behaviour.352 Thus, how else could he explain the decision in the 
Pratt case? From the analysis of the Pratt case353 as illustrated in Hatchard’s article, 
there is a presentation of the academic testimony on this issue of judicial politics.354  
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There is also the definite need for additional research to further evaluate illustrative 
evidence on this issue from a judicial standpoint.  It is in this light that this aspect will 
be pursued in the present research to demonstrate and validate the researcher’s analytic 
model of judicial politics.  
 
Ghany’s in the article ‘The Guerra, Henfield and Farrington cases’355  raises the issue 
as to whether the Pratt ruling was refined or revised.356 This literature illustrates the 
indifferent approach by the Privy Council on the issue of the death penalty.  It was 
suggested that the indifferent approach was a hidden agenda on the part of the Privy 
Council.  This literature also illustrated the refining and the revision of the Pratt ruling 
in the subsequent cases in order to shape the law on the death penalty as it related to 
delay.357 
 
Ghany highlights the comment made by the then Chief Justice of the Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago Mr. Michael de La Bastide on the issue of implementing the 
death penalty and was of the opinion that the Privy Council used the Guerra case358 
to refine the Pratt ruling.359  In the Guerra case he claimed that the evidence suggested 
that the Privy Council invoke the two year rule for the local appellate process.  
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However, this was not relevant in Pratt’s since in that case the five year rule was used 
to deem the delay in execution unconstitutional. 
 
Ghany suggested that the Privy Council used the Henfield and Farrington cases to re-
open the issue of prolonged delay, which was decided in the Pratt case in order to 
revise the rule of five years of delay between sentence and execution to three years 
and six months.  This revision seemed to be necessary based on the context of the legal 
system in which the target period for appeals is two years.360 Finally, he suggested that 
the Privy Council had made inroads into the doctrine of separation of powers by 
refusing to recognise section 80 (2) of the Constitution which is an ouster clause.  That 
clause illustrates the separation of the duties of the executive from the duties of the 
judiciary. 
 
In a summation of this literature, Ghany seemed to suggest that the Privy Council has 
allowed itself its own discretion to use its own rules when it sees it fit to do so.  By 
applying this literature in this review it was gleaned that the Privy Council did not 
apply the law in its reasoning in the matter.  This has been described as a dangerous 
signal for the region’s justice system.  Thus, this is a clear instance of the Privy Council 
developing on the issue of delay in execution for the sole purpose of bringing about 
the abolition of the death penalty.361     
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Ghany in another article on ‘The Death Penalty, Human Rights and Law Lords: 
Judicial Opinion on Delay of Execution in the Commonwealth Caribbean,’ has 
suggested key constitutional issues relevant to the death penalty in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean.362  Firstly, it underscores the historical relevance of the Privy Council 
whose purpose was identified as, to hear appeals from the British colonial 
jurisdictions.  Secondly, it evaluates the position taken by the Privy Council on the 
issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  
Finally, it provides a chronological assessment of the issue of delay in carrying out 
execution in the region from the De Freitas case363 to the Farrington case.364  
 
The evidence presented suggests that the death penalty remains the punishment for 
murder in the region primarily because the constitutional provision saved it as an 
existing law after independence.365  It was seen that the very Constitution has supplied 
provisions to challenge the death penalty as a punishment that is cruel and unusual 
and a violation of the human rights of the individual.  However, it was indicated in the 
De Freitas case that the executive act of carrying out the death penalty was not 
unconstitutional.366  
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In focusing on the issue of delay in carrying out the sentence of death, Ghany looked 
at a line of cases from the De Freitas case367 to the Farrington case368 and indicated 
that in all instances the Privy Council was not consistent with its ruling. The evidence 
that has been presented demonstrates that the policy of the Privy Council towards the 
death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean has changed within the period of those 
two decided cases.  For instance, in the Abbott case the author explained that the Privy 
Council determined the issue of delay based on months, but left open the said issue as 
it relates to years.  Further, it allows the local judges the opportunity to determine what 
constitutes reasonable time for dealing with a petition.369  
 
However, it was suggested in the Pratt case that the Privy Council viewed the delay 
in excess of five years as unconstitutional.370 The author also evaluated the Guerra 
case to identify with other patterns of inconsistency where the Privy Council held that 
the delay of four years and ten months was also unconstitutional.371  
 
Against all these indifferences of the approaches of the Privy Council, the author 
suggests that it seems that this judicial body has an agenda against the death penalty 
for the Commonwealth Caribbean.  This can be concluded since it has virtually 
legislated, through the use of judicial opinion, an activity which is described in this 
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research as judicial politics.  The author’s presentation is very attractive since it shows 
that there is need for further research to understand and present an explanation of the 
indifferent approaches of the Privy Council towards the death penalty. This will be 
facilitated in this present research as it necessitates the obtaining of further illustrative 
information in relation to the death penalty in the region.  Given the indifferent 
approaches stated above, the qualitative evidence will validate as credible, the 
theoretical perspective that the Privy Council decisions on death penalty are 
influenced by judicial politics.  
 
2.1.3: The Theories of the Attitudinal Model: Death Penalty Characteristics 
 
Social Choice Theory:    It is proposed to apply the Social Choice Theory approach 
in the attitudinal model research framework.  In this scenario the social choice theory 
entails the study and or analysis of collective decision making processes and 
procedures which concerns with the individual judicial inputs and or preferences of 
justices relative to judgments that are defined in the collective outputs of the collective 
judicial decision making.372 Thus, the attitudinal model clearly describes the social 
theoretical perspective of which Beccaria suggested that it is better to prevent crimes 
than to punish them.373  
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One of the key areas of this research revolves around the attitudinal model of judicial 
behaviour. Accordingly Epstein and Walker indicate that the attitudinal model is based 
on sociological jurisprudence.374 This model epitomises a mechanism by which the 
judges of the Privy Council have adopted social factors to construct their decisions. 
Bailey and Maltzman said that qualitatively, one can explain most Court decisions in 
terms of either policy or legal motivation.375 In similar fashion, Segal, and Spaeth 
describe the attitudinal approach as one form of policy motivation of the court. They 
suggest that policy preferences of this model holds that the Supreme Court decides 
disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-a-vis the ideological attitudes and values 
of the justices.376 
 
In this research the attitudinal model of judicial behaviour is operationalised through 
constitutional appeal cases and legal documents on the death penalty. In a six-member 
Commission of Enquiry into Prison conditions, chaired by the then Anglican Bishop, 
Clive Abdulah, between 1972 and 1980 in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, the 
Commission in its final published report included a chapter on capital punishment.377    
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It seems from the Commission that it had adopted the sociological theory of 
rehabilitation in its focus on the death penalty in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. 
This assumption was arrived at based on the Commission’s pronouncement that we 
have gone beyond the stage of supporting the views: - ‘a life for a life’ and there can 
be no possibility of rehabilitating.378   
 
In the development of this theory of rehabilitation it is apparent that the Commission 
did not spend much time in researching and presenting adequate information on the 
death penalty although the duration of its enquiry lasted two years.  This is evident 
from the fact that there was no unanimity by the Commissioners in terms of the 
operationalization of the theory.  It must be noted that in the final analysis, the 
Commission was unable to arrive at a single position on the death penalty.379  
 
In summary, the Commission’s report indicates that there was a split among their 
ranks on the use of the death penalty as the punishment in the Republic of Trinidad 
and Tobago for persons convicted of murder.  The report revealed that the majority 
supported a limited scale of the use of the death penalty but would facilitate the 
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removal of some acts of killing such as crimes of passion, from the category that 
carries the death penalty.380   
 
However, what is worth noting is the opinion of the Commission’s minority members.  
They articulated that the death penalty should be abolished for a trial period of five 
years and that life imprisonment should be the punishment for persons convicted of 
murder during this period.  This focus of the minority in the Abdulah Commission 
was, rather than adopting a novel position for the country, there should be an attempt 
to impose in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago the cultural position of the United 
Kingdom.381  This said position was adopted by that country in 1965 when it sought 
in the Parliament to address the issues on the death penalty as the punishment for 
murder through the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act of the United Kingdom, 
1965. 
 
The point to note is that the approach of the Commission presents an uncertainty of 
their position on the death penalty.  On the one hand the majority was relying on a 
limited theory of retribution and a limited theory of rehabilitation whereas the minority 
on the other hand was relying totally on the theory of rehabilitation.  In addition, it 
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seems that the Commission has adopted a comparative method in their enquiry.  Thus 
the situation of the penal justice system in other countries was assessed and inspiration 
was drawn from them.  That caused the Commission to conclude that the crime of 
murder should be categorized.382  
 
Moreover, the Commission was in support of the rehabilitation of the prisoners rather 
than their execution based on the retributive theory of punishment.  This is so even 
though it recognized that the gun-wielding burglar, who on being challenged shoots 
with intent to kill.383     
 
In summary the method adopted by the Abdulah Commission in probing the use of 
the death penalty in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, together with the weakness 
of the members of the said Commission in arriving at a unanimous agreement on the 
death penalty has failed to bring settlement to the use of the death penalty.384  This 
will be in terms of the theoretical concept that suggests the need for a high degree of 
certainty in the application of the death penalty and as such it has left the subject matter 
wide open for further enquiry.  It is proposed to collect illustrative information in this 
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present research from the decisions of the Privy Council on the constitutionality of the 
death penalty to objectively assess and explain the concept of judicial politics.  
 
 
In the third edition of his book ‘The Death Penalty A Worldwide Perspective,’  
Professor Roger Hood has allocated four pages in one of the book’s Chapters which 
directly addresses the death penalty situation in the Commonwealth Caribbean.385  
Although limited in the amount of time spent on the regional perspective, in general 
the book itself represents a major contribution of the author’s perspective on the death 
penalty.  The aim of reviewing this literature here is to focus on the criticism levied at 
the legal approach of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  To 
complement this, an assessment of the author’s theoretical perspective has been made. 
 
The Caribbean regional perspective on the death penalty would suggest a theory of 
just dessert.  This is based on the need for the application of the death penalty in the 
region as the punishment for murder can be viewed in terms of public attitude.  The 
evidence presented suggests that although most Caribbean States have not carried out 
executions in many years, they demonstrate a cultural preference for the death penalty, 
since no independent attempt has been made to abolish it through legislation.  386   
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In developing this theory, it was suggested by the author that the public’s attitude 
shows strong support for the death penalty in the region.  This is a definite indication 
that for the region the death penalty is accepted as the punishment for persons 
convicted of murder.  However, it was also suggested that the region’s failure in 
carrying out the death penalty has been the result of the attitude of the judiciary and 
also social choice of interest groups.387  
 
A point to note is that Hood’s recognition of the actions of the judiciary here is clearly 
a leading indicator of the presence of the social choice theory within the attitudinal 
model of judicial politics.388  Naturally, Hood was not alone in this area. This position 
was also articulated by Epstein, et al., in their writing on the ‘Ideology and the Study 
of Judicial Behavior.’  In it they said that judges are attempting to maximize their 
ideological preferences by bringing the law in line with their own political 
commitments.389 
 
In addition, Hood has also presented evidence of the high crime rate, a social problem 
that is endemic in the Commonwealth Caribbean, which has primarily frustrated the 
abolition of the death penalty or any government’s consideration in bringing any such 
legislation to that effect in Parliament.  This is indicative of the author’s preference of 
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the theoretical perspective of rehabilitation.  In fact, he strengthens his preference 
when he indicates that the public’s opinion in this region was very hostile towards any 
such government legislation given the high crime rate in the region.390 
 
In conclusion, a review of Hood’s final sentence on the Caribbean’s perspective 
suggests a major support of the research theoretical perspective that deals with the 
death penalty in the region and also the author’s perspective.  In this regard he 
postulates that the region’s avoidance of their international commitments is a clear 
indicator of their determination to resist abolition of capital punishment.391  
 
This outlook confirms the view that neither the Executive nor the Legislature in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean States have sought to abolish the death penalty.392 At this 
stage, compliments are hereby given to Hood’s work on the death penalty as it relates 
to the Commonwealth Caribbean.  When it is viewed in totality, it clearly demonstrates 
the culmination of years of research on the death penalty both in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean region and by extension worldwide.393  However, there seems to be one 
major inadequacy with his research hypothesis and that is it has not evaluated the role 
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played by the judiciary in death penalty matters.394  It is proposed to do so in this 
research by obtaining documentary evidence which when evaluated will confirm the 
research hypothesis as being reliable since it would be un-biased and scientifically 
objective. 
 
2.2: Models of Decision-making in the Caribbean Court of Justice and the Death 
Penalty Characteristics 
 
The Caribbean Court of Justice was established on February 14, 2001 to be the final 
judicial institution in the region when the agreement establishing it was signed.395  As 
at the time of the writing up of this thesis this court is the final appeal court for three 
Commonwealth Caribbean countries. Those countries which replaced the Privy 
Council with the Caribbean Court of Justice are the Cooperative Republic of Guyana 
in 2005,396 Barbados in 2005397 and most recently Belize in 2010.398   That court was 
inaugurated on April 16, 2005 at its geographical location in the Republic of Trinidad 
and Tobago.399  
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It is clear from an assessment of the issues in the jurisprudence emanating above that 
the Privy Council demonstrates that it is adequately protecting the rights of the citizens 
in the region.  However, there are patterns of inconsistency in treating with the issues 
concerning the constitutionality of the death penalty in the region. The point to note is 
that the Privy Council sought to give effect to the human rights and values declared 
and entrenched in the Constitution of Caribbean countries.  This has made it difficult, 
if not impossible, for the region to satisfy the legal criteria set down by the said Privy 
Council for the implementation of the death penalty when these criteria change with 
every new case which is brought before the said Privy Council.400        
                                                               
The point worthy of note is that the Caribbean Community felt a sense of usurpation 
of their rights of self-determination by the policy and approach of the Privy Council 
towards the death penalty.  Further, it was proffered that the Privy Council does not 
reflect the general sensibilities, culture and feelings of justice in the region.  In fact it 
is of great distance from the region and its policies and judgments are made miles 
away. This led to much disenfranchisement among the nations in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean.401  
 
There was a need for something more Caribbean, something which is in touch with 
the wants, needs, mentality and overall spirit of the Caribbean.  Justice Telford 
                                                 
400 Pratt and Another v. Attorney General for Jamaica and Another. [1993] 43 WIR. 340, PC and 
Farrington v. Minister of Public Safety and Immigration of The Bahamas, [1996] 49 WIR. 1 PC. 
 
401 Shridath Ramphal, Time For Action: Report of the West Indian Commission (The West Indian 




Georges of Dominica recognised this need for regionalism when he said that it was a 
compromise of sovereignty for the regional states to leave their judicial decision to a 
court, which is part of the former colonial hierarchy, a court which in the appointment 
of its members, the regional states have no say.402 The idea of a Caribbean court to 
counter the approach of the Privy Council was born and fostered as the replacement 
for the Privy Council.403 
 
Having such an institution will be beneficial to the region in a number of ways.  This 
was alluded to by Professor Francis Jacobs, a Privy Councillor and former Advocate 
General of the European Court of Justice. In essence he claims that all possible steps 
should be taken to encourage the States in the Caribbean to accept the jurisdiction of 
their own supreme court.404  
 
It is clear that Jacobs embraces local values and developing a modern jurisprudence 
as the main reasons for the establishment of the court.405 This could be viewed as an 
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enormous task as against a comparative assessment with the present functions of the 
Privy Council.406 
 
It is important to note that the Law Lords of the Privy Council are both geographically 
and culturally removed from the Commonwealth Caribbean experience.  They are not 
fully equipped with the knowledge and level of understanding required to make policy 
decisions which reflect their sensitivity for the Commonwealth Caribbean people.  
This proximity factor was attributed to the Privy Council following the decision in the 
Pratt case407 and also more recently following the decision in the Roodal case.408 
 
 Moreover, it has been advanced that the Caribbean Court of Justice will foster a 
greater sense of security and stability in the region.  Acting in its original jurisdiction, 
the Caribbean Court of Justice will be the only Court responsible for the interpretation 
and application of the Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community 1973.409  This 
will eliminate the possibility of conflicting decisions coming from other Courts which 
are lacking in geographical and cultural proximity.410  
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In addition, the Caribbean Court of Justice acting in its original jurisdiction will also 
be responsible for hearing and deciding on issues arising between the Commonwealth 
Caribbean States following the establishment of the Caribbean Single Market and 
Economy (CSME).  This proposition was well articulated by Eidson who indicated 
that one of the explicit reasons which led to the creation of the Caribbean Court of 
Justice was the need for a court to deal with the proliferating commercial disputes of 
the Caribbean Community and Common Market.  This reason has reinforced the 
aspiration in the region of a desire to have a sense of self and not to be subjected to 
the dictates of the decisions made in Europe.411 
 
It therefore means that decisions of this institution will facilitate the free movement of 
goods, services and skills within the region.  This will help the member States and 
foreign investors to feel secure in the knowledge that there is one highly respected 
Court for ensuring fairness, proper observation of the rules by the member States and 
predictable decisions.412 Finally, it has also been advanced that there are enough 
members of the legal profession possessing the requisite degree of skill and integrity 
to occupy positions within the Caribbean Court of Justice to deal with any legal matter 
and this includes dealing with matters involving the death penalty.413  
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The establishment of the Caribbean Court of Justice was not done without much 
criticism.  Persons in opposition to the court very often claim that the establishment 
of the Caribbean Court of Justice was a direct response to the ruling in the Pratt 
case.414  It was suggested that the court was created to undo the constraints on the 
death penalty decreed by the Privy Council.  It was further suggested that the court 
will primarily be a hanging Court.415   
 
 These assertions require some analysis of the background leading to the establishment 
of this judicial institution and also its approach in death penalty cases.  From a 
historical perspective it was sheer coincidence that the Pratt case416 was decided at 
that time.  It is also a fact that interest in the Caribbean Court of Justice can be credited 
to the West Indian Commission Report and certainly not the Pratt case.417  
 
This report recommended the establishment of a Caribbean Supreme Court which 
predated the decision in the Pratt case by one year.418  The most compelling reason 
advocated in that report for having a regional supreme court was for the completion 
of the region’s assumption of sovereignty.   That is to have an appropriate and 
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authoritative institution being able to interpret the Treaty Establishing the Caribbean 
Community.419 
 
Writing in defence of the Caribbean Court of Justice and in relation to the issue that it 
is viewed as a “hanging court” the then Attorney General of Barbados Sir David 
Simmons debunked that notion.420 However, Simmons was not singular in his strong 
support for the Caribbean Court of Justice.  Dr. Kenny Anthony, then Prime Minister 
of St. Lucia also strongly disputed the notion that the Caribbean Court of Justice would 
be a hanging court.  In an address to the Norman Manley Law School on June 28, 
2003 on the Caribbean Court of Justice and the issue of it been a hanging court, 
Anthony said emphatically that courts in Commonwealth Caribbean legal system, do 
not hang people.421 
 
The totality of this statement can support the premise that the Caribbean Court of 
Justice is independent of government and its political influence.  This attribute is 
                                                 
419 Caribbean Community (CARICOM). 1973.  Treaty establishing the Caribbean Community.  
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credited to the manner by which judges are appointed to that regional institution, the 
tenure of office of the judges and the financial provisions for the court.422  It should 
be noted that Judges of the Caribbean Court of Justice are appointed by a Regional, 
Judicial and Legal Services Commission, a body that is independent of political 
influence and established by Article V (1) of the Agreement Establishing the 
Caribbean Court of Justice.  The Commission itself has a well-defined institutional 
arrangement that has removed any political discomfort in the process of appointment 
of judges.423    
 
It comprises eleven members chosen from representatives of regional bar associations, 
civil society and academic institutions which are totally independent of political 
influence and of which the President of the Court is the Chairman. This composition 
ensured that the judges are not directly appointed by member States and the 
significance here will be that the regional governments will not be in a position to 
exert any informal pressure on the court to deliver a self-serving judgement.424 This is 
a clear indifference in the manner in which judges of the Privy Council are appointed.  
The appointment of the judges of the Privy Council can be described as political 
appointees since they are appointed by the Queen on the advice of the Prime 
Minister.425  
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Appointments of this nature are indeed vulnerable to political manipulation.  Evidence 
of this appeared when the Lord Chancellor's multiple functions drew public criticism 
in February 2001 when it emerged that the then holder of this office, Lord Irvine, had 
invited a number of leading lawyers to make donations to the Labour Party.  Although 
there was no known suggestion that Lord Irvine would have allowed any such 
donation or its absence, to influence his appointments of Queen Counsels or judges, 
or any decision he might make when sitting judicially, it was felt that the situation 
showed all too clearly the paradox of having an active politician in this case the Lord 
Chancellor, as head of the judiciary.426  
 
Since that time, the United Kingdom Supreme Court was inaugurated on October 1, 
2009 with the Lord Chief Justice at its helm. The position of Lord Chancellor has been 
joined with the cabinet position of Secretary of State for Justice. It therefore means 
that the Lord Chancellor is now confined only to the Cabinet in the United 
Kingdom.427 
 
In addition, the judges of the Caribbean Court of Justice have security of tenure.  They 
retire at the age of seventy-two years with a possible extension of three years on 
request.  In addition, the court is funded by a Trust Fund of one hundred million dollars 
United States of America Currency which is managed by a Board of Trustees.  These 
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administrative intricacies have insulated the court from any interference be it political 
or otherwise which ensure that the court is totally independent.428 
                                                                                                                               
The main reasons advanced for establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice was 
presented in a statement made by McIntosh, who indicated that the establishment of a 
Caribbean final court of appeal to replace the British Privy Council must be seen as 
an essential part of constitutional reform.429 One can glean from that position that there 
is the need for the supremacy of the Constitution in the region.  However, from an 
evaluation of the major statements on the establishment of the Caribbean Court of 
Justice there seem to be two primary reasons for the establishment of that court.  The 
first, entails the completion of the region’s assumption of sovereignty and secondly, 
for developing or reshaping a true Caribbean Jurisprudence.430   
 
As regards the issue of assumption of sovereignty in the region, Morrison made a very 
important revelation.  He proclaims that the Privy Council is an affront to sovereignty 
and as such it is inconsistent with independence.”431  This would suggest that the need 
has arisen for the Caribbean people to take charge of their own affairs, and to assert 
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their rights to full constitutional sovereignty.  That is, to have a regional institution in 
the form of the Caribbean Court of Justice being able to interpret the laws in the 
region.432  
 
In so doing this court will most definitely embark on its own agenda to develop and 
reshape the Caribbean jurisprudence.  This entails deciding constitutional matters on 
behalf of the people in the Caribbean.  The court will also write the region’s 
jurisprudence on nationality and political identity.  This will bring about the 
clarification, expansion and or modification of pre-existing laws in the region but it 
does not necessarily mean that it would abolish precedents.433 
 
This benefit was realised in the case, Attorney General of Barbados, Superintendent 
of Prisons and the Chief Marshal v. Joseph and Boyce.434  That case was decided on 
Wednesday November 8, 2006 in the Caribbean Court of Justice.  This was the Court’s 
first judgement on the death penalty and it certainly requires some contextual 
evaluation.  Incidentally, it is a judgment based on the due process of the law on the 
death penalty in Barbados.  In its judgement the Caribbean Court of Justice ruled that 
the Barbados Government had infringed the constitutional rights of the two 
condemned prisoners Jeffery Joseph and Lennox Ricardo Boyce.  It then stated that to 
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execute them would be unconstitutional and it confirmed the Barbados Court of 
Appeal’s decision in commuting the death sentence of the respondents to life 
imprisonment. 
 
However, that decision provides illustrative evidence to demonstrate that the 
Caribbean Court of Justice can by comparison, perform as efficiently as the Privy 
Council in dealing with matters of due process of the law and equal protection for all.  
In that case the Caribbean Court of Justice was asked to restore the death penalty for 
the two respondents.  This section would be incomplete without the procedural history 
and the factual background of the Joseph and Boyce case and its decision being told.   
 
On April 10, 1999 the respondents and two others were accused of the murder of 
Marquelle Hippolyte.  On February 2, 2001 the respondents were found guilty and 
sentenced to death for the said murder. On March 27, 2002 their appeal to the 
Barbados Court of Appeal was dismissed. On June 24, 2002 the Barbados Privy 
Council met and advised against the commutation of the death sentences.  On June 26, 
2002 death warrants were read to both men for their execution.  The said day the High 
Court of Barbados granted a stay of the execution pending an appeal.  On July 7, 2004 
the Privy Council by a 5 to 4 majority dismissed their appeal and upheld the death 
sentence. 
 
On September 3, 2004 Joseph and Boyce filed an application before the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights for a declaration that their rights under the 
American Convention on Human rights were violated.  On September 13, 2004 the 
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Barbados Privy Council met and advised the Governor General that the death 
sentences of Joseph and Boyce should be carried out.  On September 15, 2004 the 
death warrants were read to Joseph and Boyce for their execution on September 21, 
2004.  On September 16, 2004 Joseph and Boyce filed a motion before the High Court 
seeking commutation of their death sentences. 
 
On September 17, 2004 the Inter-American Court issued a provisional order requiring 
Barbados to preserve the lives of Joseph and Boyce pending the outcome of their 
petition.  On December 22, 2004 the High Court of Barbados dismissed the motion 
filed before it on September 16, 2004.  On January 18, 2005 an appeal was filed to the 
Barbados Court of Appeal.  On May 31, 2005 the Barbados Court of Appeal allowed 
the appeal and commuted the death sentences of Joseph and Boyce to life 
imprisonment. 
 
Subsequently, the Barbados government filed an appeal to the Caribbean Court of 
Justice for an order to reinstate the death sentence on Joseph and Boyce.  On June 20 
and 21, 2006 the appeal was heard before the Caribbean Court of Justice and on 
November 8, 2006 the Caribbean Court of Justice dismissed the Barbados 
government’s appeal for an order to reinstate the death sentence on Joseph and Boyce 
and in the process delivered its opinion. 
 
The court’s decision demonstrates that the notion of the court being conceived as a 
hanging court is a myth.  In this case, that issue has received the attention of the court 
and it took some time in the judgment to explain its purpose as a regional institution.  
122 
 
That is to promote the development of a Caribbean jurisprudence.435 This is a strong 
indication of the approach of the Caribbean Court of Justice in death penalty matters. 
Quite naturally it has clearly put to rest the notion that the court was established as a 
hanging court.  In fact, Cross writing on the Joseph and Boyce case express the view 
that the mandatory death penalty Commonwealth Caribbean has evolved due to 
judicial erosion coupled with an impressive human rights trend in the region.436  
 
The point to note here is that the court has made it abundantly clear in the Joseph and 
Boyce case that its purpose is to promote the development of a Caribbean 
jurisprudence.437 This is an aspect which was also alluded to in the West Indian 
Commission Report as the reason for the establishing of the Caribbean Court of 
Justice.438   
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Even more significantly is the fact that the court in its judgement iterated its position 
with regards to previous decisions of the Privy Council.  It informed that in developing 
a Caribbean jurisprudence it will respect the previous judgement of the Privy Council 
unless there is some material irregularity.  That material irregularity identified with 
the area where a written law states otherwise, or to put it simply, is in the case where 
there is conflict with the Privy Council’s judgement and legislation.  This clearly is an 
expression of the validation of previous judicial politics since in essence the Court 
was saying that it was not prepared to overrule any of the previous judgements of the 
Privy Council unless legislation has dictated that it should do so.  Moreover, it 
exhibited the ideology that the Caribbean jurisprudence cannot be developed in 
isolation without taking into account other regional jurisprudence.439  
 
In light of the fact that the Court in its first judgement waded into the thinking of its 
detractors and provided clear and unambiguous responses to the myths of describing 
the court as a hanging court.  The most appropriate assessment that can be made here 
has been that the illustrative evidence thus far has presented sufficient qualitative 
justifications for the establishment of the Caribbean Court of Justice to replace the 
Privy Council.  It also presents the perception of the adoptionist approach of the 
Court’s on the notion of judicial politics towards the death penalty.440   
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Thus, the judgement demonstrates that the Caribbean Court of Justice would not adopt 
any major different approach to the death penalty when compared with that of the 
Privy Council. In this regard, Birdsong in the article on the formation of the Caribbean 
Court of Justice demonstrates it quite succinctly by indicating that it is unlikely that a 
court with a common law could or would abandon the constitutional requirements 
previously ruled upon by the Privy Council.441 This position therefore, embraces the 
justification or the rational for this research. 
 
2.3: The Rationale for this Research 
Niblett and Yoon suggest that the existing literature has consistently found, across a 
wide array of specifications, that judicial ideology affects case outcomes.442 It is with 
this approach in mind that the relation of judicial politics and the constitutionality of 
the death penalty presents the rationale for this research to demonstrate an 
understanding of judicial behaviour. Epp on the other hand postulates that: “Apart 
from judicial independence, the presence or absence of constitutional rights 
guarantees is widely believed to be the most important influence on the extent of 
judicial policy making on rights.”443  
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In this research consideration was given to the issue as to whether the 
constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean is influenced 
by judicial politics. Ghany’s writing on the death penalty and the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council represents a major contribution on the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean.  The main purpose of this article was to show some 
fundamental misconceptions that the Privy Council has acted on as far as the local 
jurisdiction is concerned and it demonstrates a distinct correlation between the 
researcher’s analytic model of judicial politics and the constitutionality of the death 
penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean.444  
 
It is for this reason a review of this literature was applicable in this area of the 
research. The focus of the author was to highlight the reality that the will of the 
Executive is being frustrated by the level of policy intention by the Privy Council.  In 
this regard, the author presented evidence illustrating a balanced presentation of the 
many misconceptions of the Privy Council in relation to the death penalty in the 
region.  For instance, the article intimated that the Privy Council was no longer 
concerned with the death penalty as the punishment for persons convicted of murder, 
but it focused more on the conditions surrounding the carrying out of the sentence.  
Those conditions include the delay as it relates to the court process and the policies 
of the Executive arm of the government.445     
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The research method adopted in this article to present the evidence was the content 
analysis.  This method entails the evaluation of constitutional cases such as the De 
Freitas case,446 the Riley case,447 the Guerra case448 and the Pratt case.449  It was found 
from an analysis of those cases that the approaches of the Privy Council were not in 
keeping with the culture, the spirit of the law and practice in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean.450 Therefore, Ghany has shown that the Privy Council was seeking to 
impose the United Kingdom’s standard on constitutional matters in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean when there is a cultural difference between both regions.  
One way of explaining this revelation of cultural diversity would be through the theory 
of social culture.451   
 
However, in this research the theoretical perspective used to explain the approach of 
the Privy Council is through judicial politics.  In 2005 in a Death Penalty Conference 
held in Barbados, Attorney-at-Law Douglas Mendes presented a paper which 
addressed saving lives by luck and chance, the saving law clauses and the persistence 
of arbitrariness. In summary that paper showed that the death penalty litigation in the 
region is associated with the term creation both for the judiciary and for the human 
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rights attorneys.  This notion of creation in this paper substantiates this research 
exploration since it is a preliminary validation of the analytic theory of judicial politics 
presented in this research.452  
 
Accordingly, Mendes describes the creativity in the judicial decision making as being 
dramatic since the judiciary was prepared to reverse itself in death penalty 
decisions.453  He was at pains to outline a long string of such reversals undertaken by 
the Privy Council since the decision of the De Freitas case454 through to the decision 
of the Matthew case.455  These include the decision in the Pratt case456 which reversed 
the decision in Riley case457 (not to be subjected to a long delay in execution) and the 
Matthew case458 which in turn reversed the abolition of the mandatory punishment of 
the death penalty in the Roodal case.459           
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Mendes describes the judicial changing of the parameter for the carrying out of the 
death penalty as one of luck and chance.460  Thus, where lives have been saved as in 
the Guerra case,461 to Mendes, this can be attributed to luck.  On the other hand, where 
the persons were executed as in the case of Glen Ashby, Dole Chadee and Anthony 
Briggs, to him this can be deemed as unlucky.  However, against this back drop, his 
paper fits squarely in his own reflection of Lord Hoffman’s statement in Lewis case 
which warns against the sacrificing of precedent on the altar of personal philosophy.462   
 
According to Beim because of the gravity of death penalty cases, higher courts are 
more likely to care about the outcome of the cases as much as the law in creation.463 
This suggests that Mendes’ description of the events in the judiciary as creation is not 
only incomplete but it constitutes an inadequate way of representing the Privy 
Council’s approach towards the death penalty in the region.  
 
In effect such could be recognised as the judicial creation of exceptions whose impact 
restrict the implementation of the death penalty.  Thus, it would have been better 
represented had Mendes categorized the artful creation operating within the judiciary 
as the operationalisation of the legal doctrine of judicial politics by the Privy Council 
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in deciding the constitutionality of the death penalty bearing in mind Lord Hoffman’s 
doctrinal warning.464   
 
The theoretical perspective of judicial politics was well articulated in the research 
theory presented therein.  When Mendes’ work is compared with it, there seems to be 
a demonstration of this type of judicial activity taking place in the Privy Council.  This 
is apparent when it is deliberating on issues affecting the death penalty in the region.465 
 
This judicial activity by the Privy Council is further pursued and addressed in this 
research exploration in the consideration given to the issue as to whether the death 
penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean is influenced by judicial politics.  Analysis 
of this issue is necessary to illustrate the correlation between judicial politics and the 
death penalty.  However, from a preliminary assessment of the content of Mendes’ 
literature, it seems to suggest that there can be a measure of confirmation that there is 
a direct correlation between the constitutionality of the death penalty and the 
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From the review of the literature presented in this chapter it is clear that there is 
insufficient research on the subject of judicial politics in the Privy Council and the 
constitutionality of the death penalty that is directly linked to the Commonwealth 
Caribbean.  Although to a limited extent some studies were done in other areas on the 
death penalty however, the review suggests that there is no known research on the 
present topic in the region.  This therefore means that the issue of correlation between 
judicial politics and the death penalty in this region is an unresolved research issue. 
 
It is proposed to resolve this issue by pursuing with this exploration in judicial politics 
in three areas. The first will be a case law analysis of the nature of the death penalty 
in the Commonwealth Caribbean States which would be presented in chapter four of 
this research. The second would be a legal and textual analysis of the present state of 
knowledge on judicial politics and the constitutionality of the death penalty decided 
in the Privy Council which is presented in chapter five.  The final area which is 
complimentary to the two areas above, will be an analysis of human rights issues 
which impact on the death penalty in the region to be presented in chapter six.  
 
The research methodology and methods to pursue the exploration in these areas are 
presented in chapter three. This would be necessary in order to spell out the manner 
by which illustrative information would be obtained to validate the research 
theoretical perspectives. One methodological challenge foreseen is that the varying 
review on the literature produced insufficient data and or illustrative information 
regarding the nature of judicial politics in the region towards the death penalty.  It is 
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this lack of data or illustrative information which will pose the difficulty in the making 
of a comparative analysis with the data or illustrative information to be collected in 
the present research.  However, despite such a challenge, the process of qualitative 
data collection and analysis will not be stymied and will definitely be pursued herein. 
 
Another challenge that would be faced in this exploration is the lack of literature 
directly relevant to the topic and more specifically reflective of the Commonwealth 
Caribbean perspective.  While this deficiency can also be recognised as a positive 
attribute for treating with this present research as an original piece of work, this 
scarcity of direct literature will definitely support the need for this research since it is 
evident that more research is needed on this aspect of the death penalty. This research 
would not only increase our understanding of judicial behaviour in the Privy Council, 
but it would add to the stock of research on judicial politics and in this instance from 














RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
THE ANALYSIS 
 
3.1: Qualitative Research Methodology 
  The term methodology is a subfield of the science of epistemology. Epistemology is 
described as the science of knowing.467  Methodology on the other hand is concerned 
with validating knowledge.468  Babbie suggested that the science of methodology 
offers a special approach to the business of inquiry.469 In effect he described this 
approach as the science of finding out.470   
 
Writing on the said subject Nachmias et al., indicate that a scientific methodology is 
a system of explicit rules and procedures upon which research is based and against 
which claims for knowledge are evaluated.471 In effect methodology defines the 
scientific process, principles and the procedures that will be used to find answers to 
the issues raised in the research question.472       
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There are several forms of epistemological research.  However, the exploration into 
the research problem will be channelled and presented through a descriptive and 
interpretative qualitative methodology. This paradigm has its own ontological or 
nature of reality, epistemological and methodological assumptions, which would 
define the nature and direction of this research on the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean.473  
 
In essence, Gangrade literally defines the present research effort when he suggests 
that a descriptive study is a sort of fact-finding operation with adequate interpretation. 
It is in reality an exploratory or formulative study design which is pursued to gain 
familiarity with a phenomenon.474 This therefore means that the use of the descriptive 
and interpretative qualitative methodology in this research is concerned with exploring 
the processes and approaches within this social phenomenon - on judicial politics in 
the Privy Council and the constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean.  
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Hagan has described the qualitative approach in similar terms to that of the classic 
sociologist Weber. He emphasised that researchers pursuing this activity would 
immerse themselves in the subject matter and develop ‘sensitizing concepts’ that 
enhance their understanding and explanation of reality.475 This activity is pursued and 
achieved in this research through the process of investigating, interpreting, 
understanding, describing and explaining the nature and the reality of the influence 
and consequences of the research concept.   
 
It is for this reason that this qualitative methodological investigation is channelled 
through the classical criminology approach. This is in effect a research of society that 
suggests that people exercise free will in making decisions.476  In this research there 
will be immersion in the data and or illustrative information so that embedded 
meanings and relationships can emerge. The concept for which explanation is sought 
in this qualitative research is, as Hagan suggests, understanding the reality under 
investigation.477 In this research it is reflective of an understanding of the doctrine of 
judicial politics which is immersed in the Privy Council decisions as it relates to the 
constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  
 
The strategies used to carry out a collection of data through this methodology are the 
content analysis method, a secondary data analysis and evaluating research design.  
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Thus, this investigation will uncover the deeply embedded assumptions within the 
social phenomenon in order to understand the concept of judicial politics and validate 
its presence within the constitutionality of the death penalty.  This will afford the 
opportunity to build findings to explain and respond to the research question.478    
 
Since methodology is an attempt to collect accurate facts and data, then the use of the 
qualitative paradigm will be both essential and adequate in this exploration. This will 
be operationalised by following a traditional research model to define the nature, 
direction and consequence of the research into judicial politics and the death penalty. 
 
It therefore means that this research would embody a combination of case law analysis 
into the death penalty in the region, legal and textual analysis of judicial decisions 
made by the Privy Council and an analysis of human rights issues that affect the death 
penalty in the region. Leeuw, writing on legal research, indicated that legal research is 
rooted in a diversity of disciplines, sub-disciplines and specialities some going back 
for centuries. Moreover, such disciplines include amongst other things law and politics 
and as such in this research the study of the death penalty and judicial politics are sub-
discipline of law and politics. 479  
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Therefore, this research pursued on the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
region has utilized a qualitative methodology paradigm to find illustrative information 
in the research discipline.  It was Blume and Eisenberg who indicated that strong 
anecdotal evidence suggests a relation between the politics of selection methods and 
the death penalty appeal outcomes.480   Thus in this research there will be presentation 
of anecdotal evidence through the qualitative legal research paradigm. This will be 
done in three parts in order to capture the data and illustrative information necessary 
to complete this project on the case law analysis of the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, the legal and textual analysis of the judicial decisions on 
the death penalty in the Privy Council and also the analysis of human rights issues 
which impact on the death penalty in the region.481   
 
3.1.1: A Case Law Analysis of the Death Penalty in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean 
 
In this research project the case law analysis entails an analysis of the death penalty in 
the Commonwealth Caribbean from a policy perspective. This includes the 
examination of secondary data on the death penalty, the death penalty legislation, legal 
forms and stakeholder participation in the governance of the Commonwealth 
Caribbean society.  Such data analysis will be presented in a descriptive format.    
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Accordingly, Yin describes a study of this nature as one that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.482 The underlying idea 
for this case analysis is because a general legal research cannot provide a definitive 
answer regarding the research question applicable to participatory governance within 
the Commonwealth Caribbean society. Thus, this will be achieved in this research 
through a case law analysis of the data and or illustrative information on the 
application of the death penalty in the region.  
 
In addition, the role of the Privy Council as the constitutional appeal court for the 
Commonwealth Caribbean along with the region constitutional process will be 
studied. Therefore, the analysis will embrace a case study of the nature of the death 
penalty in states within the Commonwealth Caribbean.  Accordingly, Garoupa 
suggested that studies in constitutional law are more appropriate for the understanding 
of local conditions.483 It is the need for an understanding of local situation in the region 
that forms the basis of this study and this aspect of the study will be channelled through 
a mixed method of exploration, explanation and evaluation.  
 
It must be noted that it would be necessary to pursue this research, which is extant to 
the Commonwealth Caribbean region, primarily by utilising the secondary sources of 
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data collection. As such this case law analysis will be collated and presented in 
Chapter Four of this research. The objective is to present data in order to evaluate and 
explain the application of the death penalty within the Commonwealth Caribbean from 
a policy perspective. The actual effect of the attitude of the Privy Council is to 
demonstrate that its decision making impacts on the social environment of the region. 
 
3.1.2: A Legal Analysis of the Judicial Decisions’ on the Death Penalty in the 
Privy Council  
 
Whereas the second part of this research will be a legal and textual documentary 
analysis of the judicial decision makings of the Privy Council reflective of its 
paradigm on the cruelty of the death penalty. This aspect predominantly relates to the 
qualitative interpretivist research and method of collecting evidence. This is achieved 
through a document review, assessment and evaluation on the data and illustrative 
information on the judicial decision makings by the Privy Council on the 
constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Thus 
according to Sag and Jacobi, the patterns which emerged from such textual assessment 
are sufficiently clear to allow one to make some significant general conclusions on 
correlation.484   
 
 
This legal analysis will be presented in Chapter Five of this project. It is based on the 
legal reasoning approach and it has as its major benefit a reflection which is more fully 
on the interactive nature of the context of legal decision making in the Privy Council. 
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According to Levi writing on legal reasoning, this aspect of research is an attempt to 
generally clearly describe the process of legal reasoning in the field of case law and in 
the interpretation of statutes and of the Constitution.485 
 
 In this regard there will be documentary review of the contents of constitutional 
appeal decisions at the Privy Council to understand the impact on the death penalty in 
the Commonwealth Caribbean. It will be based mainly on qualitative interpretations 
of judicial doctrine and would not be subjected to any quantitative examination. 
Kastellec described the advantage of such legal reasoning in terms of the hierarchical 
and interactive nature of legal decision making.486 
 
Therefore, the objective of this aspect of the research is to explore the Privy Council 
rulings on the constitutionality of the death penalty. This is on the basis of its 
interpretation of the terms cruelty or inhumane in the Constitution within the states in 
the region. In the said review the categories of cruelty and its impact on the death 
penalty in the region along with the patterns of judicial behaviour are collated and 
analysed. The legal analysis in this area would be complemented with an analysis on 
human rights issues.  
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3.1.3: An Analysis of the Human Rights issues affecting the application of the 
Death Penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
 
The main issue here is whether the states in the region recognize individual human 
rights in the application of the death penalty. The constitutions within the individual 
Commonwealth Caribbean states guarantee certain rights for all people in the region 
without distinction of any kind. These rights include the rights to a fair and speedy 
trial, due process, trial by jury, and protection from cruel and unusual punishment.487  
 
States are bound by international treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty worldwide. 
In addition, some states have ratified the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and many other countries, however, 
have moved toward abolition.  
 
It is proposed to present a discussion of those treaties in Chapter six of this research. 
This would be necessary to address the human rights issues which impacts on the death 
penalty in the region. Moreover, it would present an understanding and an explanation 




                                                 




3.2: Evaluation Design  
The analysis pursued in this project will utilise a similar research model akin to that 
illustrated by Lutz.488 This model has been adapted herein as the research plan of work 
for the legal and textual analysis to follow.  It should be noted that this research model 
design is best suited for a classical based research analysis of this nature since it is 
applicable to the Commonwealth Caribbean as a society.489 Thus, figure 3.1 below 
provides a graphic illustration of the research model design that has been followed in 
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Research Theory 
presented in  
Ch. 1, 2 & 3 
 
Research Results and 
Conclusions 
presented in Ch. 7 
Research Hypothesis 
presented in Ch. 1, 2 & 3 
Data Analysis Procedures 
on the death penalty and 
the Privy Council 
decisions presented in 
Ch. 4 & 5 
    Research Design 
   presented and 
discussed in Ch. 3 
Data Collection on the 
death penalty and the Privy 
Council decisions, collated 
and presented in Ch. 4 & 5 
Analysis of Human  
Rights Issues presented  
in Ch. 6 
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This research model is the plan or blueprint for the research that has been conducted 
on the research question.  Its span encompasses the presentation of a research theory, 
research hypothesis, research design, data collection on the death penalty and the Privy 
Council decisions, data analysis on the death penalty, the Privy Council decisions and 
human rights issues, research results and research conclusion.  These features have 
been employed throughout the process of this research exploration and illustrate the 
varying areas of discussion within this project. The objective of this design model is 
to easily map the location of the information which present the idea that the 
constitutionality of the death penalty in this region is influenced by judicial politics. 
 
3.2.1: Research Theory  
Theory.  Theories anchor one’s research and a research is a test of theories. Therefore, 
theories seek to give plausible explanations to factual situations.491   In this research 
the problems that are of concern are illustrated both in the legal doctrine in the Pratt 
case492 and in the political statement made in 2007 by Mr. Patrick Manning, the then 
Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago.493  In an effort to explore both ideas and seek 
plausible and credible explanations for the concepts within the legal doctrine and the 
theoretical perspective in the political statement, the theories that will be applied in 
this research investigation are akin to the classical school of criminology. As described 
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in chapter two of this research they are the retributive theory, the rational choice theory 
and the social choice theory.  
 
The use of these theories in this research is significant in that they are applicable to a 
phenomenon within the Commonwealth Caribbean society.  According to Cao writing 
on major criminological theories, the classical school of criminology was nurtured by 
reformers responding to abuse of power and blatant inequities in the administration of 
justice.494  It must be noted that the central themes in the classical school of 
criminology does not revolve around a criminology theory per se.  It is more concerned 
with the criminal law and in particular the justice system addressing the way in which 
criminals are punished.  Thus, it is important to note that in similar vein this research 
is applicable to a research in criminal justice and in particular the death penalty which 
is the punishment for the crime of murder in some Commonwealth Caribbean 
countries.495 
 
For the purpose of this research the classical school of criminology is described as the 
administrative and legal aspects of criminology which in this project embrace the 
application of the death penalty.  In this investigation, the classical school of 
criminology is adopted as a reflection for rethinking the prevailing concept on the 
constitutionality of the death penalty within the Commonwealth Caribbean society.  
                                                 







The theoretical concept which is now presented is that there is the influence of judicial 
politics at the level of the Privy Council in constitutional appeals from the 
Commonwealth Caribbean on death penalty decisions.496  
 
Hagan suggested in his work on criminal justice and criminology that theory attempts 
to classify and organise events, to explain the causes of events, to predict the direction 
of future events, and to understand why and how these events occur.497 Unfortunately, 
in the Commonwealth Caribbean region, theories of crime, law and justice are 
virtually non-existent.  However, despite the lack of any regional theories to guide this 
research, this investigation would not be compromised.  In any event research is an 
international exercise and therefore this research would rely on other regions where 
most theories were developed and are relevant, giving plausible explanations to 
criminal justice phenomenon.498 
 
Thus, a rational approach has been followed to select an appropriate theory which will 
guide the theoretical aspect of this research.  In so doing, there are three theoretical 
perspectives that have been relied upon as reasonable explanations for the death 
                                                 
496 Liqun Cao, Major Criminological Theories (Wadworth/Thompson Learning Belmont, California 
2004) 30. 
 
  497 Frank E. Hagan, Research Methods in Criminal Justice and Criminology,  (6th edn. Boston Press 
2003) 9. 
 
498 Richard R. Bennett and James P. Lynch, ‘Towards A Caribbean Criminology: Prospects and 




penalty situation within the criminal justice system in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
region. They have been extrapolated from Beccaria’s theory of society.499   
 
The first theoretical perspective that is applicable is the retributive theory which seeks 
to explain the legal model and the death penalty characteristics. This theoretical 
perspective which is taken from the writings of Beccaria suggests that punishment 
should be based on retributive reasoning because the guilty person had attacked 
another individual’s rights.500 
 
The second theoretical perspective which is rational choice theory which seeks to 
explain the institutional model and the death penalty characteristics. The core 
assumption of this theory articulated by Beccaria is that the criminal is rational and 
that crime could be prevented through increased certainty, severity and celerity of 
punishment.501  
 
The third theoretical perspective is social choice theory which is presented to explain 
the attitudinal model and the death penalty characteristics. This model engulfs the 
Beccaria theoretical perspective which suggests that it is better to prevent crimes than 
to punish them.502 
                                                 
499 Liqun Cao, Major Criminological Theories (Wadworth/Thompson Learning Belmont California 
2004) 29 – 30. 
 
   500 Ibid.  
 
501 Ibid.  
 
502 Liqun Cao, Major Criminological Theories (Wadworth/Thompson Learning Belmont California 
2004) 30 Beccaria indicated that (“The aim of a very good system of legislation was the prevention of 
crime. It is better to prevent crimes than to punish them…. Every punishment which is not soundly 
147 
 
In this research the adoption of these three theoretical perspectives is essential to this 
classical research on the death penalty within the Commonwealth Caribbean society.  
The reality is that they have been identified within the concepts extrapolated from the 
research problem in the Pratt statement of law503 and also from the 2007 political 
statement made by Mr. Patrick Manning the then Prime Minister of Trinidad and 
Tobago.504 In other words these three perspectives which were presented by Beccaria 
are in sync with the events which had unfolded from the said case.  Therefore, these 
three theoretical perspectives are of sufficient quality to guide the formulation and the 
presentation of a classical theory applicable to this criminal justice research.   
 
In this regard it must be noted that, Bennett and Lynch indicated that it may well be 
that with sufficient attention and thought, existing theories can be adapted to include 
more transparently the situations currently confronting Caribbean nations.505 It is in 
this vein that a theory adaptation has been made from the classical research school 
which was exhibited in Beccaria’s theoretical perspectives.506  This adaptation was 
necessary to highlight the present investigative research and more importantly the 
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situation in the justice system in the Commonwealth Caribbean which is associated 
with the death penalty. 
 
This theory construction gives a plausible explanation of the facts, law and justice that 
are related and relevant to the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean region. 
Thus, the approach in this research will proffer a theory which postulates that:   
 The constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean has evolved through the influence of judicial politics. This is 
demonstrated through the process for the implementation of the death penalty. 
Its essential characteristic is that it must be consistent with the current features 
within contemporary jurisprudence, that is to say, it ought to exhibit a high 
degree of certainty and administered quickly.  Any derogation from such 
norms will present issues of cruelty which would render the implementation 
of the death penalty unconstitutional. 
 
This is a theory of society that is extant to the Commonwealth Caribbean region on 
the issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty and in this research it would be 
tested in chapter four, chapter five and chapter six. Basically this theory explains and 
predicts the research realities which is illustrated at the level of the specific 
hypothesis.507 
 
                                                 
 
 507 Frank E. Hagan, Research Methods in Criminal Justice and Criminology (6th edn. Boston Press 




 3.2.2: Research Hypothesis  
Hypothesis operationalisation.  Hypothesis is a term used to describe a factual 
statement that can be tested to establish proof of whether it is correct or not.  In 
Bailey’s writing on social research he indicated that the ‘New World Dictionary of the 
American Language’ describes hypothesis as a tentative assumption made in order to 
draw out and test its logical or empirical consequences. This would imply 
insufficiency of presently attainable evidence and therefore a tentative explanation.508   
 
Bailey further described the term hypothesis as a tentative explanation for which the 
evidence is necessary for testing.509 It is in this vein that in view of the literature on 
the death penalty in the region, the background study pursued and also in view of the 
issues in the research question and emanating from the research theory, the specific 
hypothesis was formulated for testing.  
 
Preliminary the research hypothesis which was deduced indicated that:  
 The constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean is 
influenced by and correlated to judicial politics in the Privy Council. 
This specific hypothesis is the tentative answer given to the research question.  It is a 
presentation of another aspect relative to the death penalty from a Commonwealth 
Caribbean perspective.  It has also brought to the fore an international correlated 
model hypothesis perspective.   
                                                 






Although international law does not prohibit the application of the death penalty as a 
punishment there is evidence of a rapid change towards a position in favour of a 
worldwide abolition.510 This evidence can be isolated from the model hypothesis 
which is located in the United Nations Resolution 32/61.511 That Resolution underpins 
the theoretical research model which explains in principle the description of judicial 
politics which is engraved in the legal doctrine in the Pratt case.512 It was articulated 
in that Resolution that the main objective to be pursued in the field of capital 
punishment is that of progressively restricting the number of offences for which the 
death penalty may be imposed with a view to the desirability of abolishing this 
punishment.513  
 
    
 It is obvious that this international model hypothesis perspective provides a clear 
demonstration of the nature and structure of the critical arguments in this research.  It 
is a clear articulation of the common legal doctrine of international politics that is 
associated with the death penalty.  This is a declaration of a piecemeal approach for 
the abolition of the death penalty worldwide.  This aspect of international doctrinal 
politics that permeates the death penalty worldwide seems to have engendered the 
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judicial politics which was adopted and pursued by the Privy Council in the Pratt 
case.514 
 
 In a reflection of this international model hypothesis it is obvious that the phrase: 
“progressively restricting the number of offences for which the death penalty may be 
imposed with a view to the desirability of abolishing this punishment”515 used in the 
Resolution 32/61 presents a clear relation to the researcher’s analytical model of 
judicial politics in the Privy Council.  In fact this statement is a leading indicator of 
the international acceptance of judicial politics to curtail the use of the death penalty 
in the region. Moreover, this statement theoretically underpins the concepts within the 
research and is identifiable within the research hypothesis.516   
 
In this research the qualitative methodology is used as the approach to conduct testing 
on the research theory in an effort to validate the research hypothesis that it is plausible 
or credible to suggest that the constitutionality of the death penalty in the region is 
influenced by judicial politics.  This would involve the collecting, organising and 
analysing of the contents of texts and judicial pronouncements on the subject matter 
which is of a contemporary nature. In essence, this qualitative research methodology 
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will consist of a detailed description of constitutional situations on the death penalty 
in the Commonwealth Caribbean region.  
 
The process adopted in this methodology will navigate the exploration of judicial 
politics.  It has provided information on the processes of judicial politics that is aimed 
at both restricting and reshaping the death penalty as a punishment in the region. This 
includes evaluating and explaining the paradox of the constitutionality of the death 
penalty. Thus, this research will demonstrate that in the absence of any changes in 
legislation or governmental policy in order to abolish the death penalty, the main 
explanation for the curtailment of the implementation of the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean lies in the realm of the legal doctrine of judicial politics in 
the Privy Council. 
 
3.2.3: Data Collection  
The data for this research are obtained primarily from document review of judicial 
matters involving the challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean which were decided by the Privy Council and the 
secondary data statistics on the death penalty in the region. In the first instance the 
data collection of written documents occurred over the course of time for a number of 
years. In the latter instance the data was operationalised through a system of secondary 
sources of collection. It is worth noting that the content of data obtained in both 
instances are collated, analysed and evaluated to conduct the test to the key theoretical 




Content analysis.  The content analysis method is the technique in this research used 
for gathering and analysing illustrative information from the contents of texts.517  This 
method will provide a useful framework for studying texts which will be applied to 
and inform on the variables in order to explain the hypothesis.  Several texts and their 
contents have been looked at and analysed in this study.  
 
These literature includes the review of the texts in legal documents such as 
constitutional jurisprudence, statutory and constitutional instruments and academic 
references.518  This also necessitates an understanding of the meaning conveyed by 
the texts and the impact it leaves on the Commonwealth Caribbean.  Of importance is 
the approach of the Privy Council with regards to the constitutionality of the death 
penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean States. Accordingly, Hall and Wright 
described content analysis of judicial opinions by indicating that it allows the legal 
academy to cross-pollinate our understanding of legal principles and institutions with 
the objective methods and epistemological assumptions of a social scientist.519 
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Neuman expressed similar sentiment by suggesting that this technique is particularly 
suited in a research of this nature since it is an objective method which is free from 
bias and it provides an estimate of the reality.520  The reality is that this method of 
analysis would communicate the effect of what is said and demonstrated by others in 
particular the Privy Council in the areas of the judicial politics and the constitutionality 
of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean States. 
 
Secondary data analysis.  The second method of data source in this research approach 
is the secondary data analysis.  The major aspect of this method is presented in chapter 
four of this research. There are methodological reasons for the use of this method.  It 
improves on the research by expanding the scope of the data.  Thus, in this study it 
necessitates the use and analysis of data collected by other researchers and law 
enforcement authority on the death penalty in the region. The significance of this 
aspect of data collection is to assist in the operationalisation or informing on the nature 
of the death penalty.521 
 
This method is facilitated here based on a conceptual-subjective reason which 
demonstrates that the use of secondary data analysis can achieve greater depth and 
scope in dealing with contemporary issues.522  This data will definitely explain the 
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ideological changes taking place in the application of the death penalty in the region.  
Here specific reference has been made of literature on its constitutionality and the area 
of human rights issues, which will be employed in this research. 
 
Evaluation research.  This third approach applied in this research is sometimes 
referred to as program evaluation.  In general, it refers to a research purpose rather 
than to a specific research method and is a form of applied research.   It is a key facet 
in social science research and is used specifically to evaluate real world effect such as 
the impact of social phenomena on society.523 
 
Therefore, the use of the evaluation research in this exploration seems to be quite 
appropriate and relevant since the death penalty as the punishment for persons 
convicted of murder is a social phenomenon that impacts on the Commonwealth 
Caribbean society.  It is for this reason that the social indicator which is applied in this 
research to monitor the death penalty is judicial politics.  With the use of the social 
indicator, the data will demonstrate that it is plausible or credible, that the death 
penalty in the region is influenced by judicial politics.524 
 
In a nutshell the research method of content analysis is relevant and applicable to all 
the chapters of this research. It was looked at from the onset and featured mostly in 
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the background study in Chapter one and the literature review in Chapter two. The 
secondary data analysis on the other hand is mostly presented in Chapter four. 
Whereas the evaluation research analysis is also relevant and applicable to all the 
chapters of this research, it was captured mostly in Chapters five and six. These 
research methods were used to draw illustrative information based on pronouncements 
made by the Privy Council and also to capture data which are necessary in order to 
gain knowledge about the concept of judicial politics which engulfs the death penalty.   
 
3.2.4: Data Analysis and Reporting 
Data Analysis Procedures.  This research will employ both the case law analysis and 
the legal and textual analysis.  The nature of case law analysis entails an assessment 
of the data on the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean. This review is 
necessary in order to investigate the operative and functional aspects of law and its 
legal consequences on the death penalty. 
 
Whereas the nature of legal and textual analysis which is used is documentary analysis 
to assess the performances of the Privy Council as a legal institution towards 
constitutional appeals on the death penalty.  In light of the fact that each of the research 
methods has its own strengths and weaknesses, it was necessary to present the 
objective discussion with regards to each method.  It is also noteworthy to emphasise 
that in this research these methods were looked at with a view of analysing the data 
relevant to the death penalty. That analysis was also necessary to test and validate the 
research theory and thereby confirm the hypothesis. 
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In addition, the qualitative evaluation research method is presented to articulate and 
explain the events of cruelty and its impact on the death penalty.  In this presentation 
a comparison was made of the data collected with the relevant concept within the 
research theory statement and this is necessary to progressively justify the 
confirmation of the research hypothesis.  
 
The purpose of this evaluation is to arrange the data gathered in a manner necessary 
to identify the varying patterns of legal, institutional and attitudinal behaviour and the 
inter-relationships between them.  The arranged data is necessary to present the Privy 
Council concepts on the paradigm of cruelty which will definitely provide the criminal 
justice understanding of the death penalty in the region.  That is to say, to validate the 
research theory and confirm the specific research hypothesis.  
 
Principle.  It is worth noting that the scientific principle which will be adopted in this 
research to understand the reality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean would be the ‘objective principle.’ Such principle would be related to or 
based on external verifiable phenomena as opposed to individual’s perception, 
feelings or intention. It is approached from the standpoint of ethical neutrality and 
value-free perspective.525  
 
The basis for the use of this principle here would be the necessity to objectively assess 
the judicial behaviour of the Privy Council towards the death penalty.  That is to say 
                                                 




by applying the objective principle terms embracing the words - plausible, credible, 
validates reliable and confirm – would be relevant in the analysis and in general 
throughout the research. 
 
However, the initial assessment indicates that there was a positive reaction to the 
concepts of the research theory.  Further, a confirmation of the research hypothesis 
was achieved from the analysis on the data collected in the investigation.  The data 
would result in confirming that there is a correlation between judicial politics and the 
constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  Moreover, 
judicial politics in the Privy Council is a variable that is attributed to influence the 
constitutionality of the death penalty in the region. 
 
Reporting of Findings.  The reporting of the findings will be presented in Chapter 
Seven of this research. This is inclusive of the research results and the conclusions.  
Hagan advocated a stage-based approach for the reporting of findings.526  This is 
necessary in order to classify the relationships that inform on the opinions of the 
reality.  It entails ascribing values to the information gathered.  However, Patton said 
that reporting on the findings also involved figuring out possible categories, patterns, 
and themes.527 
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In this research it is proposed that both the data analysis and reporting of findings will 
be illustrated through the figuring out possible categories, patterns, and themes within 
the Privy Council decision making on the constitutionality of the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. This will be appropriate in order to validate the research 
theoretical concepts with the values of plausible or credible.  The categories or patterns 
of behaviour that would be reported on in the research results are the legal, institutional 
and attitudinal behavioural models of decision makings.  The presence of these 
categories or patterns of judicial behaviours would be both relevant and sufficient for 
the confirmation of the research hypothesis.528 
 
3.3: Conclusion  
In summary it is important to have an understanding of the work of Edwards and 
Livermore in order to pronounce on the purpose, goal and objective of the present 
research.  In essence they said that legal studies can play a productive role in 
strengthening legal institutions by providing insights on the judicial process and 
suggesting areas for reform.529 
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It is against this background that this research exploration is pursued. In order to give 
legitimacy to Edwards and Livermore suggestion530 this research will utilise the 
interpretative qualitative methodology. This is necessary to examine and understand 
the research phenomena of judicial politics in the Privy Council and the 
constitutionality of the death penalty in the region.   
 
By utilising this qualitative methodology, the researcher’s proposed goal is in effect 
to engage in a study that explores published literature and also constitutional cases on 
the death penalty which emanated from the Commonwealth Caribbean region and 
were decided by the Privy Council.  For practical purposes the exploration will 
commence with an evaluation of the De Freitas case531 and culminate with a similar 
process in the case Trimmingham v The Queen.532  This would be necessary to collect 
sufficient illustrative information on the approach of the Privy Council in death 
penalty cases. 
 
During the exploration the key contemporary element that will be thoroughly 
examined would be a documentary review to assess the nature of the subject matter 
itself. This entails the present state of knowledge on judicial politics in the Privy 
Council on the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  Thus, the analysis of 
                                                 
530 Harry T. Edwards and Michael A. Livermore, ‘Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt to 
Understand The Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking’ (2009) 58 Duke Law Journal 1895 – 
1989 at 1966 - 1967.  
 
531 De Freitas v Benny [1975] 27 WIR 318, PC. 
 
532 Trimmingham v The Queen [2009] UK PC 25. 
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the contemporary issues would be presented in Chapters four, five and six of this 
research. 
 
The methodology in this research demonstrates that the paradigm herein is an 
exploratory inquiry into the social phenomenon, the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. The primary objective is to present a criminal justice 
understanding of the subject matter.  The concerns in this chapter have been to set the 
stage for the research exploration. Thus, this chapter has outlined the research design 
on the death penalty paradigm in the region, stated the objectives or purposes for the 
exploration and defined the research methodology and research methods. 
 
The rationale for the choices in the methodology used in this research allows for a 
comprehensive study on the Commonwealth Caribbean perspective on the issues 
which are necessary to test the research hypothesis.  The choice of the methodology 
in this research also provides a body of knowledge that is independent of any personal 
experience and is rational, logical and permissible.533  
 
However, there are negative implications which would be experienced during the 
research exercise.  Although this research would most definitely contribute to the 
building process of a Caribbean legal and administrative criminology in terms of the 
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criminal justice system, it is extant only to the Commonwealth Caribbean region. This 





 THE DEATH PENALTY: A CASE LAW ANALYSIS FROM A POLICY 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
In this chapter, the objective is to pursue an analysis of the death penalty in the region 
from a policy perspective. This would entail having an understanding of the 
administration of the death penalty as the punishment for the crime of murder. To 
understand this issue it will necessitate an analysis of the nature of the death penalty 
in the Commonwealth Caribbean region.  This would be necessary to put in 
perspective an important consequence of the Privy Council rulings on the 
constitutionality of the death penalty and this would also increase our understanding 
of justice and punishment in the region.   
 
4.1: The Nature of the Death Penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
 
The nature of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean can be explained in 
the context of a statement made by Vollum, Mallicoat and Buffington-Vollum to the 
effect that it remains a political and emotional hot button and polarizing point of debate 
in the realm of criminal justice and politics.534 However, Lofquist on the other hand 
described the death penalty in simple term as a legal sanction imposed by the state 
upon conviction for a crime.535 
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535 William S. Lofquist, ‘Identifying the Condemned: Reconstructing and Analyzing the History of 
Executions in The Bahamas’ (2010) (16) The International Journal of Bahamian Studies 19 – 34 at 20 
indicated that (“At its most basic level, the death penalty operates as punishment, as a legal sanction 
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It is worth noting that the application of the death penalty in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean States remains the lawful punishment for persons convicted of murder.  In 
the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, it is stated in section 4 of the Offences Against 
the Person Act Chapter 11:08 that: “Every person convicted of murder shall suffer 
death.”536  This is the statutory provision prescribing the death penalty for persons 
convicted of murder but within the last two decades there have been serious issues 
with regards to its application. 
 
The first area of concern necessitates a reflection on the death penalty policies applied 
in States’ justice systems.  Of significance here is the fact that the existing law on the 
death penalty, primarily for the offence of murder is antiquated.   According to this 
statutory provision, once a person is found guilty of murder regardless of the nature 
and circumstance of the murder, his punishment is the mandatory death penalty.  This 
provision sees no categorisation of this offence to address such areas as crimes of 
passion and diminished responsibility.537  
 
The Abdulah Commission of Enquiry538 into prison conditions, in the Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago included a chapter on capital punishment.  In that chapter, the 
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Commission looked at the situation with respect to the death penalty in the Republic 
of Trinidad and Tobago and compared it with the situation in other countries and by a 
majority, concluded that murder should be categorised.  This was to facilitate the 
removal of some acts of killing reflecting acts such as crimes of passion, from the 
category that carries death as the punishment. However, what is worth noting is the 
opinion of the Commission’s minority members.  They believed that the death penalty 
should be abolished for a trial period of five years and that life imprisonment should 
be the punishment for murder during this period.539  
 
In a subsequent parallel report, the Prescott Commission of Enquiry report into the 
death penalty in Trinidad and Tobago, a number of recommendations were made to 
address the antiquated death penalty law in Trinidad and Tobago .540  A significant 
feature of the report was one of the Commission’s recommendations in paragraph 59 
and which required immediate action. It states that a prisoner, who was sentenced to 
death for more than ten years prior to the submission of the report, should have that 
death sentence commuted to life imprisonment.  Interestingly, this approach is similar 
to the approach taken by the Privy Council in the Pratt case.541   
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The obvious reason in this regard is the antiquated policy dealing with the death 
penalty.  One Commonwealth Caribbean country that made efforts to address the issue 
of antiquated laws dealing with the death penalty for persons guilty of murder is 
Jamaica.  In October 1992, that country enacted the Offences Against the Person 
(Amendment) Act (1992), whose provision has the effect of categorising murder into 
capital and non-capital murder.   
 
The effect of this categorisation means that capital murder carries the death penalty as 
punishment, whereas non-capital murder carries a term of imprisonment.  It must be 
noted that the latter category addresses the issues of crimes of passion and diminished 
responsibility in Jamaica.542 These are two issues which statutes in the Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago have not yet been able to deal with.   
 
Affiliated to the aspect of antiquated policy is the fact that it has been observed that in 
the wider Commonwealth Caribbean region, the policy of the administration of the 
death penalty demonstrates that it is a mandatory punishment for the crime of murder. 
In essence this means that once a person is found guilty of murder the punishment of 
death is obligatory.543  This illustrates the second issue appertaining to the nature of 
the death penalty.    
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The use of the death penalty as a form of punishment has been denounced as being 
cruel.  This is based on the obvious contradiction to the use of the death penalty as a 
punishment.  That contradiction is evident from the fact that on the one hand the 
criminal justice system in the wider Commonwealth Caribbean imposes the 
mandatory death penalty for the crime of murder.544   
 
On the other hand within the region there are constitutional provisions that seem to be 
at variance with the penal provisions of the criminal justice system which are 
prescribed for the death penalty.  It should be noted that the constitutional provisions 
guarantee the right to life.  This aspect clearly demonstrates an obvious anomaly and 
that conflict presents a serious problem in the application of the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean.545  
 
Against this background, it is manifestly clear that the mandatory imposition of the 
death penalty in the wider Commonwealth Caribbean is labelled as being 
unconstitutional even in terms of the provision of the penal justice system.546  This 
unconstitutionality has extended to the application of the death penalty.  Not only has 
the death penalty been looked at as being unconstitutional, but it is viewed as a 
violation of the individual human rights of the condemned person.547  
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In the Commonwealth Caribbean, opponents to the death penalty have often argued 
that it should be abolished and have advanced several reasons in this regard.  Key 
reasons advanced are that the death penalty is final and irreversible.  In the event of 
error, a human being’s life would have been taken unnecessarily. Moreover, it is also 
argued that it is unconstitutional since it is a cruel and an unusual form of 
punishment.548  
 
Accordingly, Falco and Freiburger claimed that the most punitive type of punishment 
is arguably the death penalty.549  The reality is that the death penalty is as old as society 
itself.  The application of the death penalty clearly stems from society’s desire to 
dispense with a form of relative justice which appears to be equal to the crime 
committed or a crime worthy of such a punishment.550  
 
It should be noted that in the Commonwealth Caribbean the death penalty is imposed 
for the crimes of murder, after a final judgment of guilt, and the accused will have 
legal assistance available to him at all stages of the proceedings.  Those persons under 
the sentence of death will have a right of appeal to a higher court - the Privy Council 
being the highest appeal court for some Commonwealth Caribbean States - before the 
death sentence is carried out.551   
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In essence, all these factors account for the delay in the carrying out of the death 
penalty and currently this issue of delay has made it more and more difficult for the 
death penalty to be carried out in the region.  This is so, in spite of the fact that the 
laws of Commonwealth Caribbean States prescribe the death penalty as the 
punishment for murder.552  
 
The most important issue on the death penalty, which has attracted attention in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean region, is whether prolonged delay renders a decision to 
carry out the death penalty unconstitutionally.  Advocates for the death penalty are of 
the opinion that delay in the carrying out of the death penalty is not unconstitutional.  
They believe that the death penalty is authorised by the laws of the region and it should 
be carried out.553 
 
Despite the serious issues alluded to, concerning the administration of the death 
penalty in the region, there seems to be overwhelming popular support for this 
punishment in the region.  This issue was considered in a survey conducted by the 
ANSA McAL Psychological Research Centre of The University of the West Indies, 
St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad (1994-1999).  In its report it indicated that: “on the 
issue of the death penalty for murder in Trinidad and Tobago, an overwhelming 
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proportion of the sample expressed their support for its retention in the wake of calls 
for its abolishment.”554 
   
The data supplied in this survey exhibited some startling revelations.  It showed that 
in 1994 there were ninety-six percent in popular support for the death penalty for the 
crime of murder.  This survey also produced data indicating support for the use of the 
death penalty as a punishment for other crimes such as rape and drug trafficking.  It 
indicated that in 1994 there was sixty percent popular support for the death penalty 
for the offences of rape and drug trafficking.555    
 
The analysis presented in this section together with the data extrapolated from a survey 
conducted by the ANSA McAL Psychological Research Centre of The University of 
the West Indies showed a consistency in the public support for the death penalty as 
the punishment for murder in the region.556  Moreover, Falco and Freiburger added 
that: “Strong public support for capital punishment is the number one reason why the 
death penalty continues to be used as a form of correctional policy in the U.S. criminal 
justice system.”557   
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Such is a corresponding factor in the Commonwealth Caribbean as alluded by Hood 
that there is strong public support for the death penalty.558 It is for this reason, an in-
depth approach has been followed in this exploration to gather data on the death 
penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean in order to gain a deeper understanding of 
the nature of its constitutionality.   
 
In the Commonwealth Caribbean, with the exception of Anguilla, British Virgin 
Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat and Turks and Caicos Islands, the criminal 
justice system imposes the death penalty as the punishment for the crime of murder.559 
Those specially named territories on May 10, 1991 abolished the death penalty for 
persons convicted of murder.  This was made possible through the Caribbean 
Territories (Abolition of Death Penalty for Murder) Order 1991.  Thus, by virtue of 
this statutory instrument it would now be illegal and unconstitutional for those British 
dependencies territories to impose the death penalty on persons convicted of murder.  
Thus, where a person is convicted of murder in those countries, such a person shall 
only be sentenced to imprisonment for life.560 
 
In other Commonwealth Caribbean countries such as Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts and Nevis and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines561 
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Jamaica562 and The Bahamas563 there is the discretionary death sentence.  In such a 
case, the death penalty can only be applied constitutionally for the worst cases of 
murder.564    
 
In the wider Commonwealth Caribbean region there is the mandatory death penalty 
for the crime of murder.  This is applicable to the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago565 
and Barbados.566 It is also important to note that as alluded to earlier, in Jamaica the 
death penalty is categorised and should be mandatory in cases of murder 1, or capital 
murder.567 However, that punishment is now deemed to be discretionary since the 
Privy Council decision in Watson v Attorney General of Jamaica.568  In that case the 
Privy Council held that the mandatory death penalty for murder as applied under 
Jamaican law was unconstitutional and invalid.569 
 
In Guyana, there is a limitation to the mandatory death penalty.  It is available only 
for persons convicted of murdering specific individuals such as law enforcement 
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officials, prison officers, and members of the judiciary. All other individuals who are 
convicted of murder in Guyana received the penalty of imprisonment.570 
 
It should be noted that the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean countries is 
carried out by hanging.  Even in the case where the death penalty is mandatory there 
are statutory exceptions to the use of this punishment.  For instance, the death penalty 
cannot be imposed on a guilty person who at the time of the commission of the crime 
of murder was under the age of eighteen years or insane or in the case of a woman 
who was pregnant. This was well articulated by Bailey who said that: “A judge had to 
pronounce this sentence upon a person convicted of murder, except in two special 
classes of cases: persons under eighteen years of age at the time of the offense and 
pregnant women.  He had no discretion to impose any less severe sentence.”571 In 
those instances, such a guilty person must be detained at the State’s pleasure.572  
 
In a cursory glance at the procedure in the Commonwealth Caribbean where the death 
penalty is the applicable punishment for a person who is indicted for murder, such a 
person will be tried at the High Court before a judge and a twelve-member jury.  The 
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jury must arrive at a unanimous verdict for the death penalty to be imposed.  In such 
a case the person is found guilty the judge is compelled to impose the death penalty.573  
 
The condemned person has a right to lodge an appeal with the local Court of Appeal.  
That person has within twenty-one days following the conviction to do so.  Should the 
appeal be dismissed, then that condemned person can apply for leave to appeal to the 
Privy Council. Usually an appeal to this institution is based on the issue involving a 
point of law of general public importance.574  
 
Where an appeal against conviction and sentence for murder is dismissed the 
condemned person may, pursuant to the Constitution, file a constitutional motion in 
the High Court.  This is in fact a civil procedure, which is heard in the first instance 
by the High Court and there is a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal and then to the 
Privy Council.  Such an action examines whether there is any violation of the rights 
and freedoms, which are enshrined in the Constitution within the Commonwealth 
Caribbean States. One area in which the condemned person often seeks a ruling from 
the court, is as to whether prison conditions amount to cruel and unusual treatment.575 
 
Worthy of mention here, is that the final possibility of mercy for a condemned person 
is for that person to receive a pardon.  In the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago this is 
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provided for by the Constitution.  The President who is the Head of State may pardon 
a person on the advice of a Minister designated by the Prime Minister.576 
 
The undermentioned table 4.1 illustrates the situation which deals with the application 
of the death penalty in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.  It articulates the number 
of persons on death row as at December 31, for the years 1997 to 2016.  
 
Table 4.1: Number of persons on death row and the application of the  
Death Penalty in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago from 1997 to 2016577 
 
December 31,  
Year 
Number of Persons on 
Death Row for year 
ending 
Number of Persons 
Executed for the Year 
1997 104 Nil 
1998 104 Nil 
1999 108 10  
2000 66 Nil 
2001 76 Nil 
2002 84 Nil 
2003 90 Nil 
2004 86 Nil 
2005 83 Nil 
2006 84 Nil 
2007 76 Nil 
2008 31 Nil 
2009 39 Nil 
2010 31 Nil 
2011 - Nil 
2012 - Nil 
2013 - Nil 
2014 - Nil 
2015 32 Nil 
2016 32 Nil 
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The lack of executions is also practical evidence of the delay in the application of the 
death penalty in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.  In fact, the last execution in 
the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago occurred on July 28, 1999 when Anthony Briggs 
was executed. Prior to that date in June 1999, nine other persons were executed in this 
country. This lack of execution is not unique to the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.  
It is a phenomenon in the penal justice system within other Commonwealth Caribbean 
States.578     
 
It is for a similar reason that in this research a review of the prevailing punishment of 
the death penalty is studied at the level of the Privy Council primarily in terms of 
judicial behaviour. The reality of carrying out the death penalty in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean is presented below in table 4.2.  This table provides data concerning the 
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Table 4.2: Summary of last executions in Commonwealth Caribbean States and 
names of persons executed579 
 
Commonwealth 
Caribbean  States 
Date of last 
execution 




February 21, 1991 Tyrone Nicholas Hanging 
Bahamas January 6, 2000 David Mitchell Hanging 
Barbados October 10, 1984 Noel Jordan, Melvin 
Iniss and Errol Farrell 
Hanging 
Belize June 1985 Kent Bowers Hanging 
Dominica August 8, 1986 Frederick Newton Hanging 
Grenada October 17, 1978 Charles Ferguson Hanging 
Guyana August 1997 Michael Archer and 
Peter Adams 
Hanging 
Jamaica February 18, 1988 Nathan Nathan Foster and  
Standford Dinnal 
Hanging 
St. Kitts and Nevis December 19, 2008 Charles Elroy Laplace Hanging 
St. Lucia October 17, 1995 Joseph Solomon Vitalis Hanging 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
February 13, 1995 DouglasHamlet Franklin Thomas 




July 28, 1999 Anthony Briggs Hanging 
 
 
When an evaluation is carried out on the data in table 4.2 there seems to be no traction 
in terms of the application of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean. In 
fact for the last twenty years only one person was executed in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean region. This last execution in the region was on December 19, 2008 in St. 
Kitts and Nevis when Charles Elroy Laplace was hanged and prior to this execution 
the Bahamas executed David Mitchell on January 6, 2000.  The net effect of this is 
presented in table 4.1 where in the region there are many persons on death row.  This 
                                                 
579 Anthony Harriott, The Jamaica Crime Problem: Some Policy Consideration, (Crime and Criminal 
Justice in the Caribbean Kingston Arawak Publications 2004) and Anthony Gifford ‘The Death Penalty: 





delay or lack of execution has been equated by the Privy Council to be excessive 
cruelty on the part of the State in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  
 
The failure of the Executive to adequately respond in terms of implementation of the 
punishment was alluded to by Mr. Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj the then Attorney 
General of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago who said: “However, at the onset, it 
seemed that justice is thwarted.  The main reasons for this were the excessive delays 
imposed on the court system that contravened the stipulated time frames set down by 
the Privy Council before condemned murderers could be hanged.”580  
 
As presented in table 4.1 above within the last two decades this region has seen a 
challenge with the death penalty rarely been implemented as the punishment for 
murder.  This challenge has been remarkably significant both in Jamaica and the 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. Table 4.3 below illustrates some comparative data 
on the death penalty for both countries.    
 
       Table 4.3: Comparative data on the persons on death row  







No. of Persons 
on Death Row 
in Jamaica 
 
No. of Persons on Death 




1997 49 104 
1998 47 104 
1999 44 108 
                                                 
   580 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Implementation of the Death Penalty in Trinidad and Tobago 
1995-2000 (Ministry of the Attorney General and Legal Affairs Trinidad 2000) ii.     
 
581 Anthony Harriott, ‘The Jamaica Crime Problem: Some Policy Consideration’ (Crime and Criminal 




In Jamaica the number of persons on death row in 1997, 1998 and 1999 were forty-
nine, forty-seven and forty-four for the respective years.  During that said period there 
were no executions in Jamaica.582 However, in 1997 and 1998 in Trinidad and Tobago 
there were one hundred and four persons on death row for each of those years.  While 
in 1999 there were one hundred and eight persons on death row in that country. In 
addition, in 1997 and 1998 there were no executions in the Republic of Trinidad and 
Tobago however, according to the data presented in table 4.1, in 1999 ten persons 
were executed in that country.583   
 
It must be noted that Jamaica and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago are not the 
only Commonwealth Caribbean countries that exhibit such a striking phenomenon, as 
there are similarities in other regional States.  The important point here is that, even 
though these regional States have the death penalty as law, that law is not 
implemented. For instance, in Saint Kitts and Nevis there were nineteen persons on 
death row in 1998 and only one person was executed in that year.  In that said year, 
The Bahamas had forty death row inmates and only two persons were executed.  Saint 
Lucia had forty persons on death row in 1998 and that country did not carry out any 
executions in that year.584  
                                                 
582 Anthony Harriott, ‘The Jamaica Crime Problem: Some Policy Consideration’ (Crime and Criminal 
Justice in the Caribbean Kingston Arawak Publications 2004).     
 
583 Ramesh Deosaran, Crime Statistic, Analysis and Policy: The Way Forward (Government printer Port 
of Spain (2001); and Roger Hood and Florence Seemungal, A Rare and Arbitrary Fate, Conviction for 
Murder, the Death Penalty and the Reality of Homicide in Trinidad and Tobago (European 
Commission and Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2006). 
 
 584 Saint Lucia Royal Police Force, Annual Report on the Organisation and Administration of Royal 




This data clearly indicates that with the limited execution in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean region, most death row inmates remain languishing in prison. Radelet and 
Borg have argued that the public debate towards the death penalty has changed. It was 
suggested by them that support for the death penalty today relies on the grounds of 
retribution.585  
 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the changing nature of the death penalty was part of 
a worldwide trend towards its abolition. That being the case then it is worthwhile 
having an understanding of this trend from the perspective of the Privy Council. This 
would be primarily from its role in terms of the concept of judicial politics. In this 
regard Radelet and Borg also subscribed to the notion that discourse on the death 
penalty is changing since there is an accelerating worldwide decline in the acceptance 
of capital punishment.586 
 
The reality is that such optimism is fuelled not by the conservative politician but by 
the liberal justices and their attitudinal behaviour.  Such a situation was explored in 
                                                 
585 Michael L.  Radelet and Marian J.   Borg, ‘The Changing Nature of Death Penalty Debates’ (2000) 
(26) University of North Carolina 43 – 61 at 44. 
 
586 Michael L.  Radelet and Marian J.   Borg, ‘The Changing Nature of Death Penalty Debates’ (2000) 
(26) University of North Carolina 43 – 61 at 57 indicated that the (“discourse on the death penalty is 
changing, there is an accelerating worldwide decline in the acceptance of capital punishment. Indeed, 
the trend toward the worldwide abolition of the death penalty is inexorable. ……. Nonetheless, taking 
a long-term historical view, the trend toward the abolition of the death penalty, which has now lasted 
for more than two centuries, will continue. Things could change quickly; the final thrust might come 
from conservative politicians who turn against the death penalty in the name of fiscal austerity, religious 
principles (e.g., a consistent “pro-life” stand), responsible crime-fighting, or genuine concern for a 
“smaller” government. Public support for the death penalty might also drop if there emerged absolute 
incontrovertible proof that an innocent prisoner had been executed. For those who oppose the death 




this research and it was demonstrated that the liberal justices of the Privy Council in 
their decisions have demonstrated a clear dissatisfaction against the use of the death 
penalty.587  
 
4.2: Conclusion  
The qualitative information on the nature of the death penalty in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean which was unearthed and analysed in this chapter demonstrated a lack of 
execution in the region.  This has primarily presented the constitutional issue of the 
delay in execution.  In this regard Steiker indicates that several jurisdictions have 
abandoned the death penalty following years of state legislative inactivity resulting in 
the declined of executions. This resulted in the size of the nation's death row swelling 
and many of them face no realistic prospect of execution.588 
 
The objective assessment that can be made from the data presented is that it is credible 
to conclude that there is an insurmountable delay in the application of the death 
penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean. The data presented in the next chapter will 
illustrate the reality of such delay and the Privy Council’s dissatisfaction of this delay 
in terms of cruelty of the death penalty. 
                                                 
587 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC 341.  
 
588 Jordan M. Steiker, ‘The American Death Penalty: Constitutional Regulation as the Distinctive 
Feature of American Exceptionalism’ (2013) 67 University Miami Law Review 329 – 355 at 329 
indicated that (“After a long period of stability, the American death penalty looks newly fragile. Several 
jurisdictions have recently abandoned the death penalty following years of state legislative inactivity. 
Death sentencing has declined, as have executions. Although the size of the nation's death row has 
swelled, many of the condemned face no realistic prospect of execution. Popular support for the death 
penalty appears more tenuous. Many of our "peer" countries have abandoned the death penalty. Perhaps 
most importantly, after years of indifference, the U.S. Supreme Court has revealed a new willingness 





JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE PRIVY COUNCIL AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 
 
5.1: Explaining the Patterns of Judicial Politics in the Privy Council on the 
Constitutionality of the Death Penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
 
Descriptive statistics: Although there is a considerable body of knowledge and 
jurisprudence relating to judicial politics and the death penalty in Europe, Asia and 
the United States of America, this is not the case in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
region.  There is a paucity of comparable research on the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, examining judicial politics and constitutional issues.  It is 
with this in mind that this research explored the present state of knowledge on judicial 
politics in the Privy Council in order to present its impact on the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean states.  
 
Moreover, this has afforded the Commonwealth Caribbean region the opportunity to 
add to that already growing body of knowledge on judicial politics. It therefore means 
that this research will find a significant place in the scholarly researches on judicial 
politics and the death penalty for this region.  In particular it provides data on the 
subject area to define the gap between the pronouncement of the death penalty and the 
implementation of this punishment.  
 
Thus, this is achieved through a contextual study of the approach of the jurisdiction of 
the Privy Council.  This approach will be necessary since this institution is the final 
judicial arbiter for some States in the region.  In addition, its jurisprudential approach 
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on the death penalty in the region is very attractive. Thus, in this regard the issue that 
has been considered and resolved entails whether in light of both the majority and 
minority decisions of the Privy Council in the Riley case and the subsequent ruling in 
the Pratt case, which adopted and embraced the minority or dissenting decision in the 
Riley case, the constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
is influenced by and correlated to judicial politics. 
 
Data on the constitutionality of the death penalty in terms of judicial behaviour in the 
Privy Council will be presented and evaluated to respond to the issue raised in the 
research question.  This would be portrayed in terms of the rule of law and judicial 
politics. The representations served to put in context the qualitative information 
unearthed in this research exploration. The attempt here is to evaluate the illustrative 
information in order to present the patterns of the judicial attitude towards the 
constitutionality of the death penalty.  In addition, the presentation of this judicial 
attitude is also necessary to demonstrate the correlation which is embedded between 
the variables – judicial politics and the constitutionality of the death penalty.  
 
In this regard, Edwards and Livermore said that legal studies can supplement 
traditional legal scholarship to help inform litigants, policymakers and society as a 
whole about how the legal system works.589 Naturally, this idea is the essence of this 
research analysis which will see the presentation of an understanding of the legal 
                                                 
589 Harry T. Edwards and Michael A. Livermore, ‘Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt To 
Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking’ (2009) 58 (8) Duke Law Journal 1895 – 




doctrine of judicial politics in the Privy Council through the issue of the 
constitutionality of the death penalty. 
 
In Scherer writing on, testing the court decision making under the microscope, he 
indicated that even though law and precedents are still relevant to Supreme Court 
decision-making, what is most critical in this regard, is that the attitudinal model 
remains the holy grail of decision-making models.590 This theoretical perspective 
embraces the three behavioural models which are depicted in this research. Thus, the 
statement is suggesting that law or the legal model, precedents or the institutional 
model together with the policy preference or attitudinal model present an 
understanding and an explanation of the decision-making procedure of the Privy 
Council on issues revolving around the death penalty in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean. It is for this reason that this chapter of the research sets out to confirm this 
proposition.  
 
It is in this regard that there is a presentation of the data and illustrative information 
unearthed in the present research. Smith commented that judges are political actors 
who choose to make law rather than merely interpret it and their decision will 
inevitably be informed by the judges’ own ideology or preference.591 This clearly 
                                                 
590 Nancy Scherer, ‘Testing the Court: Decision Making Under the Microscope,’ (2015) (50) Tulsa 
Law Review 659 – 668 at 661. 
 
591 Mark Smith, Disrobed: The New Battle Plan to Break the Left’s Stranglehold on the Courts (Three 
Rivers Press New York USA 2006) 48 emphasised that there is (“No doubt about it, judges are political 
actors. They regularly deal with complex, politically charged cases, and sometimes they are required 
(choose) to make law rather than merely “interpret” it. In any given case, judges must somehow make 
sense of all the conflicting claims in order to reach a decision; that decision will inevitably be informed 
by the judges’ own ideology, priorities, and, yes, biases.”).   
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articulates a court’s decision of judicial politics and therefore, the discussion in this 
section will address the extent of the judicial politics by the Privy Council.   
 
The data on this extent of judicial politics at the level of the Privy Council is defined 
in terms of the cruelty of the death penalty and a tabular description is presented in 
table 5.1 below. The importance of this table is that it contains data collected, collated 
and assembled on the Privy Council Commonwealth Caribbean constitutional appeal 
matters on the death penalty from 1975 to 2009 and such data would be discussed 
throughout this chapter. 
 
However, in order that this table satisfactorily accommodates the data for analysis, the 
said table was designed with six columns. Each column was giving a separate heading 
and was reflective of the nature of the data extrapolated from the twenty-two (22) 
judicial decisions of the Privy Council in this study.  
 
 Column one reflects the numbering from 1 – 6 and is based on the amount of cruelty 
illustrated. There were six types of cruelty identified and they were illustrated in 
column two under the rubric category of cruelty. The first category of cruelty 
assembled dealt with was delay of execution. The second category of cruelty addresses 
swiftness of execution. The third category of cruelty is reflective of the mandatory or 
discretionary death sentence.  The fourth category presents the cruelty of prison 
conditions, while the fifth category presented dealt with the cruelty of ministerial 
advice prior to execution. Finally, the sixth category surrounds the cruelty of opinions 
of international human rights bodies.  
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There are the twenty-two (22) judicial decisions of the Privy Council which were 
studied in order to extrapolate the nature of the judicial behaviour. Those decisions 
were in each instance, collated and presented in column three of the said table under 
the rubric judicial process. These matters emanated from the Eastern Caribbean States, 
Belize, Jamaica, St. Vincent, The Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago. They include 
but are not limited to the Pratt’s case, Hughes case, the Fox case, the Watson case, the 
Roodal case, the Matthew case and the Trimmingham case.  It should be noted that 
some of the matters illustrated under judicial process are identified with more than one 
type of category of cruelty.  For instance, the Pratt decision is reflected in category 
one, three and six whereas the Lewis decision can be located in category four, five and 
six.  
 
The pattern of judicial ideology is presented in column four. This column presents the 
justification for the pattern of judicial behaviour in the Privy Council decision making 
extrapolated from each case. Such pattern embraces one of three types. The first is the 
original intent or binding precedent and this is in effect the predictor of judicial 
behaviour. The second is a demonstration of the propensity to be conservative by 
following precedent and the third pattern type is the demonstration of the propensity 
to be liberal by deviating from the precedent. Moreover, each category of cruelty 
assembled has been analysed and the picture of judicial politics in terms of the legal 
model, the institutional model and the attitudinal model which are portrayed in the 
decision are presented under the rubric of model of decision and are illustrated in 
column five. Finally, column six illustrates the overall impact of the individual 
category of cruelty on the Commonwealth Caribbean society. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive data of the categories of cruelty on the constitutionality of 
the death penalty and the patterns of judicial behaviour from 1975 to 2009 
 
No. Category of  
cruelty 
 
Judicial process  
 
Pattern of Judicial  
Ideology in the  
Decision making  
Model of  
Judicial 
decision 
Overall  Impact  
of this Category 
of cruelty 

























Reckley    (1995) 






Binding precedent - 
Predictor of judicial 
Behaviour. 
 
Propensity to be 
conservative by 
following Precedent  
 
Propensity to be 
conservative by 
following Precedent  
 
Propensity to be liberal 
by deviating from 
Precedent  
 
Propensity to be liberal 




Propensity to be liberal 
by deviating from 
Precedent  
 
Propensity to be 
conservative by 
following Precedent  
 
Propensity to be liberal 


































1. Domestic impact 
 
Following the  
Pratt’s case Jamaica  
commuted 105 death  
sentences. 
 
Trinidad and Tobago  
commuted 52 death  
sentences.  
  
2. Public Policy 
impact 
 
Delay in excess of 
five years is 
considered inhuman 
or degrading  
treatment. 
 
3. The court  
Judicially directing  
the death penalty  
policy. 










Boodram case  
(No. 2) (1999)   
Propensity to be liberal 
by deviating from 
Precedent  
 
Propensity to be liberal 
by deviating from 
Precedent  
 
Propensity to be liberal 













1. The Privy Council 
established the 
reasonable notice of 
execution rule that is 
four days’ notice prior 
to execution.  
 
2. Overall impact,  
swiftness of execution  







Hughes case  
(2002)  
 
Fox case, (2002) 
 
Reyes case,  
(2002)  
 
Watson case  
(2004)  
 
Roodal case  
(2004)  
 
Mathew case,  
(2005)  
 
Bowe case (2006)  
 
Trimmingham  
case  (2009) 
Propensity to be liberal  
 
 
Propensity to be liberal  
 
Propensity to be liberal  
 
 
Deviated from precedent 
 
 
Deviated from precedent 
  
 
Deviated from precedent 
  
 
Deviated from precedent 
 
























1. The death penalty 
should only be 
available where there 
is no possibility of 
reform and social 
reintegration of the 
offender. 
 
2. The imposition  
of the death penalty  
requires special  
justification. 
 
3.The death penalty  
should be reserved  
for the worst of the  
worst cases. 
 
4. Overall impact,  
the Privy Council  
acknowledged the  
inhumanity of the  
mandatory death  
penalty. 
4. Prison conditions Pratt case (1993) 
 
Thomas case  
(1998)  
 
Lewis case (2001) 













Overall impact, the  
Privy Council in the  
Lewis case held that 
prison conditions  
amount to inhuman  
and degrading  
treatment. 
5. Ministerial advice  
prior to execution 
De Freitas case  
(1975) 
 
Reckley case  
[No. 2] (1996)  
 

















Overall impact, the  
merits of the petition  
are not for the court to  
review but where  
there is the failure of  
the observance of the  
rules of natural justice  
or fair play in action  
same would be cruel. 
6. Opinions of  
international human  
rights bodies 
Pratt case (1993)  
 
Fisher case  
(2000)  
 
Higgs case (2000)  
 





Deviated from precedent 
 
 
Deviated from precedent 
 










Overall impact, there is  
recognition for  
international bodies  
where the Privy  
Council in the Pratt’s  
case urged that the  
decision of  
international tribunals  









5.2: A Legal Case Analysis of the Privy Council Paradigm of Cruelty on the Death 
Penalty 
 
Paradigm of cruelty. The basis of judicial politics in this exploration surrounds the 
interpretation of the term cruelty in the Constitution. This has been a significant 
judicial attribute in the constitutionality of the death penalty in the region. It was 
noticeable from the illustrative evidence presented in the literature review in Chapter 
Two. It is also obvious from the secondary data and case law analysis of the illustrative 
information presented from the study of the death penalty in Chapter Four.   
 
Accordingly, from a perusal of the data in table 5.1, it was noticed that there are six 
categories of cruelty illustrated in column two of the said table. Further, through the 
concept of judicial politics the Privy Council developed the issue of cruelty through 
its failure to observe precedents and by its attitudinal approach thereby deciding 
matters according to judicial preferences or ideologies. The reality is that such 
approaches created the six categories of cruelty which are in reality exemptions for 
the application of the death penalty. When viewed from the context of the approach 
of the Privy Council these exemptions are in effect the judicial condemnations of the 
death penalty.  From this research context these condemnations validate and also 
confirm the researcher’s analytic model of judicial politics in the decisions on the 
constitutionality of the death penalty in the region (see table 5.1 above).  
 
However, in contrast it should be noted that Berger in his writing on the death penalty 
indicated that capital punishment was not understood to be cruel and unusual in a 
constitutional sense per se. This conclusion is based on the fact that the death penalty 
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was not considered to be cruel and unusual at the time of the Constitution, it follows, 
for Berger, that the death penalty is not so now.592   
 
It is worth noting that the terms cruel, unusual treatment, torture, inhuman or 
degrading punishment are common terms within the constitution in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean.  Accordingly, section 5(2) (b) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago states that Parliament may not impose or authorise 
the imposition of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.593 
 
It should be noted that the term cruelty has been a notable feature in the written 
Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago as illustrated in the section 
above. Of significance here is that it seems that this country’s Constitution is modelled 
after the Canadian Bill of Rights 1960.  The similarity of both is prominent, based on 
a reflection of section 2 (b) of the said Canadian Bill of Rights which proclaimed: “no 
law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to impose or authorize the 
imposition of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.”594 
 
The term inhuman is present in the Constitution of Jamaica and that of the Eastern 
Caribbean countries. Accordingly section 17 of the Constitution of Jamaica provides 
                                                 
592 Raoul Berger, ‘Death Penalties, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1982) 43-
49. 
 
593 Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, s. 5(2) (b) (“Without prejudice to subsection  
(1), but subject to this Chapter and to section 54, Parliament may not- (b) impose or authorise the 
imposition of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.”).         
 




that: “No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment 
or other treatment”595 whereas section 7 of the Constitution of St. Kitts and Nevis 
provides that: “A person shall not be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
punishment or other like treatment.”596 It seems that those Constitutions are modelled 
after the European Convention on Human Rights 1950.  Article 3 of the said 
Convention illustrates the similarity by proclaiming: “No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”597 
 
Bessler in a research on unusual punishment indicated that the prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment can he broken down into three concepts namely: cruelty, 
unusualness, and punishment.598  However, in a contrasting view by Garner, in the 
following terms ‘unusual treatment, torture, inhuman or degrading punishment; 
inhuman,’ seems to be synonymous with the term “cruel.”599 Waldron on the other 
hand suggested that these terms indicate a range of attitudes towards others.600 The 
reality is that such descriptions of punishment mean that they do not comport with 
                                                 
595 Section 17 of the Constitution of Jamaica. 
 
596 Section 7 of the Constitution of St. Kitts and Nevis. 
 
597 Article 3 European Convention on Human Rights 1950. 
 
598 John D. Bessler, ‘The Concept of Unusual Punishment in Anglo-American: The Death Penalty as  
Arbitrary, Discriminatory, and Cruel and Unusual’ (2018) 13 (4/2) Northwestern Journal of Law and  
Social Policy 307 – 416 at 411. 
 
599 Bryan A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th edn. Thomson-West   Publishing Co. Saint Paul, 
Minnesota USA 2004) 799. 
 
600 Jeremy Waldron, Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment: The Words Themselves (New York  




human dignity and decency.601 In this regard Donnelly indicated that human dignity is 
an essential and unique feature which distinguishes human beings from other 
creatures. Moreover, the right of human dignity, as well as, decency are inherent in all 
human beings.602   
 
It is for this reason that this research embraces all the terms by focusing on an 
assessment of the term cruelty. Interestingly Stinneford indicated that the word cruel 
in the cruel and unusual punishments clause means unjustly harsh.603  Thus the 
significance of the word cruel in this section of the Constitution would suggest at first 
glance that any punishment that is cruel would be deemed unconstitutional.   
 
In reality it seems that the Privy Council’s interpretation of the word “cruelty” in 
constitutional matters have a similar indication and therefore it is being used to restrict 
the implementation of the death penalty in the region.  This is on the basis that the 
death penalty is recognised as a violation of human rights both domestically as 
illustrated within the Commonwealth Caribbean Constitution604 and internationally as 
illustrated in the International Bill of Human Rights.605 It should be noted that 
                                                 
601 Jeremy Waldron, Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment: The Words Themselves (New York  
University Public Law and Legal Theory Working paper 98, 2008) 1 - 47. 
 
602 Jack Donnelly, Protecting Dignity: Agenda for Human Rights (Geneva Academy of International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 2009) 1 – 92 at 1 – 84. 
 
603 John F. Stinneford, ‘The Original Meaning of Cruel’ (2017) 105 (44) The Georgetown Law Journal 
441 – 506 at 441.    
 
604 Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, s. 5(2) (b) and Section 17 of the Constitution 
of Jamaica and Section 7 of the Constitution of St. Kitts and Nevis. 
 
605 Patrick Hudson, ‘Does the Death Row Phenomenon Violate a Prisoner’s Human Rights under 
International Law’ (2000) 11(4) European Journal of International Law 833 - 856. 
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internationally, Article 2 of the ‘United Nation Convention Against Torture’ prohibits 
torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.606   
 
However, Berkman in her writing on the subject indicated that the term cruel and 
unusual punishments does not have any "natural and proper" meaning but it is a label 
for amoral concept which we call "cruelty.607  In this regard there have been several 
judicial pronouncements on the issue of cruelty as it relates to the constitutionality of 
the death penalty.  Thus, the discussion on this issue seeks to demonstrate the notion 
that the Privy Council expressed the concept of cruelty in varying forms.  Moreover, 
the doctrinal-politics approach is the form applied by the Privy Council to illustrate 
the concept of cruelty (see table 5.1 above).  
 
It seems that in defining cruelty the Privy Council applies values which are indeed 
external factors that are fundamental to the society. Manheim suggested that courts 
apply the normative approach in defining cruel and inhumane punishment.608 In this 
                                                 
 
606 United Nation Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment (United Nation December 10, 1984, 145 UN.T.S. 85 [entered into force June 26, 1987].   
 
607 Miriam Berkman, ‘Perspectives on the Death Penalty: Judicial Behavior and the Eighth 
Amendment,’ (1982) Yale Law & Policy Review 41 – 79 at 41 indicated that (“The phrase "cruel and 
unusual punishments" does not, on its face, describe any discrete set of readily ascertainable penalties. 
It does not have any "natural and proper" meaning. Rather, it is a label for amoral concept we call 
"cruelty." Giving concrete meaning to the cruel and unusual punishments clause is a process of 
clarifying the values as-associated with the constitutional concept of cruelty and applying them to 
particular cases.”).             
 
608 Karl M.  Manheim, ‘The Capital Punishment Case: A Criticism of Judicial Method’ (1978) 12 




regard he said that the meaning of the term ‘cruel and unusual’ was tied to the maturing 
ethical values of society.609  
 
It was also discovered in this research that the Privy Council has applied the normative 
approach in defining cruelty in the constitutionality of the death penalty in terms of 
six variables, (see table 5.1).  In so doing the Privy Council has categorised and valued 
cruelty in terms of delay of execution, swiftness of execution, mandatory/discretionary 
death sentence, prison conditions, ministerial advice prior to execution and opinions 
of international human rights bodies on the petition of reprieve. These are factors 
which are external to the Constitution and the death penalty law but are fundamental 
and ethical to a maturing society since they affect human dignity and decency.610  
 
As Manheim indicates that for establishing standards for cruel and unusual 
punishment the Justices used external factors and objective evidence of the evolving 
standards of decency upon which to base constitutional principles.611 In the United 
States of America the paradigm of cruelty portrays a different connotation. According 
                                                 
609 Karl M.  Manheim, ‘The Capital Punishment Case: A Criticism of Judicial Method’ (1978) 12  
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 85 – 134 at 90. 
 
610 Ibid.  
 
611 Karl M.  Manheim, ‘The Capital Punishment Case: A Criticism of Judicial Method’ (1978) 12 
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 85 – 134 at 92 indicates (“chose to seek external and objective 
evidence of the evolving standards of decency upon which to base constitutional principles. …. By 
using such external factors, these Justices rejected a reliance on personal moral feelings in establishing 




to Bedau’s description of cruelty, it is the wilful infliction of physical pain on a weaker 
being in order to cause anguish and fear.612 
 
 In another description of cruelty which was presented by Tennen who said that in 
order for it to be recognised as cruel and unusual, the Court has held that a punishment 
must either be barbaric or disproportional.613 Even though the Court have at times 
indicated that the application of the death penalty to some individual in the United 
States of America is unconstitutional, it has generally not found this punishment to be 
cruel and unusual since it is not barbaric or disproportional.614 
 
In similar vein Berger was critical of notion that the death penalty was cruel and 
unusual and a violation of the Constitution.615 In a book review presented by 
Edmundson, he illustrated the two reasons why the death penalty is not 
unconstitutional. He said that in the first instance the death penalty cannot be cruel 
and unusual in a constitutional sense  and in the second instance any review by the 
Supreme Court of the states’ sentencing procedures is an unconstitutional usurpation 
of legislative power. 616   
                                                 
612 Hugo Adam Bedau Why the Death Penalty Is a Cruel and Unusual Punishment, The Death Penalty 
in America (Oxford University Press 1997) 232 – 237 at 232. 
 
613 Eric Tennen, ‘The Supreme Court’s Influence on the Death Penalty in America:  A Hollow Hope?’ 




615 Raoul Berger, Death Penalty (Harvard University Press Cambridge Mass 1982) 242. 
 
616 William A. Edmundson, ‘Death Penalty’ (1984) 621 Duke Law Journal 624 – 639 at 625 said: 
(“First, capital punishment cannot be cruel and unusual in a constitutional sense, and second, 
proportionality review of state sentences and sentencing procedures by the Supreme Court is an 
unconstitutional usurpation of legislative power by the federal judiciary.”).    
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It is important in this regard to note that Berger has made the claim that given that the 
death penalty was not considered cruel and usual at the time of the United States 
Constitution in 1791617 it cannot now be so considered.618  However, by evaluating 
the paradigm of the Privy Council on each of the forms of judicial expression of 
cruelty of the death penalty it seems clear that even though the death penalty was not 
cruel and unusual at the time of the Constitution in the Commonwealth Caribbean, it 
is now deemed to be so.  
 
 In this regard Justice Brennan in the case Furman v Georgia said that a punishment 
is cruel and unusual if it does not comport with human dignity.619 As a corollary to 
this, Mendes indicates that the death penalty survived the enactment of written 
constitutions on independence, either because the constitutions themselves do not 
prohibit the taking of life as long as it is done in accordance with the due process of 
law, or because the death penalty is expressly saved from constitutional challenge.620    
 
                                                 
 
617 Raoul Berger, Death Penalty (Harvard University Press Cambridge Mass 1982) 242. 
 
618 William A. Edmundson, ‘Death Penalty’ (1984) 621 Duke Law Journal 624 – 639 at 625 - 626. 
 
619 Furman v Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), at pp. 271-3 Justice Brennan said: (“A punishment is cruel 
and unusual …. if it does not comport with human dignity. The primary principle is that a punishment 
must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings. . The true significance of these 
punishments ….. is that they treat members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed 
with and discarded. They are thus inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the Clause that even 
the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity.”).              
 
620 Douglas L. Mendes, The Slow Demise of the Death Penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean Center 




The point to note is that for the Privy Council the concept of cruelty of the death 
penalty explains the evolving standard of decency which preceded the Commonwealth 
Caribbean states’ Constitutions. In particular it engulfed the application of the death 
penalty and encompasses the nature of judicial politics621 whereas in the United States 
of America the death penalty was descried in similar terms in the case People v. 
Anderson. In that case it was held that the cruelty of the death penalty also revolved 
around the dehumanizing effects of the lengthy imprisonment prior to execution.622  
In a recent study Radelet indicated that in the past two decades the United States has 
moved away from several methods of execution over the past two decades because 
these methods offend evolving standards of decency.623 
 
In 2001 the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal in the Hughes case and the Fox case, 
along with Reyes case in Belize ruled that the automatic imposition of the death 
penalty without any judicial discretion amounts to cruel and inhuman punishment.  
Such ruling was appealed before the Privy Council and there it was unanimously held 
that the imposition of the mandatory death sentence, regardless of the circumstances 
                                                 
621 Douglas L. Mendes, The Slow Demise of the Death Penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean (Center  
for International Relations 2015) 49. 
 
622 People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal. 1972) it was held that (“The cruelty of capital 
punishment lies not only in the execution itself and the pain incident thereto, but also in the 
dehumanizing effects of the lengthy imprisonment prior to execution during which the judicial and 
administrative procedures essential to due process of law are carried out. Penologists and medical 
experts agree that the process of carrying out a verdict of death is often so degrading and brutalizing to 
the human spirit as to constitute psychological torture.”).        
 
623 Michael L. Radelet, ‘The Incremental Retributive Impact of a Death Sentence Over Life Without 
Parole’ (2016) University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 795 – 815 at 805 indicated that (“while  
the death penalty has been increasingly justified on retributive grounds, in the past two decades the 
United States has moved away from several methods of execution (e.g., electrocution, hanging, 
shooting) over the past two decades because these methods offend evolving standards of decency.”). 
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was arbitrary and unconstitutional.  That decision was delivered in March 2002 and 
the Committee sent the matters of the prisoners concerned back to the local courts in 
their own countries for re-sentencing.  In effect the decisions in those cases have 
outlawed the mandatory death penalty in the Eastern Caribbean countries and the 
country of Belize on the basis of cruelty.624 
 
In delivering the judgement in those cases, the Privy Council held that in a crime of 
this kind, there may well be matters relating both to the offence and the offender which 
ought to be considered before sentence is passed.625 The implication of this judgement 
is that the mandatory death penalty for the Eastern Caribbean countries and the country 
of Belize has been struck down as being unconstitutional.  This means that the death 
penalty in Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis 
and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines cannot be imposed, unless a judge looks at the 
circumstance of the case to determine whether it should be imposed.626 
 
It also means that all other inmates on death row in those countries prior to this 
judgement, will now have their sentences reviewed.  Further, the death penalty is now 
                                                 
624 Hughes v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 284, PC; Fox v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 259, PC and Reyes v The 
Queen [2002] 2 AC 235, PC. 
 
625 Hughes v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 284, PC; Fox v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 259, PC and Reyes v The 
Queen [2002] 2 AC 235, PC it was held that (“In a crime of this kind, there may well be matters relating 
both to the offence and the offender which ought to be considered before sentence is passed.  To deny 
the offender the opportunity, before sentence is passed, to seek to persuade the court that in all the 
circumstances to condemn him to death would be disproportionate and inappropriate is to treat him as 
no human being should be treated and thus to deny him his basic humanity.”).       
 




no longer mandatory in the Eastern Caribbean countries and the country of Belize but 
it is now discretionary.  Thus, it is unconstitutional for the death penalty to be imposed 
in any manner that is not in keeping with the Hughes, Fox and Reyes judgments.627  
 
Subsequent to the decision in those cases, the Privy Council in a majority judgement 
purported to abolish the mandatory nature of the death sentence for convicted 
murderers in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.  In so doing, it declared in the 
Roodal case that such impositions make the death penalty cruel and 
unconstitutional.628   
 
The brief facts in that case are that on July 15, 1999 Roodal was sentenced to death 
for the murder of Philbert Charles.  Roodal shot and killed Charles on August 19, 
1995, after Charles and other men tried to rob him of his marijuana.  He had challenged 
the decision of the local Court of Appeal, which confirmed the mandatory death 
sentence on him.  This matter was decided by five Law Lords in the Privy Council. It 
was held by a majority of three to two that the mandatory death sentence was cruel 
and unconstitutional as it was in contravention to Article 4.2 of the Inter-American 
Convention on Human Rights. 
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The decision in this case would suggest an adoption of the international and 
comparative law into the Trinidad and Tobago domestic legal system. In this regard 
Antoine in writing on the Commonwealth Caribbean Law and Legal Systems indicated 
that the courts in this region are more and more adopting, unilaterally, of treaty 
obligations and values, without benefit of the legislative process.629 
 
 
 Moreover, in similar vein Schabas in writing on the International Legal aspects said 
that the use of the death penalty sits squarely within those issues which are 
fundamentally matters of domestic criminal policy and in which international human 
rights law has been increasingly assertive.630  Of particular significance here is the fact 
that in Roodal case,631 the Privy Council has judicially contrived the international 
instrument - Article 4.2 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights which 
provides that the death sentence may only be imposed for the most serious crimes - 
into the domestic law. 
 
                                                 
629 Rose-Marie B. Antoine, ‘Waiting to Exhale: Commonwealth Caribbean Law and Legal Systems’ 
(2005) 29 (2) Nova Law Review 140 – 169 at 154 said: (“Increasingly, Commonwealth Caribbean 
courts, whether local courts or the Privy Council sitting as a Caribbean court, are being influenced by 
normative standards laid down by notions of international consensus of what are human rights and 
democratic ideals. Commonwealth Caribbean legal systems conform to the common law approach to 
international law that international law does not supersede domestic law unless incorporated. However, 
the courts are more and more adopting, unilaterally, of treaty obligations and values, without benefit of 
the legislative process.”).        
 
630 William A. Schabas, International Legal Aspects (Capital Punishment Global Issues and Prospects, 
Waterside Press 1996) 17. 
 




The basis for this decision in Roodal case632 revolved around the fact that Trinidad 
and Tobago on May 28, 1991 ratified the 1969 American Convention on Human 
Rights. On May 26, 1998 it went ahead and denounced the said convention which took 
effect on May 25, 1999. However, given the fact that the murder for which Roodal 
was charged with occurred on August 19, 1995 then it was accepted that the 
Convention was enforced at that time for the purpose of this decision. It was for this 
reason that the Privy Council applied section 68 of the Interpretation Act in 
interpreting the said Article in ruling that the death penalty in Trinidad and Tobago is 
discretionary and denounced the mandatory death penalty as being cruel and therefore 
unconstitutional.633 
 
The importance of this decision is that it exposes the conflict with the application of 
the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean and deemed it as being 
unconstitutional.  This is based solely on the fact that there is no categorisation of the 
crime of murder in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.  In essence the ruling 
indicates that regard ought to be had for the offender’s personal or extenuating 
circumstance for committing the offence.634  
 
In effect the Privy Council’s judgement in Roodal’s case has made a bold attempt to 
bring the death penalty law of the wider Caribbean in line with the Eastern Caribbean 
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countries and also that of the country of Belize as the judgement in the Hughes case, 
the Fox case, and the Reyes case, depicts.635  It also brought the system of justice in 
this region in tandem with the international standards of punishment.636 Thus the 
Commonwealth Caribbean countries which would have been affected by the Roodal 
decision include the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Jamaica. The 
obvious impact of that decision would have been the restricting of the death penalty 
in the region.637 
 
However, the implication of this judgement suggests that the general imposition of the 
death penalty in the wider Commonwealth Caribbean region is unconstitutional, as it 
is cruel and is contrary to the individual’s basic human rights.  Interestingly, doubts 
were expressed as to the correctness of the decision in this case.  In fact it was touted 
that the decision in the Roodal case was based on the judicial preference of justices of 
the Privy Council in deciding the case according to the efficiency of the death penalty 
and not on the application of the rule of law.638   
 
This apparent judicial abolition of the death penalty in the Republic of Trinidad and 
Tobago clearly works against the theoretical perspective of this research and that of 
Beccaria’s theory of society which illustrates that the complete criminal law code 
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636 Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1976. 
 






should be written and all offences and punishment should be defined in advance.639  
In other words the punishments were to be decided by the legislature and not by the 
court.640  It seems that in the Roodal case the punishment was decided by the court 
and for this reason that decision has clearly validated the researcher’s analytic model 
of judicial politics.641  Moreover, for such reason the decision in Roodal case was 
challenged subsequently in another constitutional appeal in the Privy Council.642 
 
This subsequent challenge was promoted in the Matthew constitutional appeal. 643 This 
appeal saw an unusual number of nine Law Lords sitting at one time to decide the 
appeal.  The main issue to be decided was the constitutionality of the mandatory death 
penalty in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.  At the appeal, Barbados joined as an 
interested party and was allowed to make submission before the Privy Council.644 This 
was because of the similarity in the nature of both countries Constitutions in terms of 
the general saving clause.645   
 
                                                 




641 Roodal v The State of Trinidad and Tobago [2004] 2 WLR 652, PC. 
 
642 Matthew v The State of Trinidad and Tobago [2005] 1 AC 433, PC. 
 




645 Margaret A. Burham, ‘Saving Constitutional Rights from Judicial Scrutiny: The Savings Clause in  





The Privy Council through its attitudinal approach deviated from the institutional 
model of following precedent and overruled its previous decision in the Roodal 
case.646  The consequence of that ruling is that the death penalty for persons convicted 
of murder in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago will henceforth continue to be 
mandatory.  The implication of this decision demonstrates that the Privy Council is 
not infallible and was prepared to correct its own mistakes. It also revalidated and 
confirmed that the death penalty is influenced by the judicial politics of the Privy 
Council.647 
 
The rationale for this confusion revolved around two conflicting provisions which 
affect the implementation of the death penalty in the region.  One of the two provisions 
deals with the penal code which authorised the death penalty as the punishment for 
murder.648 The other is the constitutional provision which declares, amongst other 
things, that Parliament shall not impose or authorise the imposition of cruel and 
unusual punishment.649 
 
It is important to note that Stinneford suggested that a punishment is considered cruel 
and unusual if its effects are unjustly harsh in light of longstanding prior practice.650 
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That being the case it is necessary to examine the penal provision which authorised 
the death penalty for persons convicted of murder651 to understand whether it is in 
direct conflict with section 5 (2) (b) of the Constitution.  A reflection of both 
provisions would suggest that there are inconsistencies in their application particularly 
in terms of the penal provision which authorises the death penalty for murder.  
 
A further difficulty can be viewed in light of the statement made in section 4 of the 
said Constitution.  That section states that there is:  “the right of the individual to life, 
liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except by due process of law.”652 
 
It is important to note here that the Constitution in the Republic of Trinidad and 
Tobago is supreme.  It is the law from which all laws derive, thus it supersedes all 
other law.  Accordingly, the pronunciation of section 2 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago specifically states that: “This Constitution is the 
supreme law of Trinidad and Tobago, and any other law that is inconsistent with the 
Constitution is void to the extent of the inconsistency.”653  
 
Interestingly, although the Constitution is critical of Parliament imposing ‘cruel and 
unusual punishment,’ it also makes provision for exceptions in instances of an existing 
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law.   Section 6 (1) of the said Constitution states that: “Nothing in sections 4 and 5 
shall invalidate- an existing law.”  Interestingly, section 6 (3) of the said Constitution 
indicates that an: “existing law means a law that had effect as part of the law of 
Trinidad and Tobago immediately before the commencement of this Constitution and 
includes any enactment referred to in subsection (1).”654  
 
This provision clearly defines a general savings clause in the Trinidad and Tobago 
Constitution and that provision prevents constitutional challenge to any law in 
existence at the time of independence in 1962. This type of general saving clause is 
found in two other Commonwealth Caribbean countries, namely Barbados and 
Jamaica. It should be noted that the other Commonwealth Caribbean countries with 
the exception of Belize possess partial savings clause which is limited solely to judicial 
punishment. Whereas in Belize the savings clause has an expiry date of five years after 
independence.655   
  
It should be noted further that the Republican Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago 
was enacted in 1976 in the form of Act number 4 of 1976.  Since then, the Constitution 
has gone through several amendments.  These include the amended Act number 15 of 
1978, Act number 16 of 1978 and Act number 30 of 1979.  It is in light of the provision 
of section 6 (1) of the Constitution that the death penalty law is to be assessed in order 
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655 Andrew Novak, ‘The Abolition of the Mandatory Death Penalty in Africa: A Comparative 
Constitutional Analysis’ (2012a) 22 (2) Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 267 – 295 




to determine whether it is in the category of an existing law.  That is to say, whether 
the death penalty law for persons convicted of murder in the Republic of Trinidad and 
Tobago was an existing law in that it was enacted before the Act number 4 of 1976.656  
 
An examination of the Offences Against the Person Act of the Republic of Trinidad 
and Tobago Chapter 11: 08 shows that the original version of this Act was enacted in 
1925 in the form of Ordinance number 10 of 1925.   That Ordinance made provision 
for the death penalty for persons convicted of murder.  It means therefore, that the law 
on the death penalty for murder was in existence at the time when Britain was then in 
direct control over Trinidad and Tobago.   
 
Thus, by necessary implication, the death penalty law in the Republic of Trinidad and 
Tobago - section 4 of the Offences Against the Person Act Chapter 11: 08 -  is 
protected and saved by section 6 (1) of the Constitution as an existing law.  This means 
that in Trinidad and Tobago the death penalty as the punishment for the crime of 
murder remains valid until Parliament has the legislative will to repeal it.657  This was 
the pronouncement in the Matthew case658 and therefore, in simple terms the judiciary 
and in particular the Privy Council does not possess the authority to strike down the 
death penalty as unconstitutional.659  
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The validation of the death penalty as the punishment for murder in Trinidad and 
Tobago presents a similar situation for Barbados and Jamaica.660 Commenting on the 
issue of the saving clause, Burham said that the general clause of the Constitution of 
Trinidad and Tobago saves all existing law from judicial challenge, including, of 
course, laws that are incompatible with fundamental rights guarantees.661 
 
Since section 2 of the Constitution proclaims that the Constitution is the supreme law 
and as such there could be no legal basis for the challenge of the death penalty as being 
unconstitutional in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.662 Moreover, this would 
narrow the research analysis down to the realm of the implementation of the death 
penalty.  That is to say, the act of carrying out the death penalty on a person convicted 
of murder has been a prerogative of the Executive.   
 
This tentative statement is provided for under section 57 (2) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.663  That statutory provision authorised 
the President to issue a warrant directing the execution being carried out.664 Such an 
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661 Margaret A. Burham, ‘Saving Constitutional Rights from Judicial Scrutiny: The Savings Clause in 
the Law of the Commonwealth Caribbean’ (2004) 36 (2 & 3) Inter-American Law Review 249 -269 at 
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662 Matthew v The State of Trinidad and Tobago [2005] 1 AC 433, PC. 
 
663 Criminal Procedure Act of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago Chapter 12 :  02, s. 57 (2). 
 
664 Criminal Procedure Act of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago Chapter 12 :  02, s. 57 (2) states 
that (“The President may, by warrant under his hand and Seal directed to the Marshall, respite any such 
execution and, by the same or any subsequent warrant so signed and sealed, order such execution to be 
carried into effect at such time and place as shall be appointed and specified in the warrant, in which 
case the execution shall be done at such time and place as shall be so appointed.”).       
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Executive act of carrying out of the death penalty was also judicially articulated by 
the Privy Council in the De Freitas case.665  In that case Lord Diplock said that the 
executive act of carrying out a sentence of death pronounced by a court of law is 
authorised by laws.666   Unfortunately, although the court recognises and supports the 
notion that the death penalty is authorised by law, there is no evidence since 1999 that 
the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago has made any real effort to implement it.  In fact, 
the statement made at a public consultation on crime in Trinidad and Tobago is quite 
interesting in this regard.   Here the then Prime Minister of the Republic of Trinidad 
and Tobago admitted to his Executive’s failure to implement the death penalty.667 
 
An objective evaluation of this position revealed the problems associated with the 
implementation of the death penalty.  The inability to carry out the death penalty stems 
largely from the position adopted by the Privy Council.668 This pronouncement is a 
preliminary validation of the influence of judicial politics in the application of the 
death penalty, a feature which had been theorised in this research. 
                                                 
 
665 De Freitas v Benny [1975] 27 WIR 318, PC. 
 
666 De Freitas v Benny [1975] 27 WIR 318, PC. Lord Diplock said that (“It is their Lordships’ view 
clear beyond all argument that the executive act of carrying out a sentence of death pronounced by a 
court of law is authorised by laws that were in force at the commencement of the Constitution.”).    
 
667 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Consultations on Crime in Trinidad and Tobago (Ministry 
of the National Security Trinidad 2007) 79 Mr. Patrick Manning, the then Prime Minister of the 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago said: (“Capital punishment; that has been the subject of a lot of 
discussions in Trinidad and Tobago, and our inability to carry it out stems largely from the position 
adopted by the Privy Council.  It has been particularly accentuated with the advent of Britain to the 
European Union and the attitude of the European Union to this whole question of capital punishment.  
The law lords in London, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which, as you know, is the 
highest court for Trinidad and Tobago, are taking the position that they put one impediment after the 
next in the way of the execution of capital punishment in this country.”).                      
 
668 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Consultations on Crime in Trinidad and Tobago (Ministry 




In January 2011 the Kamla Persad-Bissessar administration in Trinidad and Tobago 
introduced a Bill in Parliament which attempted to amend section 6 of the Constitution 
to exclude the judicial opinions of the Privy Council. The intention of this Bill was to 
ensure that the death penalty could be implemented. That Bill, the Constitution 
(Amendment) (Capital Offences) Bill No. 2 of 2011, failed to get the necessary 
approval in Parliament because it did not get the required three-fourths majority in the 
House of Representatives.  
 
However, the legislative intent of the government was clear and this was described 
accordingly by Kamla Persad-Bissessar, the then Prime Minister of Trinidad and 
Tobago who indicated that the said law was crucial to overcoming the hindrances to 
the implementation of the death penalty arising from the Judicial Committee’s 
jurisprudence. 669  The objective assessment which has been deduced in this regard is 
that the death penalty in the region is based on antiquated laws.  In this regard Bessler 
said that such antiquated laws should be replaced by new norm, based on the 
international standard.670 
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Review 8 – 48 at 47 said: (“although the use of death sentences and executions was once seen as a 
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It therefore means that this antiquity in the administration of the death penalty has 
anchored the Commonwealth Caribbean region in the past, and this has led to a variety 
of procedural irregularities in its effort to observe fundamental societal values such as 
human rights. In addressing the antiquity of the death penalty Manheim suggested that 
there is the need for the application of objective evidence of public values with regards 
to this punishment.671  Concurrently Bessler indicated that the death penalty runs afoul 
of core human rights values and if the abolition movement is to be successful, they 
will have to continue to struggle in the courts and before legislative bodies to achieve 
their objective.672 
 
There is no doubt that the avenue which embraces the struggle in the courts has given 
rise to the doctrine of judicial politics in judicial reasoning as a pattern of abolition of 
the death penalty. This also can be deduced from the writing of Hood and Hoyle when 
they said that the new dynamic has seen countries marching from retention to abolition 
in an unprecedentedly short period of time.673 Thus an individual variable analysis of 
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673 Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle, ‘Abolishing the Death Penalty Worldwide: The Impact of a New 
Dynamic’ (2009) 38 (1) Chicago Crime and Justice Journal 1 – 63 at 7 said: (“The new dynamic has 
seen countries marching from retention to abolition in an unprecedentedly short period of time as they 
come to embrace the view that capital punishment is not simply a weapon to be chosen by a state in 
response to its perceived and actual problems of crime but a punishment that fundamentally involves- 
and cannot be administered without- a denial of universal human right to be free from tortuous, cruel 




the Privy Council decisions in the Commonwealth Caribbean constitutional appeals 
case will be made. This would be necessary in order to illustrate the concept of judicial 
politics within the pattern of judicial ideology in the decision making on the death 
penalty.  
 
5.3: Analysing the impact of the Legal Model on the Delay of Execution 
Table 5.1 presents much data on judicial pronouncements by the Privy Council on 
varying issues relating to the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  It is 
important to note that the judicial pronouncements on this issue can be traced back to 
many years ago.  For all practical purposes, the legal approach on the constitutionality 
of delay in carrying out the sentence of death was dealt with in the De Freitas case.674  
In that case the appellant was convicted of murder in the High Court in the Republic 
of Trinidad and Tobago and was sentenced to death.   
 
The appellant lost his appeals in the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council.  He then 
filed an application for a declaration from the High Court claiming that the carrying 
out of the sentence of death would contravene his human rights as recognised under 
the Constitution, that is, his right to life. That application eventually reached the Privy 
Council where it was dismissed. In the ruling, Lord Diplock explained that the 
carrying out of the sentence of death which is pronounced by a court of law was not a 
breach of the appellant’s constitutional rights.675 This therefore was the rule of law on 
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the issue of the delay of execution and in that case, the legal model approach of the 
Privy Council was delivered by Lord Diplock who specifically said that the executive 
act of carrying out a death sentence pronounced by a court of law was authorised by 
laws that were in force at the commencement of the Constitution.676   
 
The significance of this ruling shows that the Privy Council was concerned with the 
issue of the delay in the carrying out of the sentence of death.  Clearly it shows its 
concern by demonstrating an understanding of the construction of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.  In its expression, it indicated that if a court of 
competent jurisdiction orders the penalty of death on a person, then in the absence of 
any successful appeal, that person has no right, which can be infringed.677 
  
Most interestingly however, the Privy Council in its deliberation on the breach of the 
constitutional rights of a condemned person, found difficulty in finding an argument 
for breach based on delay.  Furthermore, the appellant could not complain about the 
delay caused by his own action in seeking redress through the appellate process.678 
 
This approach by the Privy Council on the question of delay in carrying out the 
sentence of death seems to be in keeping with the spirit and intention of the rule of 
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law in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.  It describes the legal model approach on 
the issue of delay of execution and can be defined in light of Beccaria’s retributive 
theoretical approach which suggests that punishment should be based on retributive 
reasoning because the guilty person had attacked another individual’s rights.679 This 
theoretical perspective signals that the due process of law does not end with the 
pronouncement of the sentence but it includes the carrying out of the sentence.  
 
If the ruling in the De Freitas case680 was to be accepted as an adequate analysis of 
the true spirit of the rule of law on the issue of delay of execution, then there will be 
grave difficulties in understanding the judicial approach behind the rulings of the Privy 
Council in later pronouncements on the same issue. It is for this reason that the legal 
model of the Privy Council on the issue of the delay of execution is worthy of further 
evaluation. 
 
In the Commonwealth Caribbean States, the death penalty itself has also been 
challenged in the Courts as being cruel and therefore unconstitutional.  This aspect of 
the constitutionality of the death penalty was tested in the said De Freitas case.681  It 
was the first major challenge of the constitutionality of the death penalty in the region 
as being cruel.  In the said case the court was asked, amongst other things, to declare 
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whether the imposition of the death penalty for murder was unconstitutional, and a 
breach of the appellant’s human rights.682  
 
Interestingly, after evaluating the relevant constitutional provision the Privy Council 
dismissed the appeal in the De Freitas case683 and made the following comments: 
“Their lordships are accordingly of the opinion that there is nothing in the 
Constitution which would render unlawful the carrying out of the death sentence on 
the appellant in the instant case.”684  
 
This would signal the obvious reality that the act of carrying out a death sentence was 
not cruel and unconstitutional in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago since it is 
provided for by the existing law.685   In effect, the basic analysis to be identified from 
this case is that the death penalty is the legitimate punishment by the law of the State 
for persons guilty of the crime of murder and it ought to be carried out once the 
sentence was legitimately handed down and the convicted killer exhausted all legal 
remedies.   
 
In the Riley case686 the Privy Council was again called upon to give a ruling on the 
constitutionality of the death penalty. Following its deliberations, it approved the 
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principle of law as delivered in the De Freitas case.687  Lord Bridge of Harwich who 
delivered the opinion of the majority in that case was of the view that the validity of 
the death penalty was put beyond all doubt by the statutory provision that authorised 
its use.688  
  
Naturally from this majority ruling it is clear that the Privy Council was in no doubt 
that the application of the death penalty within the Commonwealth Caribbean was 
lawful.  By extension this would mean that the application of the death penalty was 
not unconstitutional.689 However, analysis of the Privy Council’s decisions on the 
death penalty demonstrated otherwise. The one major issue reflected in the cases 
presented in the aforementioned table 5.1 surround the concept of cruel and unusual 
punishment. It is worth noting Bedau comments in this regard when he said that given 
the unalterable nature of the death penalty itself, this kind of punishment even when 
carried out in most dignified fashion is a cruel and unusual punishment.690  The extent 
of the severity of the death penalty as a punishment on the basis of cruelty would be 
further analysed in the next section.  
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690 Hugo Adam Bedau Why the Death Penalty Is a Cruel and Unusual Punishment, The Death Penalty 
in America (Oxford University Press 1997) 232 – 237 at 236 said: (“given the unalterable nature of the 
death penalty itself, this kind of punishment – even when carried out in most dignified fashion, on the 
most hardened offenders, for the most heinous crimes – exceeds the severity that society acting through 
its government may employed. Translated into the terms of the severity-limiting language of the 
Constitution, the death penalty thus is a cruel and unusual punishment.”).       
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5.3.1: Analysing the impact of the Institutional Model on the Delay of Execution 
 
In the Abbott case,691 consideration was given to the issue of delay of execution.  In 
that case the appellant was convicted of murder and was sentenced to death.  
Unfortunately, the appellant Stanley Abbott lost all his subsequent appeals both in the 
Court of Appeal and the Privy Council.  He also failed in his bid to win the sympathy 
of the Mercy Committee in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.  Subsequent to the 
issuing of a warrant for his execution in March 1977, the appellant filed a motion 
contending that under section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and 
Tobago, the delay in carrying out the sentence of death between July 26, 1976 and 
March 12, 1977 would contravene his right to life which is guaranteed under section 
4 (a) of the said Constitution.  
 
The motion was dismissed by the High Court and the Court of Appeal in the Republic 
of Trinidad and Tobago and also by the Privy Council. The position of the Privy 
Council was clear in that it held that notwithstanding that there was some delay, such 
a delay did not contravene the constitutional right of the appellant.  
 
However, what seems to be of paramount interest in the Abbott case692 were the words 
of Lord Diplock who said that Their Lordships would hesitate long before substituting 
their own opinion for that of judges in Trinidad and Tobago as to what constitutes a 
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reasonable time since judges sitting in that country may take judicial notice of what 
was reasonable.693 This opinion has serious implications on the part of the Privy 
Council as it demonstrated the adoption of the institutional model approach by 
following its own precedent and thus confirmed its earlier approach in the De Freitas 
case on the death penalty.694 
  
It is also a demonstration of the rational choice theory as was suggested by Beccaria 
that the criminal is rational and that crime could be prevented through increased 
certainty, severity and celerity of punishment.695  Certainly, in dismissing the 
appellant’s motion, the Privy Council made its position abundantly clear, that is, that 
it is not prepared to entertain any question of delay in carrying out the sentence of 
death as being unreasonable and as being a violation of the constitutional rights of the 
condemned prisoner as the local judges would be better suited to make any 
determination of the reasonableness or not of any delay.696   
 
                                                 
693 Abbott v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago and Others [1979] 1 WLR 1343, PC 1348 – 
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Moreover, this declaration by Lord Diplock indicates both the reliance and confidence 
the Privy Council placed on local judges in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago to 
decide the issue of reasonableness of any delay. However, in an article written by 
Maguire et al in a United Nations Caribbean Development Report,697 it shares an 
opposing view of the justice system in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.  It 
describes the justice system as dysfunctional and claims that there are significant 
delays and backlogs in the legal system of that state.698          
                                                                 
However, from Abbott’s ruling, the judicial paradigm of the Privy Council on this 
issue seems clear, and that is, in no way would it entertain that delay in carrying out 
the sentence of death is unconstitutional.699 Further, if there was any doubt as regards 
the judicial approach which underpins the ruling given by the Privy Council in 
Abbott’s case, then such a doubt would certainly have been cleared up in the Riley 
case.700 
 
In that case, warrants for the execution of the appellants were issued in 1979, a period 
of approximately four years after they were sentenced to death.  They then sought a 
declaration that under the Constitution their execution would be inhuman or degrading 
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punishment or other treatment by reason of the delay between the day of the sentence 
and the actual date carded for execution.  The Privy Council through the institutional 
model approach could not have been clearer in its ruling when it followed the 
precedent in the De Freitas case.701 It held that the delay in the execution of a sentence 
of death was no grounds for rendering the execution as being unconstitutional.702  
 
Emanating from the Riley case703 was the principle that delay cannot be used as a bar 
to the carrying out of the death penalty.  This institutional model approach by the Privy 
Council has sent a well-directed signal to the Commonwealth Caribbean States.  Such 
a signal encompasses the fact that it is prepared to ensure that the rule of law which 
was defined in the De Freitas case704 be maintained and followed.  In such a case, it 
ensures that the status quo on the application of the death penalty is satisfied. This 
therefore means that persons who are convicted of the crime of murder receive their 
just retribution and not seek to avoid it by invoking delay when they have exhausted 
all their judicial remedies.  
 
Further to this, where the question of delay should arise, it should be left to the local 
courts as was illustrated in the Abbott case,705 for determination since incidentally, the 
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courts would be in the best judicial position to do so.706 In addition the institutional 
model approach on the law on delay in execution in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
was well illustrated in Riley’s case.707  In that case the Privy Council held that whatever 
the reasons for or the length of  any delay in the execution of a sentence of death 
lawfully imposed, the delay could afford no ground for holding the execution to be 
inhuman or degrading or other treatment.708  
 
 
However, in spite of the Privy Council rulings in the Abbott case709 and the Riley 
case,710 the issue of the delay in carrying out of the sentence of death as being 
unconstitutional still appears to be a thought provoking issue for the justices in the 
Privy Council.  Moreover, from all apparent indications, this issue had not been 
settled.  This is so in spite of the unequivocal and unambiguous rulings in both cases. 
The said issue was reviewed and similarly determined twenty five years later in 
Reckley case.711  The Privy Council in those cases made expressions that are judicially 
contrived on the said issue.  It clearly seems that those statements validate the presence 
of the researcher’s analytic model of judicial politics.  
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The decision in the Reckley case712 is also interesting for its facts.  That case arose out 
of The Bahamas where the petitioner was sentenced to death on November 7, 1990.  
He was due to be executed on May 30, 1995 when on May 29, 1995; he filed a 
constitutional motion that his right under Article 17 (1) of The Bahamas Constitution 
was infringed because of the delay in his execution.  
 
The delay he complained of was four and a half years prior to the date of completion 
of his constitutional motion and he claimed that to execute him after this period of 
time would be inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment.  The Privy Council 
was not convinced by his argument and in arriving at a decision; it followed the 
precedent in the Pratt case.713  It ruled firstly, that the delay which occasioned in 
carrying out the sentence of death on the petitioner fell within the acceptable period 
of delay, that is, five years before it could amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. 
 
Certainly, in the ruling in the Reckley case714 it appears that the Privy Council has 
indeed settled the law in respect of the constitutionality of delay in carrying out the 
sentence of death.  It stated that within the five year limitation, the sentence of death 
cannot be considered inhuman or degrading treatment.  One would have thought that 
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following the decision in Reckley’s case the issue of delay would not have created any 
further problems in the future.715   
 
For instance, it is worth noting in the Abbott case,716 that the Privy Council recognised 
that any inordinate delay might mean that the taking of the life of the condemned man 
would not be by the due process of law.  It pointed out that States should maintain 
proper practice so that execution is not allowed after prolonged delay.717 This point 
was well articulated by Christopher when he said that the interval must be brief in 
order to further the penological goals of punishment.718 
 
5.3.2: Analysing the impact of the Attitudinal Model on the Delay of Execution 
 
It is now unconstitutional for the Commonwealth Caribbean to carry out a sentence of 
death after a prolonged period of delay.  This has been a fundamental issue with the 
death penalty in the region and is based on the jurisprudence emanating from the Privy 
Council on it.  This jurisprudence identifies that at one time the concept of delay was 
not a factor affecting the death penalty.719  
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718 Russell L. Christopher, ‘Absurdity and Excessively Delay Executions’ (2016) 49 University of 
California, Davis 843 – 898 at 854 – 855 said: (“the interval must be brief because it is of great 
importance, that the punishment should follow the crime as early as possible in order to further the 
penological goals of punishment.”).    
 




However, with the passage of time, delay in execution is now considered to be cruel 
and unconstitutional.  This would suggest that although persons are convicted and 
sentenced to death it is quite possible to have the death sentence annulled as being 
cruel and unusual punishment based on the issue of delay of execution.720 This is 
owing to the application of the attitudinal model approach which see a deviation from 
the status quo presented with the application of the institutional model approach. 
 
Prior to the Pratt decision721 in 1993 the law on delay in execution in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean was defined in Riley’s case.722 This law on delay in 
execution confirmed the decision in the De Freitas case and it stood for eleven years 
as good law.  However, the Privy Council ignored this precedent and in 1993 there 
was a landmark decision in the Pratt case which changed the law.723 The point to note 
is that nothing new developed that warranted this change except to suggest that the 
Privy Council through the concept of judicial politics set aside the earlier precedent.  
To a large extent, by the time of the Pratt decision,724 the prominent conservative 
justices such as Lord Diplock, Lord Bridge and Lord Hailsham had left the Privy 
Council’s bench and a new cadre of Law Lords such as Lords Griffith, Bingham and 
Steryn with liberal views and with different outlook on the law had replaced them.  
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It should be noted that in the Riley case,725 Lord Scarman and Lord Brightman in a 
dissenting judgment recognised that the delay in carrying out the death penalty is an 
inhuman and degrading punishment.726  That judgement was made in spite of the 
unequivocal ruling given in the De Freitas case727 on the issue of unreasonable delay.  
It is obvious that those utterances are a clear demonstration of the validity and 
credibility of the researcher’s concept of judicial politics which embraces shrewd 
awareness of what seems expedient, advantageous or artful.  This would suggest that 
the law on the delay in execution was not settled. It also showed a demonstration of 
the adoption of attitudinal model approach of the Privy Council towards the issue of 
delay in carrying out of the death penalty.  
 
To compound this seemingly unsettled principle, Lord Templeman in Bell v. Director 
of Public Prosecutions and Another made a very important obiter dicta statement 
when he said that: “Their Lordships do not in any event accept the submission that 
prior to the Constitution, the law of Jamaica, in applying the common law of England, 
was powerless to provide a remedy against unreasonable delay.”728 
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That obiter dicta statement had no effect on influencing the ruling of the Privy Council 
in this said case since it applied the strict rule of law which is provided for by section 
20 (1) of the Jamaica Constitution.  This provision confers on a person charged with 
a criminal offence, the right to a fair trial within a reasonable time.  Accordingly, the 
constitutional right of the appellant was certainly infringed since his appeal was 
allowed as there was a six year delay in his retrial between 1979 and 1985, when the 
Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.729 
 
A word of significance here is that this obiter dicta statement in Bell’s case730 as well 
as the dissenting judgement in Riley’s case731 shows a remarkable division of judicial 
opinion in the Privy Council on the issue of delay in carrying out the death sentence.  
That division heralds in the liberal approach where the Privy Council through its 
attitudinal model approach exhibited the propensity to deviate from the status quo in 
the principle of delay presented in the De Freitas case.732  More importantly the issue 
was kept alive until the Pratt decision changed the scope of the law on the delay in 
carrying out the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean for the future.733  
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The facts in Pratt’s case are very interesting.734  In 1979, the appellants were convicted 
of a murder, which was committed in 1977.  In 1980, the appellants’ application for 
leave to appeal was rejected by the Court of Appeal in Jamaica.  The reason for such 
a rejection by the Court of Appeal was not given until four years later.  In 1986, the 
appellants made a special leave application to appeal to the Privy Council but this was 
refused.  In 1991, they filed a constitutional motion under Article 17 of the Jamaican 
Constitution claiming that their detention under the sentence of death had contravened 
his right to life.   
 
It must be noted that for fourteen years, the appellants were in custody awaiting their 
sentence.  The reality is that in the Pratt case735 the Privy Council had very little 
difficulty in adopting the obiter dicta statement of Lord Templeman in Bell’s case,736 
the minority view of Lord Scarman and Lord Brightman in Riley’s case and the 
concern raised in Abbot’s case,737 in ruling that prolonged delay in carrying out of the 
sentence of death was inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment and a 
breach of the constitutional rights of the appellants.738  
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Interestingly, the genesis of this ruling in the Pratt case739 can be attributed to those 
cases where the Privy Council signalled its intention to deviate from the precedent in 
the De Freitas case740 and the institutional model approach in the Riley case.741  
Moreover, it definitely shows a sequence of attitudinal approaches of shrewd 
awareness of what is expedient, advantageous or artful in arriving at the position in 
which there was an overruling of the precedent in the De Freitas case742 and total 
rejection of the majority decision in Riley’s case.743  
 
The Pratt’s decision had wide implications in the region, which has the death penalty 
as the punishment for persons convicted of murder and which still retains the Privy 
Council as their final judicial arbiter.  These implications caused States in the region 
to wonder whether or not the Privy Council by its artful judicial manoeuvres was 
sending a signal to them and if so, what was the true lesson to be learnt from such a 
signal. The reason for such a situation is the fact that the Privy Council did not only 
rule on the issue before it, that the delay was unconstitutional, but it went further and 
gave directions for Commonwealth Caribbean States to follow.744 
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Its first direction dealt with the calculation of the period of delay.  The Privy Council 
indicated that in calculating the period of delay, courts and indeed the States ought to 
take into consideration the period during which the convicted person is exercising his 
or her right of appeal.   This seems to be diametrically opposed to the general position 
within individual States, which categorically disallows any sentence of death imposed 
by a court to be executed during the period in which the convicted person is exercising 
his or her right of appeal.  For instance, in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago this 
situation is provided for under section 51 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 
Chapter 4:01.  Here it indicates that all appeals in the case of a conviction involving 
the sentence of death shall be heard before the sentence is executed.745  
 
A further direction given by the Privy Council is that where there is a five year period 
between the sentence and the actual date carded for execution, thereafter such a period 
is considered as the delay which constitutes inhuman or degrading punishment or other 
treatment.  This second implication seems to be more important of since it gave rise 
to the statement of law in Pratt’s case746 which illustrates that the death penalty must 
be carried out with all possible expedition if it is to be retained as the punishment for 
the crime of murder.747 
                                                 
745 Supreme Court of Judicature Act. Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. Chapter 4:01, s. 51. 
 
746 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another, [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC 341. 
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approximately two years.  If in any case execution is to take place more than five years after sentence, 
there will be strong grounds for believing that the delay is such as to constitute “inhuman or degrading 
punishment or other treatment.”).    
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It must be noted that this statement of law provides a legal ground breaking record of 
judicial politics.  In effect it illustrates the attitudinal approach of the Privy Council as 
regard addressing the issue of delay in constitutional matters reflecting the death 
penalty. This was an obvious deviation by justices of the Privy Council from the status 
quo which is following the institutional model approach. Thus the attitudinal model 
approach provides the tentative answer to the research question in this exploration.748 
 
The Pratt case did not only address the querulous situation of prolonged delay but it 
further addressed the issue of avoiding the delay as a result of the directive given in it.   
This clearly demonstrated the Privy Council’s willingness to gain an inroad into the 
legislative and policy making domain of states within the Commonwealth Caribbean. 
Baum defined such situation in his work on law and policy by indicating that it is easy 
for the Supreme Court justices to find legal justification for whatever positions they 
prefer since they care more about policy than law.749 
 
It is worth noting that following those directions in the Pratt case,750 a new dimension 
seems to be unfolding from the Privy Council on the issue of the constitutionality of 
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delay in carrying out the sentence of death.  This new dimension is, in effect, a new 
judicial approach of the Privy Council which is in keeping with the theme of this 
research.  Primarily it signals that if the death penalty is to be retained as a punishment 
for the crime of murder in the region, it must be carried out as expeditiously as 
possible. This obviously necessitates the demonstration of the shrewd awareness by 
the Privy Council for what is expeditious in the application of the death penalty.751   
 
The principle of delay in execution was fuelled by the statement of law in the Pratt 
decision.752  Since the decision in this case, there have been varying indifferent 
judgements on the issue of delay in execution.753 This would suggest that there is no 
settled principle on the issue of delay and more importantly the concept of judicial 
politics is alive in the Privy Council.   
 
This Pratt legal doctrine is a very powerful statement of law which is seen to address 
the delay in carrying out of the death penalty in the region. For this researcher, the 
judicial behaviour of the Privy Council in the Pratt case is the display of doctrinal-
politics. It is clearly an exhibition of the attitudinal model approach of the legal 
doctrine of judicial politics by the Privy Council.754  
 
                                                 




753 Guerra v Baptiste and others [1995] 4 All ER 583, PC. 
 




According to the last sentence within this principle a delay of five years or more 
between date of sentencing and the date carded for execution would be deemed cruel 
and indeed unconstitutional. One of the major impact of the Pratt decision is that it 
has overruled the decision in the Riley’s case on delay.755  Further, it illustrates that 
where there is delay in the judicial process, same would render the executive act of 
carrying out the death penalty cruel. Moreover, the statement of law has also 
demonstrated the Privy Council’s attitudinal approach of overruling the precedent 
through the concept of judicial politics.756 
 
Another impact of this statement for the region was that, persons under a death 
sentence for five years or more had their death sentence commuted to life 
imprisonment.  In the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago fifty-two persons on death 
row were benefactors of this treatment.  In Jamaica one hundred and five persons on 
death row had their death sentence commuted to life imprisonment.757 However, the 
ultimate impact of the Privy Council’s decision in Pratt’s case758 is a public policy 
one in that it has judicially directed the administration of the death penalty in the 
region.759  
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strong grounds for believing that the delay is such as to constitute “inhuman or degrading punishment  
or other treatment”. It therefore, rather than waiting for all those prisoners who have been in death row  
under sentence of death for five years or more to commence proceedings pursuant to section 25 of the 
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The general feature of the Pratt case760 has been the liberal response by the Privy 
Council to the issue of delay in carrying out of the death penalty.  This case has led to 
several similar challenges and ironically there has been an indifference of subsequent 
rulings on the said issue by the Privy Council.  With these new cases, the Privy Council 
driven by judicial politics was able to have unfettered policy developmental approach 
on the concept of inhumanity or cruelty in the constitutionality of the death penalty. 
 
For instance, in the Guerra case761 which followed Pratt’s case,762  the Privy Council 
ruled that the period of four years and ten months which elapsed for the domestic 
appeal process was tantamount to cruel and unusual punishment.763 The display of 
judicial politics by the Privy Council in terms of it attitudinal approach was also visible 
in this decision. This approach means that the justice system cannot be too swift and 
this would lead to believe that in effect the Privy Council has abolished the death 
penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  In that case the Privy Council further 
developed on the concept of cruelty. In order to justify its decision the Privy Council 
revaluated its ruling in Pratt’s case764 and claimed that this period was not specified 
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An interesting phenomenon about this judicial pronouncement is the fact that the Privy 
Council made such a ruling in the constitutional motion brought by the convicted killer 
Guerra even though it recognised that his crime was one of shocking brutality.  It also 
endorsed the sentiment of the Court of Appeal in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago 
by indicating also that the murders for which Guerra and Wallen were convicted were 
heinous and abominable in the extreme.766 It is clear that the Privy Council’s 
description of cruelty seems farfetched in comparison to the manner of its description 
of the crimes Guerra was convicted of.767 This category of cruelty will be further 
analysed in the next section.   
 
This indifference in the ruling on delay in execution was further exacerbated in the 
Farrington case.  In that case, it was noticeable that the delay which Farrington 
complained of and the period which elapsed between the time he was sentenced and 
the time of his application was three years and four months.768 
 
                                                 
765 Guerra v Baptiste and others [1995] 4 All ER 583, PC 593 [d] said: (“It is to be observed that this 
period was not specified as a time limit.  Its function was to enable the Jamaican authorities to deal 
expeditiously with the substantial number of prisoners, who had spent many years on death row, without  
having to deal with all such prisoners individually following constitutional proceedings.”).           
 








Prima facie, if any court were to follow the established precedent in this case as in the 
decision of the Pratt case769 and/or the decision of Guerra’s case,770 it would be a 
foregone conclusion that Farrington neither fulfilled the threshold of the five year 
period set out in the Pratt case771 nor the minimum limit of four years and ten months 
set out in the Guerra case.772 Nevertheless, in the Privy Council, their Lordships 
attitudinal approach was that there was a breach of Farrington’s constitutional right.  
This was owing to the fact that delay of execution was measured alongside other 
factors which will be analysed in the next section and in Farrington’s case it was based 
on the delay in the appellate process.773            
           
5.4: Analysing the impact of the Attitudinal Model on the Swiftness of Execution 
 
The jurisprudence on this issue suggests that the Privy Council was perplexed with 
the institutional systemic delay in the implementation of the death penalty.  At the 
same time, it is less concerned with the perceived discrimination in judicial situations 
where appeals and petitions have been facilitated in order to avoid delays.  With regard 
to institutional systemic delay, this was recognised in the decision in the Pratt case774 
and it seems that this factor had prompted the executive in the Republic of Trinidad 
                                                 
769  Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC. 
 
770 Guerra v Baptiste and others [1995] 4 All ER 583, PC. 
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and Tobago to move post-haste to carry out the death sentence on Guerra.  In relation 
to the death sentence in Guerra’s case, he was given seventeen hours’ notice of his 
execution. 775 
 
However, the execution was not effected since the issue of delay was again defined in 
Guerra v. Baptiste and others.776 This is a case which originated out of the Republic 
of Trinidad and Tobago.  In this case, the appellant was sentenced to death on May 
18, 1989.  He exhausted all his judicial remedies with respect of appeals and sought 
to avoid his retribution by way of a motion to the High Court claiming that executing 
him after a delay of four years and ten months was tantamount to cruel and unusual 
punishment which is contrary to section 5 (2) (b) of the Constitution of the Republic 
of Trinidad and Tobago.  
 
It was not surprising that the local courts dismissed the appellant’s motion as they 
clearly followed the precedent set out in the Pratt case as regards the five year 
limitation period.777  However, when the petition came up for hearing in the Privy 
Council, they reversed the ruling given by the Court of Appeal in the Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago and held that the delay in carrying out the sentence of death in 
this case constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and it was therefore 
unconstitutional. 
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The significance of this ruling is that the Privy Council seemed to deviate from the 
strict timetable of five years laid down in the Pratt case778 and it ruled that within the 
five year period the punishment can be considered as cruel and unconstitutional.  
However, what the Privy Council sought to explain here is that the five year time limit 
set in the Pratt case is a mere guideline.779  Therefore, each case ought to be looked at 
on its own merit in order to determine whether or not the delay occasioned could be 
considered as unconstitutional.  
 
Ironically, in Guerra’s case780 the Privy Council focused on the local systemic delay 
in the judicial process which has not conformed to the guidelines in the Pratt case and 
considered such a delay to have been unconstitutional.  The point on which the Privy 
Council turned was the fact that the domestic appeal process that was outlined in the 
Pratt case of two years for completion was exceeded by a further two years and ten 
months. Although the outer limit of five years was not exceeded, the inner limit of two 
years for domestic appeals was exceeded.781   
 
The Privy Council’s attitudinal approach was that such a move was too swift and 
Guerra should have been given four days’ notice of his impending execution which 
must include a weekend.  In other words, the Privy Council has claimed that the   
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swiftness of the execution was cruel and therefore a breach of section 5 (2) (b) of the 
Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago.782 In furtherance of this position the Privy 
Council has identified its judicial preference of what it considered to be reasonable 
notice of time.  Therefore, it stated that this principle of reasonable notice of time 
should be recognised and incorporated in the reading of the death penalty warrant.783 
 
The essential difference with the Guerra case was that the appellate process was 
completed in four years and ten months, so that he did not have time to embark on the 
constitutional challenge.784 The Privy Council pounced on that distinction to rigidly 
enforce the Pratt principle of two years for the local appellate process and three years 
for the constitutional challenges and petitions of reprieve.785  
 
                                                 
782 Guerra v Baptiste and others [1995] 4 All ER 583, PC 596 [d], [e] said: (“Their Lordships are of 
the opinion that justice and humanity require that a man under sentence of death should be given 
reasonable notice of the time of his execution.  Such notice is required to enable a man to arrange his 
affairs, to be visited by members of his intimate family before he dies, and to receive spiritual advice 
and comfort to enable him to compose himself, as best as he can, to face his ultimate ordeal.  Their 
Lordships understand that this principle was long recognised in England in the days when capital 
punishment was still in force; and for reasons which will shortly appear, the like principle appears to 
have long been accepted in Trinidad and Tobago.  In these circumstances they are satisfied that to 
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It should also be noted that had the execution been carried out on Guerra it would 
have been within the five years’ time limit as was prescribed in Pratt’s principle of 
swift punishment.786  Moreover, it would certainly have been carried out in 
conjunction and within the ambit of the theoretical perspective from Beccaria’s theory 
of society which states that the punishment must be a certainty, inflicted quickly, and 
should not be administered to set example; neither should it be concerned with 
reforming the offender.787   
 
 
In addition, its application would have subscribed to the concepts in the research 
theoretical perspective which suggested that its essential characteristic is that it must 
be consistent with the current features within contemporary jurisprudence, that is to 
say, it ought to be administered quickly. (See research theory in ch3).  However, the 
fact that the reading of the death penalty warrant did not conform to the Privy Council 
attitudinal approach of reasonable notice of time then such practice is considered cruel 
and unconstitutional, thereby rendering the death sentence commuted to life 
imprisonment.  
 
Interestingly, the Privy Council applied the said concept of systemic delay in the case 
Farrington v. The Attorney General of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas788 in order 
to determine whether or not there was a breach of the appellant’s constitutional rights 
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788 Farrington v The Attorney General of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas (1996), 49 WIR 1, PC. 
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occasioned by the delay in carrying out the sentence of death.  In that case, the 
appellant was convicted of murder in The Bahamas on November 30, 1992.  Both his 
appeals to the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council were dismissed on April 28, 
1994 and September 7, 1995, respectively.  On March 27, 1996, a warrant was read to 
him for his execution on April 9, 1996 and he filed a motion that the time, which had 
elapsed since he was sentenced to death constituted inhuman punishment which was 
a clear violation of Article 17 (i) of The Bahamas Constitution.  It must be noted that 
the delay which he complained of and the period which elapsed between the time he 
was sentenced to death and the time of his application to the court was three years and 
four months. 
 
Prima facie, if any court were to follow the precedent such as the decision in Pratt 
case789 and or the decision of Guerra’s case,790 it would have been a foregone 
conclusion that Farrington neither fulfilled the time limit of the five year period set 
out in the Pratt case nor the minimum threshold of four years and ten month period 
set out in the Guerra case.791  
 
Although the Court of Appeal in The Bahamas had very little difficulty with such 
recognition and dismissed the appeal, the situation was certainly different when the 
appellant’s appeal was heard in the Privy Council.  Their Lordships exhibited the 
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attitudinal model approach by identifying with the period of delay, which did not 
accommodate the target period for the relevant appellate procedure.  That period 
which affected the case in question was eighteen months and the Privy Council 
considered it to be substantial enough to be a breach of the appellant’s constitutional 
right.792  
 
On the other hand the judgement in the Boodram case793 presents an opposite 
reflection of cruelty in the category of swiftness of execution.  The appellants in that 
case complained that their appeals against conviction and their petitions to the human 
rights organisations had been facilitated and enabled to be determined without being 
subjected to the delays which had been experienced by other persons convicted of 
murder.  This assertion would suggest that swift execution was facilitated through the 
means of judicial discrimination. 
 
In that case the Privy Council upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal in the 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago that the appeal had no substance since there was no 
breach of the appellants’ constitutional rights.  The appellants in this judgement are 
now history since they were eventually executed in June 1999.  However, history may 
very well judge the appellants to have been discriminated against since they too would 
have benefited from the Roodal decision.  This is evident from the fact that four years 
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later following the judgement in the Matthew case794 and based on the principle in the 
Roodal case795 fifty prisoners on death sentence in the Republic of Trinidad and 
Tobago had their sentence commuted to life imprisonment. 
 
Although the decision in the Roodal case796 was eventually overruled by the Matthew 
case,797 the Privy Council has displayed its attitudinal approach that it would be cruel 
and unusual punishment to reinstate the death penalty.  This was because of their 
legitimate expectation that as a result of the Roodal case they would have been entitled 
to a re-sentencing hearing before a judge.798 
 
Lord Hoffman strongly denounced the attitudinal model approach of the Privy Council 
in a dissenting judgment, cited before, in Lewis et al v. Attorney General of Jamaica 
and another.799 That statement of Lord Hoffman, though a dissenting one, naturally 
sums up the current attitudinal approach of the Privy Council towards the 
constitutionality of death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  In effect, this 
statement subscribes to the current research concept.  Moreover, it validates the notion 
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that the death penalty in the region evolved through judicial politics.  Most importantly 
it is a reliable and leading indicator from within the Privy Council itself that its own 
rulings on the constitutionality of the death penalty within the Commonwealth 
Caribbean are fraught with politics.800   
 
Smith on his writing on the Supreme Court and the politics of death took a similar 
position to Lord Hoffman concerning the United States of America Supreme Court 
decision in the Furman case.801 He said that by constitutionalizing capital punishment, 
the Court in-advertently politicized it, and the political process quickly responded with 
new death penalty schemes crafted to correct the defects identified in Furman.802 
 
Thus by comparison of the impact of delay of execution and swiftness of execution, 
both illustrate the Privy Council’s restrictive approach for the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. They not only affect the nature of the death penalty in the 
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region but display the institutional and attitudinal approaches of the Privy Council.  
Thus, whether there is delay in execution or there is swiftness of execution, both will 
render the death penalty being ruled inhuman or cruel and therefore 
unconstitutional.803  
 
In summary this clearly is a no win situation and as such a leading indicator of the 
effects and impacts of the legal doctrine of judicial politics in the Privy Council 
decision making on the constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean. Moreover, it is a demonstration of a dichotomy between the Guerra’s 
principle of swiftness of execution.804 It clearly runs counter to an aspect or the part 
of the Pratt’s legal doctrine which states that if capital punishment is to be retained it 
must be carried out with all possible expedition and the capital appeals must be 
expedited and legal aid allocated at an early stage.805   
 
Such a dichotomy presented a deeper and more fundamental problem associated with 
the decision making in the Privy Council which is the lack of regional contribution to 
the judgement.  Accordingly, Maharajh illustrated this when he said that the Privy 
Council has attracted a lot of criticism for the fact that it encompasses such a large 
number of judges but it is difficult for the Caribbean voice to gain a majority because 
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only a limited number of people from the region are used on appeal.806 This therefore 
means that the development of the Commonwealth Caribbean jurisprudence through 
the Privy Council is achieved without any regional contribution. 
 
5.5: Analysing the impact of the Attitudinal Model on Mandatory or 
Discretionary Death Sentence 
 
In the discussion on the constitutionality of the death penalty in this research, it was 
illustrated that by reason of statutes the death penalty was mandatory for persons 
convicted of murder in two Commonwealth Caribbean States.807 It should be noted 
also that in other States in this region the death penalty is discretionary.808  
 
Writing on the subject of the mandatory death penalty, Kadri indicated that the courts 
have repeatedly emphasised that a mandatory death penalty rule is objectionable no 
matter how grave the crime committed.809  Therefore, the mandatory and discretionary 
natures of the death penalty were tested in the courts in which there were several 
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judicial pronouncements. An evaluation of the judicial pronouncements on the two 
issues would suggest that the Privy Council through its attitudinal model approach 
demonstrates a judicial preference for treating the death penalty as being discretionary.   
 
It should be noted that this preference is based on the one hand the Privy Council’s 
paradigm which illustrates that the mandatory death penalty is a cruel and unusual 
punishment.810 On the other hand, it is based on the Privy Council’s interpretation of 
international convention and decisions and the adoption of comparative international 
law into the domestic law in the region.811 Moreover, it was held that there was no 
defence to violate international obligations under a duly ratified treaty even though 
the death penalty had not yet been found unconstitutional in the respective domestic 
legal system.812  
 
In this discourse, the presentation of the issue revolving around the mandatory or 
discretionary death sentence is viewed from the perspectives of the situation adopted 
in the Eastern and Southern Caribbean States.  The leading trilogy of cases on this 
issue originated in the Eastern Caribbean States and also in the country of Belize. They 
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were the Hughes case,813 the Fox case814 and the Reyes case.815  The Privy Council 
was asked in each of those cases to determine whether a mandatory sentence of death 
was an inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment.816  
 
Their Lordships in the Privy Council, in response, held that the mandatory death 
penalty was inconsistent with the Constitution.  In arriving at this decision their 
Lordships interpreted the death penalty law with the modifications provided for in the 
Constitution and proclaimed that on a conviction for murder the prisoner may be 
sentenced to death or else he may be sentenced to a lesser punishment.817 Thus, it is 
for the trial judge to determine the appropriate sentence based on the circumstances 
that exist.  Moreover, in determining the appropriate sentence the judge must hear 
submissions relevant to the choice of sentence.818  
 
The ultimate effect of the decision in those cases is that the Privy Council ruled that 
the death penalty is discretionary rather than mandatory for persons convicted of 
murder.  More importantly this ruling subscribes to the concept of judicial politics 
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advanced in the research, whereby the Privy Council through its attitudinal model 
approach has created another exception of discretionary death sentence for the 
Commonwealth Caribbean region.819  
 
Such an exception is based on the notion that the mandatory death penalty is 
considered to be inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment by their Lordships in 
the Privy Council.  The obvious ideology at work here is the concept of judicial 
politics whereby the Privy Council exhibits a liberal stance and decides the matters 
according to its judicial preferences. Thus it has restricted the death penalty in the 
Eastern Caribbean States and in Belize on the basis that it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution.820 
 
It is worth noting that the Privy Council’s decision goes against the spirit of Beccaria’s 
theory of society perspectives which suggest that the punishment must be a certainty, 
inflicted quickly, and should not be administered to set example; neither should it be 
concerned with reforming the offender.821 Beccaria also suggested that the complete 
criminal law code should be written and all offences and punishment should be defined 
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in advance.822 In other words, this later theoretical perspective suggests that 
punishments were to be decided by the legislature and not by the court.823 
 
In the Southern Caribbean States there are two cases of interest which can be identified 
with the Privy Council’s judicial preference for the discretion in the administration of 
the death penalty.  These two cases are   the Roodal case824 and the Matthew case825 
both of which emanated from the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.  Moreover, those 
cases also identify with the Privy Council’s ideology that the death penalty is 
considered to be cruel. 
 
In the Roodal case the Privy Council held by a majority of 3 to 2 that the mandatory 
death penalty in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago was unconstitutional.826 In 
arriving at this decision the Privy Council recognised the fact that the Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago was a signatory to the American Convention of Human Rights.  
Accordingly, it showed judicial preference for article 4. 2 of the Convention which 
proclaims that the death sentence may only be imposed for the most serious crimes.827    
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825 Matthew v The State of Trinidad and Tobago [2005] 1 AC 433, PC. 
 
826 Roodal v The State of Trinidad and Tobago [2004] 2 WLR 652, PC. 
 
827 Organization of American States General Secretariat, ‘American Convention on Human Rights’ 




The Privy Council further recognised the interpretation of this Convention given by 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights which suggests that a mandatory death 
sentence is inconsistent with article 4.2 of the Convention.828 In fact it did not make 
any distinction but found that all mandatory death sentences are unconstitutional. 
More importantly the mandatory nature of the death penalty made it a cruel, inhuman 
and degrading punishment.829 
 
The Privy Council’s attitudinal approach on this issue suggested that an interpretation 
of the mandatory death penalty in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago should be 
consistent with the Convention as determined by the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights.  Therefore, it concludes that in light of the Constitution and the international 
obligations the penalty of death for persons convicted of murder is the maximum 
penalty which means that it is a discretionary punishment.830 
 
This decision did not stand for long and the Matthew case which followed, overruled 
it by a slim majority of 5 to 4.831 In its decision, the Privy Council held that the 
mandatory death penalty is saved by the existing law under section 6 (1) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and therefore is prevented from 
being declared unconstitutional.  This is so despite the fact that it is not consistent with 
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the current interpretation of the various Human Rights treaties to which the Republic 
of Trinidad and Tobago is a party.832  
 
The impact of the ruling in the Matthew case is a leading indicator that the Privy 
Council decisions on the constitutionality of the death penalty is linked to judicial 
politics.833  Firstly, in that said case the Privy Council has revalidated the death penalty 
in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago as being mandatory.  Secondly, it also 
confirms that the death penalty could only be abolished by the Parliament through the 
means provided in the Constitution.   It must also be noted that although the Privy 
Council overruled the decision in the Roodal case834 it also recognised the concept of 
cruelty of the death penalty which was featured in that case.835 
 
Thirdly, this statement clearly demonstrates the attitudinal model approach of the 
Privy Council that it has a judicial preference for a discretionary death penalty rather 
than its mandatory nature.  In order to present the feelings of the Privy Council on the 
issue of the mandatory death penalty, their Lordships stated that “they do not think it 
would be fair to deprive anyone presently under sentence of death of the benefit of the 
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Roodal decision.  They will accordingly allow the appeal against sentence and 
substitute a sentence of imprisonment for life.”836 
 
Thus the impact of the Matthew case837 was that it afforded some fifty prisoners on 
death row in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago the benefit of having their sentence 
commuted to life imprisonment.  These were prisoners who were at the date of the 
Matthew case already sentenced to death.838   In this regard, Cross writing on the 
subject of the de facto abolition of the mandatory death penalty, said that the judicial 
precedents have resulted in a de facto repeal of the mandatory death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean countries.839 
 
 
This statement by Cross is in realty a validation of the judicial politics concept 
presented herein and it is worth noting that it revolves around the attitudinal model 
approach of the Privy Council whereby it adopted a judicial preference for the 
discretionary death. This is naturally a similar approach to that of the approach of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  Its model is a presumption against the death 
penalty so that life sentence is the norm and the death penalty is the exception which 
                                                 
836 Matthew v The State of Trinidad and Tobago [2005] 1 AC 433, PC. 
 




839 Jane E. Cross, ‘A Matter of Discretion The De facto Abolition of the Mandatory Death Penalty in 
Barbados – A Study of the Boyce and Joseph Cases’ (2014) 46 (1) Inter-American Law Review 39 –  
59 at 58 - 59 said: (“The resulting precedents have resulted in a de facto repeal of the MDP in Barbados 
and other Commonwealth Caribbean countries through the diligent infusion of due process and human 





has to be justified in rare cases by exceptional heinousness of the murder and lack of 
individual mitigation situation in the offender.840  
 
Moreover, this approach of the Privy Council is evidence of the application of 
comparative international law which articulates the progressive abolition of the death 
penalty.  This has been the international model hypothesis to this research and is 
located in Resolution 32/61 which was adopted at the thirty-second session by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations.841 
 
The Trimmingham case842 is essential in this category of cruelty. In that case, the 
appellant Daniel Dick Trimmingham was convicted for the murder of Albert Browne 
of St. Vincent and was sentenced to death.  At the time of the murder the appellant 
had a firearm and robbed the victim Albert Browne aged 68 years of six goats.  He 
then slit the victim’s throat and cut off his head.  The appellant then slit the victim’s 
belly, covered the body and stuffed the trousers containing the head into a hole under 
a plant in a nearby banana field.843 
 
                                                 
840 Jane E. Cross, ‘A Matter of Discretion The De facto Abolition of the Mandatory Death Penalty in  
Barbados – A Study of the Boyce and Joseph Cases’ (2014) 46 (1) Inter-American Law Review 39 –  
59 at 58 - 59 said: (“The resulting precedents have resulted in a de facto repeal of the MDP in Barbados 
and other Commonwealth Caribbean countries through the diligent infusion of due process and human 
rights principles into post sentencing mandatory penalty death proceedings.”).   
 
841 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 32/61 (Adopted 8th December 1977 9th plenary 
meeting, 32 Session United Nations General Assembly New York 1977). 
  






The facts in Trimmingham case844 would suggest that he had satisfied the criteria for 
the discretionary death penalty based on the provision of article 4. 2 of the Inter-
American Convention which proclaims that the death sentence may only be imposed 
for the most serious crimes.845   However, the Privy Council in Trimmingham case 
held that it was not comparable with the worst cases of sadistic killings.846   
 
This pronouncement is evident of the application of attitudinal model approach by the 
Privy Council. It has shown its judicial preference by lifting the bar very high for the 
discretionary death penalty in cases where there is no mandatory sentencing.  The bare 
facts in this case are enough for one to think that Trimmingham was qualified for the 
discretionary death penalty. However, given the decision in this case it is now virtually 
impractical for the death penalty to be carried out in the region since the bar for this 
punishment is now extremely high.847  
 
This is made possible whereby the Privy Council adopted international law to guide 
its deliberation in domestic matters. In this regard it is worth noting article 6 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1976, in which the 
death penalty is carefully described as an exception to the right to life. Paragraph 2 of 
                                                 
844 Trimmingham v The Queen [2009] UK PC 25. 
 
845 Organization of American States General Secretariat, American Convention on Human Rights 
(Organization of American States San Jose Costa Rica 1969). 
 
846 Trimmingham v The Queen [2009] UK PC 25 said: (“The appellant behaved in a revolting fashion, 
but this case is not comparable with the worst cases of sadistic killings. Their Lordships would also 
point out that the object of keeping the appellant out of society entirely, which the judge considered 
necessary, can be achieved without executing him.”).     
 




that said article proclaims that: “In countries which have not abolished the death 
penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in 
accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime.”848  
 
In this research perspective the objective academic conclusion that can be derived here 
is that through its attitudinal model approach of judicial behaviour the Privy Council 
has restricted the death penalty in the region. A similar position was articulated by 
Novak who in a research on the global decline of the mandatory death penalty 
indicated that the death penalty has declined rapidly in the English-speaking world to 
the point of extinction in the Commonwealth .849  
 
5.6: Analysing the impact of the Legal Model on Prison Conditions 
In dealing with the issue of prison conditions it is necessary to have an understanding 
of the manner in which an inmate was detained while under a sentence of death.  The 
Inter‐American Commission on Human Rights (2011) in its report on ‘The Death 
Penalty in the Inter‐American Human Rights System: From Restrictions To Abolition’ 
indicated its expectation for the death penalty in terms of the right to humane treatment 
and punishment.850 It suggested in that report that under the conditions on death row 
                                                 
848 Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1976. 
 
849 Andrew Novak, The Global Decline of the Mandatory Death Penalty: Constitutional Jurisprudence 
and Legislative Reform in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean (Routledge, Taylor and Francis group 2014) 
1 – 177 at 1 indicated that (“The death penalty is in rapid and irreversible retreat everywhere in the 
English-speaking world, even in the most intransigent holdout like Texas and Singapore. The common 
law mandatory death sentence, automatic upon conviction for homicide or a small number of other 
serious felonies, has declined faster than this, to the point of extinction in the Commonwealth.”).    
 
850 Santiago A. Canton, Executive Secretary:  The Death Penalty in the Inter‐American Human Rights 
System: From Restrictions (The Inter‐American Commission on Human Rights 2011) 1 - 201. 
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States have the obligation to provide adequate prison conditions in keeping with the 
minimum international standards.851 
 
In the case Thomas and Another852 the issue of prison condition in terms of the 
obligation of the State was addressed. In that case the appellants were convicted of 
murder and sentenced to death in the High Court in the Republic of Trinidad and 
Tobago. That sentence was subsequently confirmed in that country’s Court of Appeal.  
 
In October 1997, the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago issued a 
series of instructions relating to persons with applications before the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Committee.853 
The appellants in the case Thomas and Another,854 filed a constitutional motion and 
in the High Court the death sentence against Thomas was vacated. The state appealed 
this decision and the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated the death 
penalty.  
                                                 
 
851 Santiago A. Canton, Executive Secretary:  The Death Penalty in the Inter‐American Human Rights 
System: From Restrictions (The Inter‐American Commission on Human Rights 2011) 1 – 201 at 176 
stated that (“States have the obligation, as guarantors of the rights of people under their custody, to 
provide adequate prison conditions, as interpreted in light of minimum international standards in this 
area. All detained persons have the right to live in conditions compatible with the inherent dignity of 
every human being. This entails a duty upon States to ensure that the manner and method of any 
deprivation of liberty do not exceed the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention, and that 
the detainees’ health and welfare are adequately safeguarded. A failure to do so may result in a violation 
of the absolute prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment.”).     
 
852 Thomas and Another v Baptiste [1998] 54 WIR 387, PC. 
 
853 Gazette of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, October 13, 1997. 
 




There was a further appeal to the Privy Council and that institution was very reluctant 
to set aside a death sentence based on the fact that prison conditions were cruel.  Thus 
the legal position of the Privy Council on the issue of prison conditions as was 
presented in the Thomas ‘and Another case  illustrated that: “Even if the prison 
conditions in themselves amounted to cruel and unusual treatment, however, and so 
constituted an independent breach of the appellants’ constitutional rights, 
commutation of the sentence would not be the appropriate remedy.”855 
 
Thus, the Privy Council’s legal model paradigm on prison conditions as it relates to 
the death penalty seems to suggest that any prolonged period that echoes down in 
years is deemed to be cruel.  However, prison condition in itself would not necessarily 
lead to the commutation of the death sentence to life imprisonment.856  
 
5.6.1: Analysing the impact of the Attitudinal Model on Prison Conditions 
It has been contended subsequently that prison conditions coupled with the manner in 
which the prisoner is treated constitute cruelty within the meaning of the Constitution 
and this could allow the death sentence to be commuted to life imprisonment.  There 
is evidence that the Privy Council has been deeply concerned with prison conditions 
in the context where the prisoner has been held under a sentence of death for many 
years.  This judicial institution recognised that such a period in terms of years of 
incarceration can be deemed cruel or inhuman in relation to the application of the 
                                                 
855 Thomas and Another v Baptiste [1998] 54 WIR 387, PC 427. 
 




death penalty.   The Privy Council’s paradigm in this regard was disclosed in Pratt 
case which indicated that it is an inhuman act to keep a man facing the agony of 
execution over a long extended period of time.857   
  
This protracted period of time in prison, the Privy Council described as the death row 
phenomenon.  In the Pratt case858 it expressed that the notion of the death row 
phenomenon should not be part of the jurisprudence in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  
This obvious judicial condemnation of prison conditions by the Privy Council is based 
primarily on our humanity.  This assessment can also be gleaned from the Privy 
Council attitudinal approach in the Pratt case in which it was stated that the death row 
phenomenon must not become established as a part of our jurisprudence.859  
 
It is clear that this is a judicially contrived statement made by the Privy Council which 
seems to overlook the appellate procedures in the region that implicitly allow for a 
period of delay for appellants to seek legitimate resort.  For instance in the Republic 
                                                 
857 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC 356, Lord 
Griffith said: (“There is an instructive revulsion against the prospect of hanging a man after he has been 
under sentence of death for many years.  What gives rise to this instructive revulsion?  The answer can 
only be our humanity; we regard it as an inhuman act to keep a man facing the agony of execution over 
a long extended period of time.”).        
 
858 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC. 
 
859 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC 359 Lord  
Griffith said: (“In their lordships’ view a State that wishes to retain capital punishment must accept the 
responsibility of ensuring that execution follows as swiftly as practicable after sentence, allowing a 
reasonable time for appeal and consideration of reprieve.  It is part of human condition that a condemned  
man will take every opportunity to save his life through use of the appellate procedure.  If the appellate  
procedure enables the prisoner to prolong the appellate hearings over a period of years, the fault is to 
be attributed to the appellate system that permits such delay and not to the prisoner who takes advantage  
of it.  Appellate procedures that echo down the years are not compatible with capital punishment.  The  




of Trinidad and Tobago delay in execution is implicitly provided for under section 51 
of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act Chapter 4 : 01. This provision indicates that 
all appeals in the case of a conviction involving the sentence of death shall be heard 
before the sentence is executed.860 However, in spite of this statutory authority the 
Privy Council suggested that the period of delay in execution which is echoed down 
in years would be deemed cruel and unconstitutional according to the Pratt 
decision.861   
 
The Privy Council although perplexed with the prison conditions in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, which it considered were unacceptable in a civilised 
society, was however reluctant to set aside a death sentence based on the fact that it 
was cruel.  That position was short lived as the Privy Council in the Lewis case862 
demonstrated its attitudinal model approach by ignoring and overruling the decision 
in the Thomas and Another case863 on the issue of prison conditions.  It held that prison 
conditions amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment.  Thus in the Lewis case the 
Privy Council deviated from the precedent in the Thomas case and allowed the 
appellants appeal on the said issue of prison condition.864  
 
                                                 
860  Supreme Court of Judicature Act of Trinidad and Tobago Chapter 4 : 01. s.51.  
 
861 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC 359. 
 
862 Lewis et al v Attorney General of Jamaica and another [2001] 2 AC 50, PC.   
 






5.7: Analysing the impact of the Legal Model on Ministerial Advice prior to 
Execution 
 
In addressing this issue in the De Freitas case Lord Diplock made the famous but 
interesting statement that: ‘Mercy is not subject to legal rights. It begins where legal 
rights end.’865  It is for this reason that the Privy Council held in the De Freitas case 
that: “the appellant had no legal right to have disclosed to him the material furnished 
to the advisory committee and to the Minister on which the Minister tendered advice 
to the Governor-General as to the exercise of the prerogative of mercy as the exercise 
of the royal prerogative was solely discretionary and not quasi-judicial.”866 
 
This pronouncement by the Privy Council in the De Freitas case867 is the legal model 
approach which indicates that since the function of the Minister is discretionary then 
there could be no challenge by way of judicial review to the advice given to the 
Advisory Committee on Mercy. This has been the clear legal position taken by the 
Privy Council on the issue of ministerial advice given prior to execution. 
 
5.7.1: Analysing the impact of the Institutional Model on Ministerial Advice prior 
to Execution 
 
The Privy Council in the Reckley case (No. 2)868  was again asked to make a 
determination on the issue dealing with whether the ministerial advice would be 
                                                 
865 De Freitas v Benny [1975] 27 WIR 318, PC 394. 
 
866 De Freitas v Benny [1975] 27 WIR 318, PC 389. 
 
867 De Freitas v Benny [1975] 27 WIR 318, PC. 
 




subject to judicial review, a similar issue to that decided in the De Freitas case.869  In 
that case, the Privy Council confirmed and maintained that its earlier decision in the 
De Freitas case remained good law.870 This clearly validates the institutional model 
approach whereby the Privy Council followed the precedent on the issue of ministerial 
advice prior to execution. 
 
Moreover, it also held in Reckley’s case (No. 2) that, in The Bahamas, ministerial 
advice was not amenable to judicial review, since the prerogative of mercy was not by 
its nature the subject of legal rights, but began where legal rights ended.  It further 
indicated that the designated Minister’s exercise of his personal discretion whether to 
advise the Governor-General that the law should or should not take its course was not 
justiciable.871   
 
5.7.2: Analysing the impact of the Attitudinal Model on Ministerial Advice prior 
to Execution 
 
Although the Privy Council in Reckley’s case (No. 2) 872 confirmed the decision in the 
De Freitas case873 it took a liberal stance and decided this issue differently in the Lewis 
case.874 In the Lewis case it was held that mercy can no longer be regarded as totally 
                                                 









873 De Freitas v Benny [1975] 27 WIR 318, PC. 
 




personal and discretionary.  In delivering the decision Lord Slynn demonstrated the 
attitudinal model approach and declared that: “The merits are not for the courts to 
review. It does not at all follow that the whole process is beyond review by the 
courts.”875  
 
This has been another issue in which the Privy Council sought to define the term 
cruelty.  In the context of the implementation of the death penalty this issue was raised 
and answered in the Lewis case.876  The issue embraced a prerogative challenge in the 
High Court of the advice given to the advisory body on mercy, to the Head of State 
based on procedural impropriety.  This procedural impropriety would be limited to the 
advice given by the appropriate Minister to the Advisory Committee on Mercy.877 
 
In the Lewis case878 the Court was in reality asked to review the legal model approach 
taken in the decision in the De Freitas case879 as both cases were adjudicated on the 
same issue.  The applicable issue which the Privy Council was asked to deal with in 
the cases was whether on a petition for mercy the appellants are entitled to know what 
material the Jamaican Privy Council had before it and to make representations as to 
                                                 




877 Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, s. 89. 
 
878 Lewis et al v Attorney General of Jamaica and another [2001] 2 AC 50, PC. 
 




why mercy should be granted.  In this matter the Privy Council clearly deviated from 
following the precedent. 
 
In this regard, through its attitudinal model the Privy Council’s approach held that a 
defect in procedure resulting from a breach of the rules of fairness, and of natural 
justice can give rise to a challenge to ministerial advice through judicial review. This 
would suggest that it would be cruel and unconstitutional for the prerogative of mercy 
to be exercised other than in accordance with the rights enshrined in the Constitution.  
According to the Lewis case where a fundamental breach exists there could be no 
justification for excluding judicial review of ministerial advice.880 
 
5.8: Analysing the impact of the Legal Model on the Opinion of International 
Human Rights Organisations 
 
In some Commonwealth Caribbean States when a convicted person has exhausted all 
legal procedures for judicial remedies, that person is entitled to petition to the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee and or the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, to have their case reviewed.  The applications to these bodies are to determine 
whether there was any derogation by the regional member States of any international 
standards or human right abuses.881 
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881 United Nations Secretariat, Human Rights and Social Economic Development, (United Nations 
Department of Public Information New York October Publication 1990) and Organization of American 
States General Secretariat, American Convention on Human Rights (Organization of American States 




In order to activate the service of these human rights institutions, a petition must be 
filed by the aggrieved party.  Usually, a petition will first be filed to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights and in the event that the petition fails, a similar petition 
will be filed to the United Nations Human Rights Committee.882  
 
There are provisions, which prevent the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights from hearing a petition which is pending or which has been examined and 
settled by another similar body of which the State concerned is a member.  Therefore, 
in order to maximise one’s benefit of these services, a petition will certainly be made 
first to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.883  
 
The Privy Council in the Pratt case884 recognised the importance of these two human 
rights bodies in relation to the death penalty.  That recognition certainly embraces an 
acceptable period of delay for their deliberations but insisted that it should not be 
prolonged.  The Privy Council demonstrates its acceptance of the role and functions 
of these bodies and as such it wished to say nothing to discourage Jamaica from 
benefiting from the wisdom of their deliberations.885 It is for this reason that the Privy 
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884 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC 361. 
 




Council allotted a total of eighteen months delay for matters to be dealt with before 
the international human rights bodies.886   
 
 This judicial allocation of a period of delay for international bodies which has been 
identified in the Pratt case has posed serious challenges to the regional governments.  
The reality is that these international bodies take longer than eighteen months to arrive 
at a decision. More importantly that statement is a demonstration of the legal model 
approach of the Privy Council on the issue. Of essence here is the fact that it judicially 
directed regional government to have a period of time to be allotted for delay on the 
part of international bodies.887  
 
5.8.1: Analysing the impact of the Attitudinal Model on the Opinion of 
International Human Rights Organisations 
 
Prior to the judgement in the Lewis case888 the Privy Council held in the Fisher case889 
and also in the Higgs case890 that it was not necessary to wait for the decision of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights before the execution is carried out.  
However, the position in the Lewis case demonstrates the liberal attitudinal approach 
of the Privy Council where it has in effect overruled the decision in the Fisher case891 
                                                 
886 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another, [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC 362 Lord 
Griffith suggested that (“It therefore appears to their Lordships that, provided that there is in future no 
acceptable delay in the domestic proceedings, complaints to the UNHRC from Jamaica should be 
infrequent and, when they occur, it should be possible for the committee to dispose of them with 
reasonable dispatch and (at most) within eighteen months.”).     
 
887 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC 341. 
 
888 Lewis et al v Attorney General of Jamaica and another [2001] 2 AC 50, PC. 
 
889 Fisher v Minister of Public Safety and Immigration (No. 2) [2000] 1 AC 434, PC. 
 
890 Higgs v Minister of National Security [2000] 2 WLR 1368, PC. 
 
891 Fisher v Minister of Public Safety and Immigration (No. 2) [2000] 1 AC 434, PC. 
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and the Higgs case.892 This is a further validation of the concept of judicial politics 
within the constitutionality of the death penalty.  
 
It should be noted that in addressing the issue concerning the model pronounced in the 
Pratt’s case,893 the Governor-General of Jamaica issued procedural instructions on 
August 6, 1997 which purported to address the delay caused by the international 
bodies.  Those instructions were featured in the challenge in the Lewis case894 and it 
was stated in part by the Governor-General of Jamaica that applications to 
International Human Rights Bodies by or on behalf of Prisoners under sentence of 
death must be conducted in as expeditious a manner as possible.895 A similar position 
was adopted by the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and 
published in the Gazette on October 13, 1997 with regards to the international 
bodies.896 
 
                                                 
 
892 Higgs v Minister of National Security [2000] 2 WLR 1368, PC. 
 
893 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another, [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC 362. 
 
894 Lewis et al v Attorney General of Jamaica and another [2001] 2 AC 50, PC.  
 
895 Lewis et al v Attorney General of Jamaica and another [2001] 2 AC 50, PC it stated in part that 
(“Whereas the Government of Jamaica has resolved [that] those applications to International Human 
Rights Bodies by or on behalf of Prisoners under sentence of death must be conducted in as expeditious 
a manner as possible.”).     
 
896 Lewis et al v Attorney General of Jamaica and another [2001] 2 AC 50, PC and the Gazette of the  
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago October 13, 1997 both indicate that: (“Where, after a period of six 
months, beginning on the date of despatch of such response, no recommendation has been received 
from the first International Human Rights body, the execution will not be further postponed unless 
intimation in writing is received by the Minister of National Security from or on behalf of the prisoner 




The instructions in both instances include a period of six months for each of the 
international bodies to arrive at a decision. However, where there is a failure or there 
is non-communication on the part of these bodies the execution will not be 
postponed.897 Naturally this directive seems to be in keeping with the legal model 
approach of the Privy Council which was illustrated in the Fisher case898 and the Higgs 
case.899    
 
 The legality of those instructions were tested in the Lewis case.900  In that case the 
Privy Council was asked to decide whether the prisoners have a right not to be 
executed before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights or the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee has finally decided on their petitions.  The Privy 
Council through its attitudinal model approach took a liberal position and proclaimed 
that the time limits imposed in the instructions violated the rules of natural justice and 
were therefore unlawful.901  
 
                                                 
897 Lewis et al v Attorney General of Jamaica and another [2001] 2 AC 50, PC and the Gazette of the  
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago October 13, 1997 both indicate that: (“Where, after a period of six 
months, beginning on the date of despatch of such response, no recommendation has been received 
from the first International Human Rights body, the execution will not be further postponed unless 
intimation in writing is received by the Minister of National Security from or on behalf of the prisoner 
that he intends to make an application to the second International Human Rights body.”). 
  
898 Fisher v Minister of Public Safety and Immigration (No. 2) [2000] 1 AC 434, PC. 
 
899 Higgs v Minister of National Security [2000] 2 WLR 1368, PC. 
 
900 Lewis et al v Attorney General of Jamaica and another [2001] 2 AC 50, PC. 
  
901 Lewis et al v Attorney General of Jamaica and another [2001] 2 AC 50, PC held that: (“Accordingly  
their Lordships are of the view that the time limits imposed by the Governor-General in his instructions  
of 6th August 1997 violated the rules of natural justice and were unlawful.  Execution consequent upon  
the Jamaican Privy Council’s decision without consideration of the Inter-American Commission report  




This decision by the Privy Council clearly suggests that it would be unlawful to carry 
out the execution without the opinion of the international bodies.  Thus, the objective 
assessment of the issue under consideration would be that the opinions of these human 
rights bodies do matter on petitions for reprieve.  
 
5.9: Summary of the Judicial Politics perspectives of the Privy Council 
 
The legal and textual analysis pursued in this chapter resulted in six categories of 
cruelty determined by the Privy Council to wit delay in execution, swiftness of 
execution, mandatory death sentence, prison condition, ministerial advice prior to 
execution and opinion of international human rights organisations. It is quite obvious 
that the advancement of these six categories of cruelty are in reality the judicial 
condemnation of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean. This is clearly 
deduced from the judicial expressions made during the determination of the 
Commonwealth constitutional appeal matters on the death penalty which highlights 
the identifiable categories of cruelty. 
 
Such expressions by the justices of the Privy Council are in reality the endorsement 
of the concept of judicial politics which is explored in this research. Therefore, a 
summary of such aspect of politics and the impacts they present on the death penalty 
in the Commonwealth Caribbean society are illustrated. It is worth noting that such 
expressions of judicial politics hinge primarily on the statements made by the liberal 





Delay of execution. In terms of delay of execution illustrated as a category of cruelty 
there are two identifiable impacts revealed in this category of cruelty. Firstly, there is 
the domestic impact whereby following the Pratt’s case902 Jamaica commuted 105 
death sentences to life imprisonment whereas Trinidad and Tobago commuted 52 
death sentences to life imprisonment.903 The politics in this area was illustrated by 
Lord Griffith and accepted by Lords Lane, Ackner, Lowry, Slynn and Wolf. Here they 
proclaimed that if capital punishment is to be retained it must be carried out with all 
possible expedition and any delay will constitute inhuman or degrading punishment 
or other treatment and as such would be cruel.904 
 
Secondly, there is the public policy impact emanated from the proclamation of the 
justices in the Privy Council in which it was considered that delay in excess of five 
years is inhuman or degrading treatment. This impact was illustrated in the said Pratt 
case905 by Lord Griffith and is reflective as a directive to Jamaican government.906  
                                                 
902 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC. 
 
903 Michael De La Bastide ‘The Case for a Caribbean Court of Appeal’ (1995) 5 Caribbean Law Review  
401. 
 
904 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another, [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC 341 Lord 
Griffith held that: (“If capital punishment is to be retained it must be carried out with all possible 
expedition.  Capital appeals must be expedited and legal aid allocated at an early stage.  Although no 
attempt is made to set a rigid timetable, the entire domestic appeal process should be completed within 
approximately two years.  If in any case execution is to take place more than five years after sentence, 
there will be strong grounds for believing that the delay is such as to constitute “inhuman or degrading 
punishment or other treatment.”).      
      
905 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC. 
 
906 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC 362 Lord 
Griffith directed that: (“In any case in which execution is to take place more than five years after 
sentence there will be strong grounds for believing that the delay is such as to constitute “inhuman or 
degrading punishment or other treatment”. It therefore, rather than waiting for all those prisoners who 
have been in death row under sentence of death for five years or more to commence proceedings 
pursuant to section 25 of the Constitution, the Governor-General now refers all such cases to the JPC 
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Interestingly, Lord Griffith’s perspective in the Pratt’s case907 was the complete    
opposite to Lord Diplock’s perspective in the De Freitas908 and Abbott cases909 and to 
Lord Bridge perspective in the Riley case. In fact in the Riley’s case Lord Bridge was 
adamant that whatever the reasons for (or the length of ) any delay in the execution of 
a sentence of death lawfully imposed, the delay could afford no ground for holding 
the execution to be inhuman or degrading or other treatment.910  
 
That being the case then the only objective conclusion that one could arrive at in 
relation to the statements made by Lord Griffith in the Pratt case as opposed to the 
statements made by Lord Bridge in the Riley case and also Lord Diplock in the De 
Freitas case is that the former statements (of Lord Griffith) were driven by politics. 
The point to note is that Lord Griffith judicially contrived the statements in the Privy 
Council that impacts ominously on the Commonwealth Caribbean Society.911 
 
Swiftness of execution. In addressing swiftness of execution as a category of cruelty, 
the concept of judicial politics was very pronounced and it resulted in a twofold impact 
on the death penalty within the Commonwealth Caribbean society. Firstly, the justices 
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907 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC. 
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of the Privy Council established that swiftness of execution constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment and secondly, they established a reasonable notice of time for 
execution rule as a requirement prior to any execution. The effectiveness of this rule 
means that notice must be given at least four days prior to execution which must 
include a weekend.  
 
The Guerra case is quite relevant in the present instance. In that case the judgement 
was delivered by Lord Goff to which Lords Keith, Slynn, Nolan and Nicholls agreed. 
In the first instance those justices of the Privy Council exhibited judicial politics 
concept by saying that justice and humanity require that a man under sentence of death 
should be given reasonable notice of the time of his execution.912 In addition, in the 
second instance the justices stated that a period of at least four clear days, including 
weekends will be necessary to constitute such reasonable time.913  
 
                                                 
912 Guerra v Baptiste and others [1995] 4 All ER 583, PC 596 [d], [e] it was stated that: (“Their 
Lordships are of the opinion that justice and humanity require that a man under sentence of death should 
be given reasonable notice of the time of his execution.  Such notice is required to enable a man to 
arrange his affairs, to be visited by members of his intimate family before he dies, and to receive 
spiritual advice and comfort to enable him to compose himself, as best as he can, to face his ultimate 
ordeal.  Their Lordships understand that this principle was long recognised in England in the days when 
capital punishment was still in force; and for reasons which will shortly appear, the like principle 
appears to have long been accepted in Trinidad and Tobago.  In these circumstances they are satisfied 
that to execute a condemned man without first giving him such notice of his execution would constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment contrary to section 5 (2) (b) of the Constitution.”).            
  
913 Guerra v Baptiste and others [1995] 4 All ER 583, PC 598 [b], [c] stated that: (“It follows that, in 
their Lordships’ opinion, the due process of law requires that a reasonable time should be allowed to 
elapse between the reading of the warrant of execution and the execution itself, not only for 
humanitarian purposes which their Lordships have previously described, but also to provide a 
reasonable opportunity for the condemned man to take advice and if necessary seek relief from the 
courts.  The settled practice that a period of at least four clear days (including weekends) will be 
necessary to constitute such reasonable time should be regarded as applicable as much to the latter 




An objective evaluation of both statements will clearly indicate that the justices of the 
Privy Council have abandoned their role as interpreters of the law and have taken on 
the role of legislators. This has brought into shape conflict the issue of the separation 
of powers, an issue though relevant does not form part of this research. It is obvious 
that both statements were judicially contrived by Lord Goff and justices in the Privy 
Council and it is a clear exhibition of the justices’ liberal approach of personal 
ideology in the attitudinal model of judicial politics.914  
 
Mandatory death sentence. The mandatory death sentence was defined through the 
concept of judicial politics in the Privy Council as a category of cruelty and this 
resulted in several impacts on the Commonwealth Caribbean society.  In this regard 
the justices in the Privy Council acknowledged the inhumanity of the mandatory death 
penalty. Ancillary to this is that the death penalty should only be available where there 
is no possibility of reform and social reintegration of the offender. In addition, the 
imposition of the death penalty requires special justification and it should be reserved 
for the worst of the worst cases.915 
 
The rulings of the Privy Council could be categorised in two areas: those rulings which 
are applicable for the Eastern Caribbean and Belize and those which are applicable for 
the wider Caribbean such as Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados. In the Eastern 
Caribbean and Belize, the trio of cases which collectively dealt with the issue were 
                                                 
914 Guerra v Baptiste and others [1995] 4 All ER 583, PC 596 [d], [e] 
 
915 Hughes v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 284, PC; Fox v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 259, PC and Reyes v  




the Hughes case, Fox case and Reyes case. Lord Rodger delivered the judgement in 
those matters to which Lords Bingham, Hutton, Hobhouse and Millett agreed.916 In 
delivering the judgement the justices of the Privy Council indicated that in a crime of 
this kind, there may well be matters relating both to the offence and the offender which 
ought to be considered before sentence is passed.917          
             
This is a clear denunciation by Lord Rodgers in the Privy Council of the mandatory 
death penalty in the Eastern Caribbean countries and in Belize. Hood in a memoriam  
on Lord Rodger presented him in the context of one who recognised the need for 
continuing improvement and reform of the law.918 Based on the principle of objectivity 
there is no indication that such a pronouncement in the Hughes case, Fox case and 
Reyes case was as a result of any legislative or constitutional interpretation but was 
the result of the justices’ attitudinal ideology akin to judicial politics.919  
 
                                                 
916 Hughes v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 284, PC; Fox v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 259, PC and Reyes v  
The Queen [2002] 2 AC 235, PC. 
 
917 Hughes v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 284, PC; Fox v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 259, PC and Reyes v The 
Queen [2002] 2 AC 235, PC it was decided that: (“In a crime of this kind, there may well be matters 
relating both to the offence and the offender which ought to be considered before sentence is passed.  
To deny the offender the opportunity, before sentence is passed, to seek to persuade the court that in all 
the circumstances to condemn him to death would be disproportionate and inappropriate is to treat him 
as no human being should be treated and thus to deny him his basic humanity.”).   
 
918 Caroline M. Hood, In Memoriam: Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (1944-2011) (School of Law, 
University of Aberdeen 2011) presented: (“the belief that Lord Rodger did not place the law and 
particularly Scots law, on a pedestal but recognised the need for continuing improvement and 
reform.”)..    
 
919 Hughes v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 284, PC; Fox v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 259, PC and Reyes v The 




Whereas in the wider Caribbean the decisions in the Roodal case920 and the Matthew 
case921 are of practical importance.  In the Roodal case Lord Bingham delivered the 
majority judgement to which Lords Steyn and Walker agreed and held that the 
mandatory death penalty in Trinidad and Tobago is unconstitutional. On the other 
hand Lords Millett and Rodger dissented 922   
 
However, in the Matthew case nine justices sat in the Privy Council to deal with this 
matter. They were Lord Hoffmann who delivered the majority judgement to which 
Lords Hope, Scott, Rodger and Zacca agreed. The justices overruled the previous 
decision in the Roodal case and held that the mandatory death penalty in Trinidad and 
Tobago is constitutional and could only be abolished through an Act of Parliament.923   
In this said case Lord Bingham and Lord Nicholls each wrote a dissenting judgement 
while Lords Steyn and Walker subscribed to the dissenting judgements.  
 
What is interesting in the Matthew case is the fact that the justices in the Privy Council 
corrected the previous decision in the Roodal case. In fact the Roodal judgement did 
not seriously consider section 6 (1) and 6 (3)  of the Constitution whose provisions 
contain the saving clause that saved the death penalty law as an existing punishment 
                                                 
920 Roodal v The State of Trinidad and Tobago [2004] 2 WLR 652, PC. 
 
921 Matthew v The State of Trinidad and Tobago [2005] 1 AC 433, PC. 
 
922 Roodal v The State of Trinidad and Tobago [2004] 2 WLR 652, PC. 
 




for persons guilty of murder in Trinidad and Tobago.924 This therefore means that 
based on the principle of objectivity the Roodal judgement was clearly driven by 
judicial politics.925 
 
Prison conditions. The Lewis case is applicable with regard to this and the next two 
categories of cruelty and it clearly demonstrates the concept of judicial politics by the 
justices of the Privy Council. In terms of prison conditions the overall impact of 
judicial politics in the Privy Council is that that prison conditions could amount to 
inhuman and degrading treatment.926 
 
Ministerial advice prior to execution. The impact of this category of cruelty illustrates  
that the merits of the petition for reprieve are not for the court to review but where 
there is the failure of the observance of the rules of natural justice of fair play in action  
same would be cruel. 
 
Opinions of International Human Rights Bodies on the petition of reprieve. The 
overall impact of this category of cruelty is a recognition of international bodies. It is 
worth noting that the Privy Council in the Pratt case urged that the decision of 
international tribunals be afforded weight and respect. In the Lewis case, Lord Slynn 
                                                 
924
Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, s. 6 (1) (3) and Margaret A. Burham, ‘Saving 
Constitutional Rights from Judicial Scrutiny: The Savings Clause in the Law of the Commonwealth 
Caribbean’ (2004) 36 (2 & 3) Inter-American Law Review 249 -269 at 250.  
 
925 Ibid.  
 






showed appreciation for all three categories of cruelty which is a clear departure from 
the legal model approach which in each instance spoke to the contrary. However, of 
importance here is the fact that Lord Hoffman denounced the attitudinal model 
approach of the Privy Council in a dissenting judgment in Lewis et al v. Attorney 
General of Jamaica and another.927  
 
That statement by Lord Hoffman, though a dissenting one, is also denunciation of the 
judicial politics perspective of the justices in the Privy Council towards the 
constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  This concept 
of judicial politics seems to be a dominant perspective for the judiciary to address 
public and social policies in recent times.928  
 
In summary the motivation of justices in their decisions on policy are not only 
reflected in their judicial preferences but could be deduced from areas outside the 
courts such as the judge’s political ideology. This would suggest that a justice of the 
Privy Council exhibits both judicial and political decision-making role. Garoupa in a 
study on judicial decision making subscribed to this notion by indicating that there are 
some specific aspects of the legal environment that account for the diversion in 
                                                 
927 Lewis et al v Attorney General of Jamaica and another [2001] 2 AC 50, PC Lord Hoffman said: (“If 
the board feels able to depart from a previous decision simply because its members on a given occasion 
have a ‘doctrinal disposition to come out differently’, the rule of law itself will be damaged and there 
will be no stability in the administration of justice in the Caribbean.”).        
 
928 Diana Woodhouse, The Law and Politics More Powers to Judges – and to the People? 54 (Hansard  
Society for Parliamentary Government 2001) 223 – 237 at 234 eloquently indicated that: (“Judges will 
not only be scrutinising decisions made by those in public office but will also be giving effect to states 
in a way which is compatible with Convention rights ‘in so far as it is possible to do so’. This means 
that they will where necessary read words into statutes to ensure compatibility, even if this alters the 
substance of what Parliament intended. Moreover, through making a ‘declaration of incompatibility’ 




decisions.929 By comparison, in a similar study conducted in another jurisdiction, 
Ostberg and Wetstein concluded that Canadian Supreme Court justices are indeed 




Goldberg and Dershowitz in their research on the death penalty surmised that from 
the analysis of cruel and unusual punishment doctrine it is obvious that there are a set 
of principles which condemn the death penalty as being unconstitutional.931 In similar 
fashion the data presented in this chapter demonstrate that the role of the Privy Council 
and its justices in decision-making on the death penalty for the Commonwealth 
Caribbean is certainly not a simple one (see table 5.1).  
 
In October 2011 the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office produced a journal on 
‘HMG Strategy for Abolition of the Death Penalty 2010-2015’ which sets out the 
                                                 
929 Nuno Garoupa, Constitutional Review (Texas A&M University School of Law 2016) 1- 26 at 3 
stated that: (“Realistically judicial decision-making in a constitutional court, as in any court, reflects a 
complex set of different determinants, including personal attributes, attitudes (policy or ideological 
preferences being relevant), peer pressure, intra-court interaction (a natural pressure for consensus and 
court reputation; a common objective to achieve supremacy of the constitutional court), and party 
politics (loyalty to the appointer) within a given constitutional and doctrinal environment.”).              
 
930 C. L. Ostberg and Matthew E. Wetstein, Equality Cases and the Attitudinal Model in the Supreme 
Court of Canada (University of the Pacific and the Canadian Political Science Association, Winnipeg, 
Manitoba, June 5, 2004) 1 – 33 at 20. 
 
931 Arthur J. Goldberg and Alan M. Dershowitz, ‘Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional’ 
(1970).83 Harvard Law Review 1773 – 1819 at 1797 – 1798 surmised that: (“The conclusion to be 
drawn from this analysis of cruel and unusual punishment doctrine is that the clause has generated a set 
of principles which, when coupled systematically with traditional modes of adjudication applied to the 
protection of other primary rights, condemn the death penalty as unconstitutional. These principles are 




United Kingdom’s policy on the death penalty, and offers guidance to Foreign 
Commonwealth Office overseas missions on how they can take its objectives foward. 
One of its overarching goals which was also illustrated in that journal was the 
reduction in the numbers of executions and further restrictions on the use of the death 
penalty in retentionist countries.932  
 
In this present research the analysis of the data collected seems to suggest that the 
Privy Council has been fulfilling this overarching goal. In fact the said British Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office journal indicated quite interestingly that the United 
Kingdom has had successes over the restricting of the use of the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean.933    
 
It seems clear that the Privy Council has satisfactorily fulfilled the overarching goal 
of the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office by adopting models or 
patterns of behaviour which are the basic procedures for arriving at judicial decisions 
on the death penalty. It was suggested by Dahl that the Court operates to confer 
legitimacy upon the basic patterns of behaviour required for the operation of a 
democracy.934 
                                                 
932 British Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘HMG Strategy for Abolition of the Death 
Penalty 2010-2015’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2011) 1 -23 at 5. 
 
933 British Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘HMG Strategy for Abolition of the Death 
Penalty 2010-2015’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2011) 1 -23 at 10. 
 
934 Robert A. Dahl, ‘Decision-making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-maker’ 
(1957) Journal of Public Law 279-295 suggested that: (“The existence of these patterns of behaviour 
in turn presupposes widespread agreement (particularly among the politically active and influential 
segments of the population) on the validity and propriety of behaviour. Although its record is by no 
means lacking in serious blemishes, at its best the Court operates to confer legitimacy, not simply on 
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The point to note here is that these patterns of judicial behaviour demonstrate the 
extent to which the Privy Council has gone outside the established legal criteria of 
precedent, statute and Constitution or other legal model approaches in decision 
making on issues addressing the death penalty. In this regard Mitchell said in a 
commentary on the death penalty that: “Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the 
Supreme Court’s regulation of capital punishment has been its failure to persuasively 
explain why the Court’s judgments surrounding the use of capital punishment should 
prevail over the decisions made by the political branches.”935 
 
Moreover, the action of the Privy Council is also a demonstration of the magnitude of 
the relation of the influence of judicial politics in the decision making on the death 
penalty at the level of the said Privy Council. However, Tennen put it quite succinctly 
when he said that the Supreme Court has the power to affect the death penalty.936  
 
It is worth noting that Antoine reflected on the Privy Council decisions on the 
constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean and said that 
the judgments were hugely unpopular in the region, by governments and peoples alike 
who, by and large, supported the death penalty. Moreover, they believe that the Privy 
                                                 
the particular and parochial policies of the dominant political alliance, but upon the basic patterns of 
behaviour required for the operation of a democracy.”).        
 
935 Jonathan F. Mitchell, ‘Death Penalty Commentary Series Capital Punishment and the Courts’ (2017) 
130 Harvard Law Review Forum 269 -275 at 274. 
 
936 Eric Tennen, ‘The Supreme Court’s Influence on the Death Penalty in America: A Hollow Hope?’ 
(2005) Public Interest Law Journal 251 – 275 at 257 said: (“These statistics contradict the view that 
certain Supreme Court decisions have been a catalyst for curtailing the death penalty. As noted, the 
Supreme Court has the power to affect the death penalty. Given that, many people seem to believe that 




Council displayed a serious disregard for the intent and spirit of the constitutions in 
question and the will of the Caribbean peoples.937 The objective assessment of this 
statement is a recognition and validation of the presence of judicial politics at the level 
of the Privy Council similar  to recognition made by the then Prime Minister Manning 
in the 2007 statement on the consultation on crime in Trinidad and Tobago.938  
 
In similar vein the International Commission against the Death Penalty in an article 
on the death penalty and the most serious crimes, validated the strategic role of the 
Privy Council in death penalty matters.939 In a review of its work on the death penalty 
situation in the Commonwealth Caribbean it clearly articulated and glorified the 
ideology of the Privy Council as demonstrated in its research.940 
                                                 
937 Rose-Marie B. Antoine, ‘Waiting to Exhale: Commonwealth Caribbean Law and Legal Systems’ 
(2005) 29 (2) Nova Law Review 140 – 169 at 152 – 153 indicated that: (“These judgments were hugely 
unpopular in the region, by governments and peoples alike who, by and large, supported the death 
penalty. Many believed that the Privy Council was attempting to force its own belief that the death 
penalty should be outlawed (which is the position in the United Kingdom) onto Commonwealth 
Caribbean legal systems. Notwithstanding cries of judicial imperialism made by the general public, it 
is clear from precedents from the European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee that the position on undue delay was one grounded in international law. Yet, the 
judgments displayed a serious disregard for the intent and spirit of the constitutions in question and the 
will of the Caribbean peoples.”).     
 
938 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Consultations on Crime in Trinidad and Tobago (Ministry 
of the National Security Trinidad 2007) 79. 
 
939 Secretariat of the International Commission Against the Death Penalty, ‘The Death penalty and the 
most serious crimes’ (2013) International Commission against the Death Penalty Review 1 – 39. 
 
940 Secretariat of the International Commission against the Death Penalty, ‘The Death Penalty and the 
most serious crimes’ (2013) International Commission Against the Death Penalty Review 12 illustrates: 
(“The continuing limitations and rare use of the death penalty were attributable in part to rulings by a 
number of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies including the Caribbean Court of Justice and the Eastern 
Caribbean Supreme Court, the UN Human Rights Committee, the Inter-American human rights system 
and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council based in London (traditional court of appeal for 
Commonwealth nations). Between them these bodies have engaged in strategic litigation which has 
resulted in prohibition of the mandatory death penalty, limits on the number of years prisoners can 
spend on death row, and the restriction of capital crimes to exceptionally heinous murders (“worst of 




Thus, the strategic litigations have defined the constitutionality of the death penalty in 
the Commonwealth Caribbean. This resulted in the judicial prohibition and restriction 
of the death penalty and as such described in clear terms the present research analytic 
model of judicial politics.941 Peel in her writing echoes the theory that waiting to die 
inevitably causes suffering, but a delay between sentence and execution is an obvious 
necessity for the appeals process.942  
 
This research clearly endorsed the attitudinal ideological approach of the Privy 
Council from this research perspective. In the words of Amaral-Garcia and Garoupa’s 
research on the judicial politics at the Privy Council, they indicated that the so-called 
attitudinal model sees judicial preferences, with special emphasis on ideology, as the 
main explanatory model of judicial decision making.943 Therefore, this research 
                                                 
941 Secretariat of the International Commission against the Death Penalty, ‘The Death Penalty and the  
most serious crimes’ (2013) International Commission Against the Death Penalty Review 12. 
 
942 Diana Peel, ‘Clutching at Life, Waiting to Die: The Experience of Death Row Incarceration’ (2013) 
14(3), Western Criminology Review 61-72 at 66 stated that: (“Waiting to die inevitably causes 
suffering, but a delay between sentence and execution is necessary for the appeals process. 
Internationally, courts have deemed that it only becomes cruel when the delay is no longer attributable 
to a legitimate purpose, because the appeals process is not being carried out in a timely manner. This is 
not to say that appeals should be expedited, as that could result in a less thorough judicial review, and 
render the safeguard of the appeals process meaningless. Rather, if a state wishes to maintain capital 
punishment, it must have a fully functioning and efficient capital appeals process that is capable of 
carrying out thorough judicial reviews of all of those that the state sentences to death in a timely fashion. 
If the system cannot do that, then the fault is with the system, and it is not just to subject men and 
women to years on death row because the system does not work.”).    
 
943 Sofia Amaral-Garcia, and Nuno Garoupa, Judicial Politics at the Privy Council: Empirical Evidence 
(ETH Zurich, Center for Law and Economics 2014) 1 – 47 at 7 said: (“There is vast literature on judicial 
politics. Different theories have been developed, mainly in the context of the United States, to explain 
judicial behavior. In this respect, there is an important ongoing debate over whether judges are guided 
solely by the law, solely by their personal ideology, or by a mixture of the two. Formalists or legalists 
argue that judges simply interpret and apply the law in a largely conformist view of precedents. In other 
words, judges are fundamentally guided by what the law says and abide by a strict legal authoritative 
interpretation. The so-called attitudinal model sees judicial preferences, with special emphasis on 
ideology, as the main explanatory model.”).             
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illustrates the impact of this model arising from the post-conviction process, which 
generate delay in execution, swiftness of execution, mandatory/discretionary death 
sentence, prison conditions, ministerial advice prior to execution and opinions of 
international human rights bodies on the petition of reprieve which were formally 























ANALYSIS OF THE  
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES THAT IMPACT ON THE DEATH  
PENALTY IN THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN  
 
 
This chapter presents a discussion on human rights issues which complement the legal 
analysis presented in the previous chapter. Both analysis have comingled to present 
the impact of the application of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean. 
Hammond, Chief Executive of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, indicated 
that human rights are the basic rights and freedoms that belong to everyone.944   It 
entails the rights that are inherent to all human beings. Donnelly in his writing on 
protecting dignity added that human rights are, according to the literal sense of the 
term, the rights that we have simply because we are human.945  
 
Thus what are considered human rights are expressed in some major international 
treaties. These include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its optional protocols, the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child and the Convention against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  
 
These instruments are known collectively as the International Bill of Human Rights. 
They address a broad array of human rights, including those relevant to the death 
                                                 
944 Mark Hammond, Human Rights: Human Lives (Equality and Human Rights Commission 2014) 1 – 
81 at 5.  
 
945 Jack Donnelly, Protecting Dignity: Agenda for Human Rights Human Dignity And Human Rights 
(Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 2009) 1 – 92 at 8. 
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penalty. It should be noted that all people are guaranteed protections from 
discrimination, torture, and cruel or unusual punishment, as well as the right to life, 
security of person, due process and equality before the courts. Johnson, writing on the 
subject the reflections on the death penalty, indicated that a central premise of human 
rights thinking is that each and every human being has an innate dignity that must be 
respected. Moreover, respect for one’s human dignity is the original human right from 
which other human rights flow.946  In this regard a reflection will be made on those 
aspects of human rights that are appropriate only to the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean.   
 
6.1: Impact of the International Human Rights norms towards the Death 
Penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In an article on human rights examination, 
case study and jurisprudence, Goel said that the deliberate institutionalized taking of 
human life by the State is the greatest degradation of the human personality 
imaginable.947 This assertion is an issue of human rights which has brought into sharp 
focus a statement made by Hanna Jr., Director of the Legal Aid Clinic, Eugene 
Dupuch Law School, The Bahamas in which he said that the death penalty really is a 
dangerous weapon in the hands of the legal system.948 
                                                 
946 Robert Johnson, ‘Reflections on the Death Penalty: Human Rights, Human Dignity, and 
Dehumanization in the Death House’ (2014) 13 (2) Seattle Journal For Social Justice, 583 – 598 at 583 
- 584. 
 
947 Vaibhav Goel, ‘Capital punishment: A human right examination case study and jurisprudence’ 3 
(9), 2008 International NGO Journal, 152-161 at 152.  
 
948 Amnesty International Secretariat, ‘Death Penalty in the English-Speaking Caribbean A Human 
Rights Issue’ (Amnesty International publications 2012) 15 it was said:  (“It’s very easy to convict  
someone under our legal system who may be innocent, and there is no redress, unless you have public  
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This statement was clearly evident in a reflection of the facts in Pratt case.949 In that 
case it was quite noticeable that Lord Griffith in the Privy Council was concerned 
about the issue of human rights in the application of the death penalty.950 
 
 
The reality of this suggestion is the consideration that the application of the death 
penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean is a violation of the most basic of human 
rights since the states in the region must recognise the right to life.951  In similar vein 
Justice Chaskalson in the South African Constitutional Court in the case Makwanyane 
and Mchunu,952 said: "The rights to life and dignity are the most important of all 
human rights . . . . And this must be demonstrated by the State in everything that it 
does, including the way it punishes criminals."953  
 
The death penalty is a denial of the most basic human rights which violates one of the 
most fundamental principles under widely accepted human rights law and that states 
                                                 
campaigns to overturn a decision, and we don’t have that kind of culture in the Bahamas, so given the  
absence of that sort of activism in our community, the death penalty really is a dangerous weapon in 
the hands of the legal system.”).     
 
949 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC. 
 
950 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC. 343 it was 
stated that: (“The statement of these bare facts is sufficient to bring home to the mind of any person of 
normal sensitivity and compassion the agony of mind that these men must have suffered as they have 
alternated between hope and despair in the fourteen years they have been in prison facing the gallows....  
It is against this disturbing background that their lordships must now determine this constitutional 
appeal and must in particular re-examine the correctness of the majority decision in Riley and Others v 
Attorney-General of Jamaica and Another (1982). 35 WIR. 279.”).           
 
951 Roger Hood, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective (Oxford University Press 2002) 7. 
 
952 Makwanyane and Mchunu v. The State, 16 HRLJ 154 (Const. Ct. of S. Africa 1995). 
 




must recognize the right to life. It is in this regard, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights which was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 
December 1948 through the General Assembly resolution 217A. That Declaration 
presents a common standard of achievements for all peoples and all nations.  
 
With regard to the application of the death penalty two of the articles of the 
Declaration are significant where human rights are concern. In principle article 3 of 
the said Declaration stated that “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
person.” This article suggest that the use of the death penalty in Commonwealth 
Caribbean violates the region’s obligations under international human rights law and 
this was evident in the Pratt’s decision.954  
 
Moreover, article 3 is complimented with article 5 of the said Declaration which 
prevent and prohibit discrimination and torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment. This later article specifically states that “No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”  In this regard, 
Prokosch writing on the subject of human rights illustrated its significance by saying 
that the cruelty of the death penalty is manifest not only in the execution but in the 
time spent under sentence of death.955 
                                                 
954 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC 343. 
 
955 Eric Prokosch, ‘Human Rights V. The Death Penalty Abolition and Restriction in Law and Practice’ 
(1998) Amnesty International 1 – 14 at 2 illustrated that (“The cruelty of the death penalty is manifest 
not only in the execution but in the time spent under sentence of death, during which the prisoner is 
constantly contemplating his or her own death at the hands of the state. This cruelty cannot be justified, 




The Privy Council has recognised this aspect of cruelty in terms of prison conditions. 
For instance, it ruled in this regard in the Pratt’s case that in any case in which 
execution is to take place more than five years after sentence there will be strong 
grounds for believing that the delay is such as to constitute inhuman or degrading 
punishment or other treatment.956 This statement most definitely demonstrates the 
Privy Council concern as it relates to inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment 
and subtly placing a ban on the death penalty. 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It should be further noted that the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is one of the key documents 
discussing the imposition of the death penalty in international human rights law.  This 
covenant was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by the 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December, 1966. 
Subsequently it came into force on March 23, 1976.957 
 
Accordingly article 6 of the said Covenant contains restrictions to the death penalty 
since it illustrates guarantees regarding the right to life, and also contains important 
safeguards to be followed by signatories who retain the death penalty. It is proclaimed 
in article 6 (1) of the said Covenant that “Every human being has the inherent right to 
life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
                                                 
956 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC 341. 
 
957 United Nations, ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (ICCPR) in 1976 (Adopted  
and opened for signature, ratification and accession) by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of  




life.” In addition, article 6 (2) of the said Covenant states that: “In countries which 
have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the 
most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission 
of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty 
can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court.” 
 
Moreover, article 6 (4) of the Covenant requires countries to ensure that “Anyone 
sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence. 
Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all 
cases.” Whereas article 6 (5) of the said Covenant provided for restriction and states 
that a “Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below 
eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.” Additionally, 
article 6 (6) of the said Covenant provides that “Nothing in this article shall be 
invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party 
to the present Covenant.” 
 
The Lewis et al case is interesting in this regard since it dealt specifically with human 
rights issues in three areas namely prison conditions, ministerial advice prior to 
execution and appeal to International Human Rights Bodies on the petition for 
reprieve. 958 The Privy Council in that case gave recognition to Article 6 of 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. By so doing it restricted the 
                                                 




death penalty on human rights ground and thereby created issues of cruelty. With such 
a creation it resulted in the Privy Council overruling its previous decision in cases of 
Thomas and Another v Baptiste,959 Reckley v Minister of Public Safety and 
Immigration and others,960 and Fisher v Minister of Public Safety and Immigration961 
of which there were no previous issues of cruelty.  
 
Moreover, the Privy Council decision in the Lewis et al case962 naturally subscribed 
to the thinking of the Inter‐American Commission on Human Rights. In its report on 
the conditions of person on death row it stated that States have the obligation, as 
guarantors of the rights of people under their custody, to provide adequate prison 
conditions, as interpreted in light of minimum international standards in this area.963  
 
Further, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights illustrated similar restrictions to 
the death penalty by indicating that the Convention adopts an approach that is clearly 
incremental in character. That is, the Convention imposes restrictions designed to 
                                                 
959 Thomas and Another v Baptiste [1998] 54 WIR 387, PC. 
 
960 Reckley v Minister of Public Safety and Immigration and others (No. 2) [1996] 1 All ER 562, PC. 
 
961 Fisher v Minister of Public Safety and Immigration (No. 2) [2000] 1 AC 434, PC. 
 
962 Lewis et al v Attorney General of Jamaica and another [2001] 2 AC 50, PC.   
 
963 Inter‐American Commission on Human Rights, The Death Penalty In The Inter‐American Human 
Rights System: From Restrictions To Abolition, (Organization of American States 2011) 1 – 201 at 176 
indicated that: (“States have the obligation, as guarantors of the rights of people under their custody, to 
provide adequate prison conditions, as interpreted in light of minimum international standards in this 
area. All detained persons have the right to live in conditions compatible with the inherent dignity of 
every human being. This entails a duty upon States to ensure that the manner and method of any 
deprivation of liberty do not exceed the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention, and that 
the detainees’ health and welfare are adequately safeguarded. A failure to do so may result in a violation 




delimit strictly the application of the penalty to bring about its gradual 
disappearance.964 
 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee, the United Nations body whose 
interpretations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are 
considered authoritative, discussed article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights in detail in its General Comment in 1982. The Committee 
clarified that while the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights did not 
explicitly require the abolition of the death penalty, abolition was desirable, and as 
such the Committee concludes that all measures of abolition should be considered as 
progress in the enjoyment of the right to life.965 
 
The Committee also said that the death penalty should be an exceptional measure. It 
reiterated important procedural safeguards including that the death penalty can only 
be imposed in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the 
crime, and that the right to a fair hearing by an independent tribunal, the presumption 
of innocence, minimum guarantees for the defence, and the right to review by a higher 
tribunal must all be strictly observed. As at September 2019, the International 
                                                 
964 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) And 4(4) 
American Convention On Human Rights) Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 of September 8, 1983, para. 57. 
  
965  High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘CCPR General Comment No. 6: Article 6 Right to Life’ 
(Adopted at the Sixteenth Session of the Human Rights Committee, on 30 April 1982) (Office of the 




Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has 173 state parties and a further six 
countries have been signatories but have not yet ratified the Covenant.966  
 
The Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.  The Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty is the only treaty directly 
concerned with abolishing the death penalty, which is open to signatures from all 
countries in the world. It came into force in 1991, and as October 2019 there has been 
88 states parties and 39 signatories.967  
 
In this regard it is stated in the preamble to the protocol that the abolition of the death 
penalty contributes to enhancement of human dignity and the progressive 
development of human rights.968 Article 1(1) of the Second Optional Protocol states 
that “No one within the jurisdiction of a State Party to the present Protocol shall be 
executed.” and whereas article 1(2) of the said Protocol was instructive when it said 
that “Each State Party shall take all necessary measures to abolish the death penalty 
within its jurisdiction.”  
                                                 
966 High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘CCPR General Comment No. 6: Article 6 Right to Life’ 
(Adopted at the Sixteenth Session of the Human Rights Committee, on 30 April 1982) (Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights) 1- 2. 
 
     967 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty’ (Adopted and proclaimed by at 
the Forty-fourth session of the General Assembly resolution 44/128 of 15 December 1989) 1 – 2. 
 
968United Nations General Assembly, ‘Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty’ (Adopted and proclaimed by at the 
Forty-fourth session of the General Assembly resolution 44/128 of 15 December 1989) 1 – 2 indicated 
that: (“The States Parties to the present Protocol, Believing that abolition of the death penalty 
contributes to enhancement of human dignity and progressive development of human rights.”).    
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In addition, article 2 of the said Second Optional Protocol declares that: “No 
reservation is admissible to the Second Optional Protocol except for a reservation 
made at the time of ratification or accession that provides for the application of the 
death penalty in time of war pursuant to a conviction for a most serious crime of a 
military nature committed during wartime.” Some state parties have made such 
reservations. In this regards Schmidt in his writing on the universality of human rights 
and the death penalty said that in spite of the fact that the death penalty is permissible 
under the Covenant, the Human Rights Committee has used both the reporting and 
the Optional Protocol procedure to limit states parties' resort to its application.969 
 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child.  Similar to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, article 37(a) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
explicitly prohibits the use of the death penalty against persons under the age of 
eighteen years.  Accordingly, article 37(a) of the said Convention indicates that States 
Parties shall ensure that: (a) “No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life 
imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed 
by persons below eighteen years of age.” As of July 2015, 196 countries had ratified 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
 
                                                 
969 Markus G. Schmidt, ‘Universality Of Human Rights And The Death Penalty-The Approach Of  




The Convention against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment. Evolving from the analysis in this research there is the indication that 
the death penalty violates the principle against torture and cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment or punishment.  In this context, the Special Rapporteur on 
Torture evaluated the use of the death penalty and the conditions under which it is 
implemented and found that regardless of the legality of the death penalty itself, its 
use amounts to torture.970 
 
The Convention against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment also known as the Torture Convention and the United Nations Committee 
against Torture have been sources of jurisprudence for limitations on the death 
penalty as well as necessary safeguards. The Torture Convention does not regard the 
imposition of death penalty per se as a form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.971 
 
                                                 
970 Juan E. Méndez, ‘Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment’ (United Nations General Assembly resolution 66/150, 2012) 20 
said: (“even if the emergence of a customary norm that considers the death penalty as per se running 
afoul of the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is still under way, most 
conditions under which capital punishment is actually applied renders the punishment tantamount to 
torture. Under many other, less severe conditions, it still amounts to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.”).       
 
971 United Nation Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (United Nation Resolution 39/46 December 10, 1984, 145 UN.T.S. 85 [entered into force 
June 26, 1987] Article 1 of the said Convention describes the term torture to mean  (“any act by which 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act 
he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing 
him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering 
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in 




The fact that the death penalty is a lawful sanction it clearly does not reflect torture 
under the Convention.  However, some methods of execution and the phenomenon of 
death row have been seen as forms of torture under the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child by United Nations.  
 
In the Commonwealth Caribbean Human Rights Seminar held during the period 
September 12 to 14, 2000 at the Radisson Fort George Hotel, Belize City, Lehrfreund 
speaking on international law and domestic court urged Caribbean courts to have 
regards to international norms when determining issues concerning the application of 
capital punishment.972 Further, Lehrfreund in his presentation made reference to 
national courts including the Courts in the United Kingdom which avail themselves to 
the use of international law in addressing domestic issues.973 
 
This statement is quite interesting since, although the Privy Council sits in London 
and is to a significant degree composed of English judges, it is not a United Kingdom 
national court. When deciding a case, it applies the law of the jurisdiction from which 
                                                 
972 Saul Lehrreund, ‘The Commonwealth Caribbean and evolving international attitudes towards the 
death penalty’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2000) 75 – 90 at 76 urged Caribbean courts: (“In 
the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction the domestic courts in the Caribbean, when determining 
issues concerning the application of capital punishment, should have regard to international norms as 
illustrative of contemporary standards of justice and humanity.”). 
 
973 Saul Lehrreund, ‘The Commonwealth Caribbean and evolving international attitudes towards the 
death penalty’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2000) 75 – 90 at 77 emphasised that: (“National 
courts of several states including South Africa, Zimbabwe, Canada, and the United Kingdom, have 
found international law to be particularly helpful in the interpretation of such notions as the right to life  




the case comes such as Trinidad and Tobago, Jersey and the Cayman Islands or 
wherever. 
 
Moreover, the treatment of prisoners under sentence of death is at the fore front of 
international law.  Hearn in an article on the said issue clearly demonstrated the 
attitude of the Privy Council in this area by indicating that the death row phenomenon 
as out of step with modern international human rights standards.974 
 
It should be noted that in this regard the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
on 23 July 1996 adopted Resolution 1996/15 which is applicable to that effect and 
which:  “Urges Member States in which the death penalty may be carried out to 
effectively apply the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, in order 
to keep to a minimum the suffering of prisoners under sentence of death and to avoid 
any exacerbation of such suffering.”975 
 
In this vein it seems plausible that the Privy Council had given consideration to the 
wordings of international law and in particularly Resolution 1996/15 in the decision 
in the Pratt case.976 In that decision the following is testimony to their thinking on the 
                                                 
974 Jane Hearn, New Legal Breakthrough for Death Row Prisoners: Pratt v Attorney General for Jamaica 
(1994) 1(1) Australian Journal of Human Rights 392 – 397 at 393 indicated: (“The Privy Council has 
effectively condemned the 'death row' phenomenon as out of step with modern international human 
rights standards and the case is expected to lead to renewed constitutional challenges to the death 
penalty in the USA. The case is also significant for its reliance on the decisions of international human 
rights bodies and the influence of international legal materials on the development of common law and 
constitutional interpretation.”).        
 
975 United Nations Economic and Social Council (adopted) Resolution 1996/15 on 23 July 1996, P7. 
 




treatment of prisoners when they said that the primary purpose of the Constitution 
was to entrench and enhance pre-existing rights and freedoms, not to curtail them.977   
Moreover, in the 2015 annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights it was published by the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General, 
that the death penalty has no place in the twenty-first century and it is incompatible 
with fundamental tenets of human rights, in particular human dignity.978 This point 
was also being emphasized by Olalere in her study on the dilemma of death penalty 
when she said that with the awareness of human right, death penalty should not be a 
policy implemented in the twenty-first century.979 
 
6.2: Conclusion 
Thus it is credible to conclude that international legal norms have evolved to restrict 
the lawful use of the death penalty in a very narrow variety of cases, and a very limited 
manner.980 In 1984, the United Nations adopted the Safeguards Guaranteeing 
                                                 
977 Pratt and Another v Attorney General for Jamaica and Another [1993] 43 WIR 340, PC, 355 said: 
(“The primary purpose of the Constitution was to entrench and enhance pre-existing rights and 
freedoms, not to curtail them. Before Independence the law would have protected a Jamaican citizen 
from being executed after an unconscionable delay, and their lordships are unwilling to adopt a 
construction of the Constitution that results in depriving Jamaican citizens of that protection.”).       
 
978 United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Capital punishment and the implementation of the safeguards 
guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty’ (Office of the High 
Commissioner and the Secretary-General 2015) 1 – 18 at 18 said: (“the death penalty has no place in 
the twenty-first century. In the light of the evolution of international human rights law and jurisprudence 
and State practice, the imposition of the death penalty is incompatible with fundamental tenets of human 
rights, in particular human dignity, the right to life and the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment. The application of the death penalty often also violates the right 
to equality and the principle of non-discrimination.”).        
 
979 Shona Olalere, ‘The Dilemma of Death Penalty’ (University of the West of Scotland 2018) 1 – 9 at 
6. 
 
980 Saul Lehrreund, ‘The Commonwealth Caribbean and evolving international attitudes towards the 
death penalty’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2000) 75 – 90 at 77 said: (“the dynamic approach 
afforded to the interpretation of international instruments, the resolution of constitutional issues by the 
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Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, which limit the use of the 
death penalty and protect those facing it from extensive suffering. Later the United 
Nations reinforced its stance that the death penalty is incompatible with human rights 
when it adopted the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty. Countries that ratify 
the optional protocol must end all executions and take steps to abolish the death 
penalty.981  
 
There is a clear trend towards abolition of the death penalty in international law and 
state practice in the region and across the globe. As recent as 2007 there was 
resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly which called for the 
abolition of the death penalty worldwide.982 Perhaps it worth ending this chapter with 
the thinking of the permanent Deacons of Paterson, New Jersey on this subject. They 
indicated said that a truly human and responsible society cannot abdicate its moral 
responsibilities as it is related to the protection and enhancement of human life.  The 
point of significance here is that life is both sacred and social and as such society must 
protect and foster it at all stages and in all circumstances through the institutions of 
                                                 
domestic courts, concerning the application of the death penalty, is severely hampered by limitations 
to the existence and enjoyment of human rights.”).       
 
981 Article 1 of the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
 
982 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 2/149 (adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on 18 December 2007) specifically states that: (“Considering that the use of the death 
penalty undermines human dignity,   and convinced that a moratorium on the use of the death penalty 
contributes to the enhancement and progressive development of human rights, that there is no 
conclusive evidence of the death penalty's deterrent value and that any miscarriage or failure of justice 




the state. Quite naturally this accounts for the position taken by the Privy Council in 





















                                                 
983 Mary E. Williams, Capital Punishment, ‘Capital Punishment Undermines the Sacredness of Life’  





 RESEARCH RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter is integral to the research for two reasons.  Firstly, there is the 
presentation of the research results in the subject of Judicial Politics in the Privy 
Council and its impact on the Constitutionality of the Death Penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. Secondly, there is the presentation of main conclusions to 
the research. In terms of the presentation of the research results Babbie suggested that 
the listing of the attributes which were investigated and then reporting on the findings 
is the basic form of presenting the results in this research.984 In this regard the research 
findings in the thesis would encapsulate an analytical summary of the information 
unearthed during the research exploration.  Therefore, this would involve the 
presentation of the findings through the process of analysing and objectively 
explaining the relevant individual attribute.   
 
On the other hand subsequent to presenting the results there are four main conclusions 
derived from this research. Firstly, there is a conclusive answer to the research 
question. Secondly, there is presentation of an overall conclusion based on a criminal 
justice understanding and explanation to the research problem.  Thirdly, the 
implications of this research for the Commonwealth Caribbean society have been 
presented.  Finally, recommendations are provided herein to treat specifically with the 
future of the death penalty.  
 
                                                 
984 Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Science Research (6th edn. Wadworth Publishing Company 




7.1: The Impact of Judicial Politics on the Legal Doctrine of the Constitutionality 
of Death Penalty 
 
 Legislate strategically. In 1976 Delvin indicated that there is no doubt that historically 
judges did make law, at least in the sense of formulating it.985  By analogy the key 
impact of judicial politics on the legal doctrine of the constitutionality of death penalty 
which is revealed in this research is that the Privy Council, through its decision 
making, occasionally legislates strategically.  On the other hand Presser said that 
perhaps it would be, after all, more than a bit naïve to argue that judges do not make 
laws.986   
 
One major attribute which is revealed from an evaluation of the data which is tabulated 
in table 5.1 is that the Privy Council, as an institution through the legal doctrine of 
judicial politics, occasionally legislates strategically. Thus the attitudinal approach 
illustrated the six categories of cruelty which are presented in table 5.1 and which are 
in reality new laws made by the Privy Council. As Dworkin said in an article on hard 
cases that judges must sometimes make new laws, either covertly or explicitly.987 
 
Thus the inescapable implication of the Privy Council being a legislator is the fact that 
there is a potential for the loss of liberty because the change alters what the law permits 
and risks favouring some persons over others. This scenario was evident for instance, 
                                                 
985 Patrick Delvin, Judges and Lawmakers (1976) 39 (1) The Modern Law Review 1 – 16 at 5. 
 
986 Stephen B. Presser, ‘Judicial Ideology and the Survival of the Rule of Law: A Field Guide to the 
Current Political War over the Judiciary’ (2008) Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 47 – 468 at 
467. 
 




in the Boodram case.988 In that case the appellants complained in 1999 that their 
appeals against conviction and their petitions to the human rights organisations had 
been facilitated and determined without them being subjected to the delays which had 
been experienced by other persons convicted of murder.  
 
The Privy Council held that the appeal had no substance since there was no breach of 
the appellants’ constitutional rights and the appellants were eventually executed in 
June 1999.  However, four years later following the judgement in the Matthew case989 
and based on the principle in the Roodal case990 fifty prisoners on death sentence in 
the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago had their sentence commuted to life 
imprisonment.  Had the appellants in the Boodram case991 been successful in their 
appeal to the Privy Council then they would have benefitted from the judgement in 
the Matthew case992 which benefitted the fifty prisoners under death sentence in the 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. In this regard Pound in his research on the theory 
of judicial decision indicates that judicial declaration of law prescribes a rule with 
reference to precedent.993 
                                                 
988 Boodram and Others v Baptiste and Others (No. 2) [1999] 55 WIR 404, PC.  
 
989 Matthew v The State of Trinidad and Tobago [2005] 1 AC 433, PC. 
 
990 Roodal v The State of Trinidad and Tobago, [2004] 2 WLR 652, PC. 
991 Boodram and Others v Baptiste and Others (No. 2) [1999]55 WIR 404, PC.  
 
992 Matthew v The State of Trinidad and Tobago [2005] 1 AC 433, PC. 
 
993 Roscoe Pound, ‘The Theory of Judicial Decision. III. A Theory of Judicial Decision for Today’ 
(1923) 8 (36) Harvard Law Review 940 - 959 at 956 indicates that: (“Judicial declaration of law, on the 
other hand, prescribes a rule with reference to and as a measure for a situation or transaction of the past 




In a comparative analysis in the case Chambers v. Florida, Justice Hugo Black in 
United States Supreme Court said “[u]nder our constitutional system, courts stand 
against any winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer 
because they are helpless, weak, out-numbered, or because they are . . . victims of 
prejudice and public excitement.”994 In essence this statement demonstrates that 
Supreme Court plays a very important political role in the United States’ constitutional 
system of government by ensuring that each branch of government recognizes the 
limits of its own power.  
 
In addition, such an idea was also presented by Posner who indicates that judges have 
been occasional legislators through the process of exercise discretion.995 By exercising 
discretion, judges through the courts, bring about reform of the justice system. This 
thereby affords protection of civil rights and liberties by striking down laws or acts 
that violate the Constitution.  The point to note is that it is evident that the Privy 
Council is an occasional legislator like ministries of government and secretaries of 
assemblies. It is also part of the institutional structure of governments within the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. One of its major characteristics as illustrated by Shapiro 
is that it produces public policy decisions which keep the Constitution and the death 
penalty law for murder in harmony with social progress.996 
                                                 
994 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) 241. 
 
995 Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (Harvard University Press Cambridge Massachusetts 2008) 
1-15 at 5 said: (“Our judges have and exercise discretion. Especially if they are appellate judges, even 
intermediate ones, they are occasional legislators.”).   
 
996 Martin Shapiro, ‘Political Jurisprudence’ (1964) 52 Kentucky Law Journal 294 – 345 at 297 well 
illustrates this societal attribute when he said: (“Judges take their places with the commissioners, 
congressmen, bureaucrats, city councilmen, and technicians who make the political decisions of 
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In this regard through social policy, the law is inescapably shaped by the Privy 
Council. As seen in the Pratt’s case997 it has judicially directed the administration of 
the death penalty in the region when it stated that: “In any case in which execution is 
to take place more than five years after sentence there will be strong grounds for 
believing that the delay is such as to constitute inhuman or degrading punishment or 
other treatment.”998  Thus, from the analysis and evaluation pursued in this research 
it was objectively determined that the Privy Council through judicial politics provides 
key law making functions for the Commonwealth Caribbean society. 
 
7.2: Impact of the institutional approach of Judicial Politics on the 
Constitutionality of the Death Penalty 
 
Developing social policy. The major impact of the institutional approach of judicial 
politics on the constitutionality of the death penalty is the development of social policy 
for the Commonwealth Caribbean society. The reality is that the Privy Council is an 
integral aspect of governmental activity that impacts socially within the 
Commonwealth Caribbean society. Dahl concluded that the court is inevitably a 
policy making institution. To that effect he suggested that the court is in a stronger 
position to influence national policy by pursuing an independent course of action.999 
                                                 
government. In short, the attempt is to intellectually integrate the judicial system into the matrix of 
government and politics in which it actually operates and to examine courts and judges as participants 
in the political process, rather than presenting law, with a capital L, as an independent area of 
substantive knowledge. Quite fundamentally, political jurisprudence subordinates the study of law, in 
the sense of a concrete and independent system of prescriptive statements, to the study of men, in this 
instance those men who fulfil their political functions by the creation, application and interpretation of 
law.”).   
 




999 Robert A. Dahl, ‘Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy Maker’ 
(1957) 6 (Fall) Journal of Public Law 279 – 295. 
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This therefore means that identification of the six categories of cruelty and the manner 
of addressing them reflect the development of social policy with regard to the death 
penalty for the Commonwealth Caribbean society by the Privy Council. (See Table 
5.1). It was Friendly who said that the courts must address themselves in some 
instances to issues of social policy, not because this is particularly desirable, but 
because often there is no feasible alternative.1000 
 
Friendly suggested that the plainest example for the development of social policy is 
evident in cruel and unusual punishment clause. This is because the concept of cruelty 
is not static but must continually be re-examined and reassessed in the light of the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.1001 
Objectively this is in reality an institutional approach of the Privy Council towards the 
death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean. This approach has been denounced in 
various legal analysis.  
 
For instance, Fischman and Jacobi were critical of any analysis that provide too much 
discretion to judges to choose outcomes according to their policy preferences, or 
giving too little consideration of the justice meted out to individual parties.1002 Clearly 
this approach is the policy preference that afforded the Privy Council the opportunity 
                                                 
 
1000 Edmund Ursin, ‘Judicial Lawmaking’ (2009) (57) Buffalo Law Review 1267 – 1360 at 1340. 
 
1001 Edmund Ursin, ‘Judicial Lawmaking’ (2009) (57) Buffalo Law Review 1267 - 1360 at 1341. 
 
1002 Joshua B. Fischman and Tonja Jacobi, ‘The Second Dimension of the Supreme’ (2016) 57 William 




to define the death penalty in the region as cruel owing to the failure of evolving 
standard of decency within the region’s justice system. 
 
7.3: Impact of the attitudinal approach of Judicial Politics on the                
Constitutionality of the Death Penalty 
 
Judicial creativity. It is worth noting that judicial politics makes decisions more 
reasonable in terms of social necessity which is relevant to the demand of public 
sentiment. This impact of judicial politics was well described by Tamanaha who said 
that through the declaration, construction, interpretation, and application of the law, 
judges play an important role in the creation and implementation of public policy.1003  
 
In addition, Steinman in a constitutional article said that Judges make law in a number 
of different ways such as a court’s issuance of a final judgment which is itself a legal 
decree.1004 This was demonstrated in the data presented in Table 5.1 in Chapter Five 
of this research. Moreover, this research also demonstrates that such judicial 
innovation is necessary to address the changing conditions and values of the death 
penalty. This is in reality the judicial acceptance of the enterprise liability theory 
which suggest that Courts have a creative job to do when they find that a rule has lost 
                                                 
1003 Brian Z. Tamanaha, ‘The Several Meanings of “Politics” in Judicial Politics Studies: Why 
“Ideological Influence” is not Partisanship’ (2012) 61 (759) Emory Law Journal 768 said: (“Politics 
can also be commonly understood as a process (any process) that produces public-policy decisions. 
Through the declaration, construction, interpretation, and application of the law, judges play a role in 
the creation and implementation of public policy.”).   
 
1004 Adam N. Steinman, ‘A Constitution for Judicial Lawmaking’ (2004) 65 University of Pittsburgh 
Law Review 545 – 596 at 552 said: (“Judges make law in a number of different ways. In the most 
conventional sense, a court’s issuance of a final judgment is itself a legal decree. It is a legally binding 




its touch with reality and should be abandoned or reformulated to meet new conditions 
and new moral values.1005  
 
The development of the six concepts of cruelty by the justices of the Privy Council 
exhibits a negative impact by creating limitations thereby restricting the 
implementation of the death penalty. Naturally this is credible evidence of judicial 
creativity and more specifically the application of the enterprise liability theory by the 
justices of the Privy Council.  In this qualitative research evaluation and analysis of 
the ideological approach of the justices of the Privy Council a clear pattern of 
inconsistency has been demonstrated by the justices of this judicial institution in 
treating with the issues concerning the constitutionality of the death penalty.  In 
essence, it can be said that the justices of the Privy Council through the interpretation 
of the constitutional provisions have developed on the issue of cruelty surrounding the 
death penalty.    
 
In addition, the attitudinal approach of the justices of the Privy Council on the issue 
of cruelty has been both glorified and criticised in varying sectors.  For instance, 
Mendes has described the attitudinal approach of the justices of the Privy Council in 
                                                 
1005 Edmund Ursin, ‘Judicial Lawmaking’ (2009) (57) Buffalo Law Review 1267 – 1360 at 1309 
Traynor presents this theory by suggesting that: (“Courts have a creative job to do when they find that 
a rule has lost its touch with reality and should be abandoned or reformulated to meet new conditions 
and new moral values. Their role is to engage in a “pragmatic search for solutions” and then to “hammer 
out new rules that will respect whatever values of the past have survived the tests of reason and 
experience and anticipate what contemporary values will meet those tests.” In short, courts “can and 




death penalty cases as the creation of exceptions for the most exceptional 
punishment.1006   
 
This representation is presented in the first paragraph of the research on ‘saving lives 
by luck and chance: Saving Law Clauses and the persistence of arbitrariness’ in which 
he glorified the creation of those judicial exceptions. He indicated that the death 
penalty challenges the administration of justice and constantly calls into question its 
most basic assumptions which tested the creativity of lawyers who search for even 
more ingenious ways to keep the hangman at bay. This he said provokes the judiciary 
into exploring the uttermost reaches of the legal system.1007  
 
This position is a clear validation of the presence of the research concept of judicial 
politics in the Privy Council’s decisions on the constitutionality of the death penalty.  
It is also an expression of the Privy Council’s justices’ liberal stance where it was 
demonstrated that they decide matters in accordance with the attitudinal model 
approach. 
 
                                                 
1006 Douglas Mendes, Saving lives by luck and chance: Saving Law Clauses and the persistence of 
arbitrariness (European Commission Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2005) 41 – 52 at 41. 
 
1007 Douglas Mendes, Saving lives by luck and chance: Saving Law Clauses and the persistence of 
arbitrariness (European Commission Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2005) 41 – 52 at 41 indicated 
that: (“More than any other issue, the death penalty challenges the administration of justice and 
constantly calls into question its most basic assumptions.  It tests the creativity of lawyers who search 
for ever more ingenious ways to keep the hangman at bay.  It provokes the judiciary into exploring the 
uttermost reaches of the legal system to press into service forgotten, never before developed or fledging 
principles and remedies to make the administration of the death penalty, while it lasts, fairer and more 
humane to the extent that this is possible. Death penalty litigation is all about the creation of exceptions 
for the most exceptional punishment.  To this end, the judiciary has shown itself prepared to reverse 




However, unlike Mendes position Lord Bingham in the Reyes case1008 was critical of 
the attitudinal model approach by the justices of the Privy Council.  He basically said 
that the court has no licence to read its own predilections and moral values into the 
Constitution.1009  This statement although an expressed confirmation of the judicial 
behaviour by the Privy Council justices’ it also suggests that Lord Bingham was more 
in favour of the legal and the institutional model approaches than the judicial 
innovation in the liberal attitudinal model approach. 
 
In a similar vein, Lord Hoffman denounced the attitudinal model approach of 
creativity by some of the justices of the Privy Council in the Lewis case.1010  He made 
an interesting statement in a dissenting judgment in the said Lewis case1011 which also 
showed support for both the legal and institutional approaches.  In that case he 
described the attitudinal approach of the Privy Council justices in death penalty cases 
as an exhibition of a doctrinal disposition to come out differently.1012   
 
The approach of the Privy Council in death penalty cases can be validated and 
confirmed in terms of the researcher’s analytic model of judicial politics.  This has 
                                                 
1008 Reyes v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 235, PC. 
 
1009 Reyes v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 235, PC 246. 
 
1010 Lewis et al v Attorney General of Jamaica and another [2001] 2 AC 50, PC.   
 
1011  Ibid.    
 
1012 Lewis et al v Attorney General of Jamaica and another [2001] 2 AC 50, PC Lord Hoffman 
denounced the attitudinal model approach by saying: (“If the board feels able to depart from a previous 
decision simply because its members on a given occasion have a ‘doctrinal disposition to come out 
differently,’ the rule of law itself will be damaged and there will be no stability in the administration of 




been achieved through the alteration of principles and practices by the court to 
promote its judicial preferences on national policy. To compliment this issue Rubin 
and Feeley writing on judicial policy making and litigation against the government 
said that the courts’ involvement in establishing correctional policy must be seen as 
part of the broader trend to establish national norms for the administration of criminal 
justice.1013    
 
In this regard, these expressions by the Privy Council are in reality the judicial 
condemnations of the death penalty which are indicative of the use of judicial politics 
to create national policy. This concept is reflective of the sort of judicial behaviour of 
having to use or using shrewd awareness of what is expedient, advantageous or artful 
to restrict the use of the death penalty in the region.  In this research such is 
demonstrated through the doctrinal – politics paradigm of attitudinal approach of 
judges of the Privy Council. 
 
The impact of the attitudinal model approach of judicial politics is that it negatively 
affects the constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  
Thus, whether the judicial doctrinal approach  by the Privy Council is deemed 
creativity as suggested by Mendes or  whether it is the imposition of its own 
predilections and moral value, as stated by Lord Bingham in the Reyes case,1014 or 
                                                 
1013 Edward L. Rubin and Malcolm M. Feeley, ‘Judicial Policy Making and Litigation Against the 
Government’ (2003) Journal of Constitutional Law 617 – 664 at 660. 
 




whether it is an exhibition of doctrinal disposition to come out differently as identified 
by Lord Hoffman in the Lewis case,1015  or whether it is considered in light of the 
analytic models of judicial politics as described, analysed and evaluated herein, its 
major impact has been that the operationalisation of the doctrinal judicial politics 
obscures the Beccaria’s theory of society perspectives.1016  That is to say it negates 
the theoretical perspective which suggests that punishment must be a certainty, 
inflicted quickly, and it should not be administered to set example neither should it be 
concerned with reforming the offender.1017  
 
It is quite obvious that the judicial innovation of the six concepts of cruelty of the 
death penalty created by the Privy Council validate the research analytical theoretical 
perspective. A major impact is that judicial politics operates counter to another of 
Beccaria’s theoretical perspective which suggests that the complete criminal law code 
should be written and all offences and punishment should be defined in advance.1018  
In addition, judicial politics impacts on punishment which should be decided by the 
legislature and not by the court.1019 To put it simply the judicial creativity is a form of 
                                                 
1015 Lewis et al v Attorney General of Jamaica and another [2001] 2 AC 50, PC.   
 











judicial innovation that is synonymous to judicial politics and it impacts negatively on 
Cesare Beccaria’s theory of society perspectives.1020  
 
Another impact has been the damaging of the rule of law on the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean and this has the effect of destabilising the administration 
of justice in the region. The Privy Council in Reyes v. The Queen1021 acknowledged 
this by saying that the ordinary task of the courts is to give full and fair effect to the 
penal laws which the legislature has enacted and this would result in the prevention of 
crime.1022 
 
It seems from the assessment of the approaches of the Privy Council in death penalty 
cases that the ordinary task of the courts as illustrated in Reyes case is not achieved.  
It is quite evident from that statement that to a large extent the problems associated 
with the crimes that this region is experiencing should be placed on the doorstep of 
the Privy Council.   
 
That institution failed to give effect to the political will of the democratically-elected 
legislature in the Commonwealth Caribbean states.  Its members on a given occasion 
have exhibited judicial politics by coming out against established principles on the 
                                                 
1020 Liqun Cao, Major Criminological Theories (Wadworth/Thompson Learning Belmont California  
2004) 30. 
 
1021 Reyes v. The Queen, [2002] 2 AC 235, PC said: (“The prevention of crime, often very serious crime, 
is a matter of acute concern in many countries around the world, and prescribing the bounds of 
punishment is an important task of those elected to represent the people. The ordinary task of the courts 
is to give full and fair effect to the penal laws which the legislature has enacted.”).   
 




death penalty.  This has caused damage to the death penalty rule of law while 
effectively destabilising the administration of justice in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean. This type of activity was condemned by Sir William Blackstone and 
documented in the first volume of his book the Commentaries when he said that law, 
without equity, is much more desirable for the public good, than equity without law; 
which would make every judge a legislator, and introduce most infinite confusion.1023 
 
7.4: Correlation between Judicial Politics and the Constitutionality of the 
Death Penalty 
 
Public Policy impact. The main objective of this research is to understand the extent 
to which the Privy Council decision making on the constitutionality of the death 
penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean’s influenced by judicial politics. This 
research finds significant evidence in support of the correlation between judicial 
politics and the death penalty in the decision making by the justices of the Privy 
Council. An examination of the data will illustrate that they hinge on the public policy 
of the Commonwealth Caribbean society.  Pacelle Jr. and Pyle in their research on 
public policy indicated that Justices construct public policy through the precedents 
that come from individual decisions.1024 
                                                 
1023 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 6 (1765) at 62 commented that: (“The 
liberty of considering all cases in an equitable light must not be indulged too far, lest thereby we destroy 
all law, and leave the decision of every question entirely in the breast of the judge. And law, without 
equity, [though] hard and disagreeable, is much more desirable for the public good, than equity without 
law; which would make every judge a legislator, and introduce most infinite confusion; as there would 
then be almost as many different rules of action laid down in our courts, as there are differences of 
capacity and sentiment in the human mind.”).       
 
1024 Richard L. Pacelle Jr. and Barry W. Pyle, Issue Emergence and Evolution in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Open Judicial Politics (edited by Rorie Spill-Solberg, Eric Wattenburg, and Jennifer Segal).  
(Corvallis: Oregon State University Press 2020) 527 – 548 at 527 – 528 indicated that: (“Justices 
construct public policy through the precedents that come from individual decisions. Those decisions 
are pieced together into doctrine. Doctrine results from the ongoing conversation that happens among 
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In addition, the data presented in this research demonstrates that the Privy Council 
decisions on the death penalty, influence public policy in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean and drastically alter and or in some instances shape the policy landscape in 
the region.  The result of Cahill-O’Callaghan research on judicial decision making 
demonstrated that same is influenced by matters other than the evidence and 
arguments presented in the court.1025  This present research illustrates a solution of 
public policy justice by the Privy Council in its decision-making on the 
constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  
 
In the fifth edition of the book on ‘Social Research Methods’ it has been stated by 
Neuman that qualitative researchers look at the sequence of events and pay attention 
to what happens.1026 It is with this description in mind that a qualitative analysis has 
been undertaken in order to validate and confirm the reality of the research hypothesis.  
Interestingly, the said literature also indicates that qualitative researchers can look for 
                                                 
litigants, courts, and interest groups that defines the terms of debate about the constitutionality or 
legality of an issue. It is important to understand the roots of doctrine. The basis for new cases will 
affect how that issue area will unfold. It also helps explain why precedents seldom get overturned.”).       
 
1025 Rachel Cahill-O’Callaghan, The Influence of Personal Values on Legal Judgments (Cardiff 
University 2015) 333 indicated that: (“despite the external and internal constraints imposed by judicial 
procedure and the judicial oath, judicial decision making is influenced by matters other than the 
evidence and arguments presented in the court.”). 
 
1026 William Lawrence Neuman, Social Research Methods Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 
(5th edn. Boston Press New York 2003) 148 said: (“Qualitative researchers look at the sequence of 
events and pay attention to what happens first, second, third, and so on. Because qualitative researchers 
examine the same case or set of cases over time, they can see an issue evolve, a conflict emerge, or a 




patterns or relationships, but they begin analysis early in a research project, while they 
are still collecting data.1027 
 
It therefore stands to reason, that, this exercise of qualitative analysis of the research 
variable commences with the background study of the death penalty problem. This 
includes a statement of the problem with regard to the death penalty which is 
documented in Chapter One.   Based on the revelation in the background study the 
literature review was pursued and documented in Chapter Two. From the stand point 
of the review of literature it was confirmed that there is no known literature in the 
region which is directly relevant to the concept of judicial politics.  This has made any 
meaningful comparative analysis of the research impossible. However, there is 
illustrative evidence from the content research method pursued in the literature review 
which validate the researcher’s analytic model of judicial politics.   
 
In view of this a qualitative methodology was designed in Chapter Three.  This was 
followed with a legal case study of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
which was documented in Chapter Four. In that chapter secondary data was obtained 
and presented on the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean. The data 
demonstrated a lack of execution in the region and such inactivity is synonymous with 
delay in execution.  
 
                                                 
1027 William Lawrence Neuman, Social Research Methods Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 
(5th edn. Boston Press New York 2003) 440. 
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In chapter five there was the presentation of a legal and textual analysis on illustrative 
information of pattern of behaviour on the concept of judicial politics.1028  Most of the 
data evaluated from the qualitative research method have demonstrated to some degree 
that the Privy Council influence on judicial politics has an impact on the 
Commonwealth Caribbean’s efforts to carry out the death penalty.   
 
This was based on the interpretation of the terms inhuman and cruel.  Thus, the 
objective assessment seems to suggest that although the death penalty is lawful for 
persons convicted of murder in this region, the Privy Council has restricted its 
implementation.  Thus, the mere restriction of the implementation of the death penalty 
by the Privy Council would be a qualitative measure of confirmation for the specific 
hypothesis. Accordingly Garoupa said in this regard that judicial decision-making in 
a constitutional court is inclusive of ideological preferences.1029 
 
That measure of confirmation can also be gleaned from the analysis of the statement 
made at the Public Consultations on Crime held in 2007 in the Republic of Trinidad 
and Tobago by Mr. Patrick Manning the then Prime Minister.  In response to a 
question on the government’s policy on the implementation of the death penalty in the 
                                                 
1028 William Lawrence Neuman, Social Research Methods Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 
(5th edn. Boston Press New York 2003). 
 
1029 Nuno Garoupa, ‘Empirical Legal Studies and Constitutional Courts’ (2014) Indian Journal of 
Constitutional Law 26 – 54 at 29 said: (“Whatever model prevails, judicial decision-making in a 
constitutional court, as in any court, is the result of personal attributes, attitudes (including policy or 
ideological preferences), peer pressure, intra-court interaction (a natural pressure for consensus and 
court reputation; a common objective to achieve supremacy of the constitutional court), and party 




Republic of Trinidad and Tobago the then Prime Minister said that our inability to 
carry it out stems largely from the position adopted by the Privy Council.1030 
 
The reality is that this expression presents sensitizing concepts and understanding of 
the death penalty in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.  Foremost within this 
statement is the criticism of the attitudinal approach adopted by the Privy Council 
which inhibits the carrying out of the death penalty.  In reality it supports as credible 
the notion of the Privy Council that judicial politics restricts the region’s propensity 
to carrying out the death penalty.  Moreover, this statement presents illustrative 
evidence which is consistent with the Privy Council, departs from following the 
binding authority of judicial precedents and focuses on its institutional role of 
overruling the precedents.     
 
The evaluation of judicial politics in Chapter Five presents the judicial perspective of 
the Privy Council which complimented the public perspective. In the first instance it 
illustrated what was suggested by Cairns in his article that the Judicial Committee 
laboured under two fundamental weaknesses, the legal doctrine which ostensibly 
                                                 
1030 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Consultations on Crime in Trinidad and Tobago (Ministry 
of the National Security Trinidad 2007) 79 Mr. Patrick Manning, the then Prime Minister, indicated 
that: (“Capital punishment; that has been the subject of a lot of discussions in Trinidad and Tobago, 
and our inability to carry it out stems largely from the position adopted by the Privy Council.  It has 
been particularly accentuated with the advent of Britain to the European Union and the attitude of the 
European Union to this whole question of capital punishment.  The law lords in London, the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council which, as you know, is the highest court for Trinidad and Tobago, are 
taking the position that they put one impediment after the next in the way of the execution of capital 




guided its deliberations, and its isolation from the setting to which those deliberations 
referred.1031 
 
Whereas in the latter case it was discovered that the Privy Council itself through its 
own members confessed that it was involved in dismantling the death penalty in the 
region.  The leading statement on this issue came from Lord Hoffman in the Lewis 
case. He admonished the members for their doctrinal disposition to come out 
differently.1032 In addition, Lord Bingham in the Reyes case, was critical of the 
attitudinal approach of the Privy Council when he said that the court has no licence to 
read its own predilections and moral values into the constitution.1033  
 
  Relying on these statements alone there is a clear confirmation of judicial politics at 
the level of the Privy Council. In this regard Young in his writing on the death penalty 
said that when the justices are engaging in constitutional interpretation, their rulings 
significantly influence the jurisprudence of the Commonwealth Caribbean states and 
this raises the spectre of policy making by the court.1034 The objective reflection which 
                                                 
1031 Alan C. Cairns, ‘The Judicial Committee and Its Critics’ (1971) (iv) 3 Canadian Journal of Political 
Science 301 – 345 at 327. 
 
1032 Lewis et al v Attorney General of Jamaica and another [2001] 2 AC 50, PC. Lord Hoffman said: 
(“If the board feels able to depart from a previous decision simply because its members on a given 
occasion have a ‘doctrinal disposition to come out differently,’ the rule of law itself will be damaged 
and there will be no stability in the administration of justice in the Caribbean.”).    
 
1033 Reyes v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 235, PC 246. 
 
1034 Harold Young, ‘The Death Penalty: The Law Lords Alter Course in the Commonwealth Caribbean’ 
(2019) 10 (2) Journal of International and Global Studies 64 – 85 at 80 said: (“When the Law Lords 
engage in constitutional interpretation, their rulings significantly influence the jurisprudence of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean states. With the use of the death penalty in the spotlight of human rights 
advocates, the debate about the legality regarding international law and usefulness in deterring crime 
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can be deduced from the content of these assertions is that it not only validates the 
concept illustrated in the research theory as plausible or credible, but it provides a 
measure of confirmation that the hypothesis of the specific research is reliable. 
           
This scientific principle of objectivity which was used to assess the data, presents the 
realistic portrait of judicial politics as a means of explaining the constitutionality of the 
death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  This attitude of the Privy Council was 
also highlighted by Morrison  who said that one highly unusual feature of the decisions 
of the Privy Council on death penalty cases from the Commonwealth Caribbean is that 




In this regard Morrison not only recognised unusual feature of decision making by the 
Privy Council but he identified with the changing norms of that institution through 
decision making.1036 It therefore means that this idea clearly supported the validation 
of the research analytic model that judicial politics in the Privy Council decision 
                                                 
continues. As their rulings are not subject to review by any other court, it raises the specter of policy 
making by the court.”). 
 
1035 Dennis Morrison, ‘Caribbean Legal Affairs: The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and The 
Death Penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean: Studies in Judicial Activism’ (2006) 30 Nova Law 
Review 403 at 441 said: (“one highly unusual feature of the decisions of the Privy Council on death 
penalty cases from the Commonwealth Caribbean over the past twenty-five to thirty years is that it has 
felt able to explicitly reverse its own previous decisions on at least three occasions, a phenomenon 
which represents a recognition of the ferment of changing norms in the arena of international human 
rights, and no less of changing times.”). 
 




making negatively affects the constitutionality of the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean.  
 
In 2016, the Cornell University Law School through its Death Penalty Worldwide 
research and advocacy centre indicated that in many countries, the path to abolition of 
the death penalty begins by a restriction on the application of capital punishment. In 
that regard it indicated that the judiciary and the legal profession lay the groundwork 
for the abolition of the death penalty by developing a culture that emphasizes the 
overriding value of fundamental rights. It is clear that the judicial decisions by courts 
may prepare for legal reform by chipping away at allowable death penalty 
practices.1037 
 
Thus, by analogy to the suggestion made by Cornell University Law School, the pattern 
of decision making on the issue of cruelty illustrated in this research is a definite 
validation of the research theoretical concept of judicial politics and the confirmation 
of the research hypothesis.  Therefore, the illustrative data unearthed in this research 
have provided strong evidence that the ideological preferences of the justices have 
frequently influenced their decisions. Thus the research analysis and evaluation of the 
said data herein have made the case that:    
 The constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean is 
influenced by and correlated to judicial politics in the Privy Council. 
                                                 
1037 Cornell University Law School, Pathways to Abolition of the Death Penalty (Swiss Federal 




Writing on the subject of death penalty Mitchell considers such aspect of decision 
making by the Supreme Court to be troubling. In so doing he indicated that the most 
troubling aspect of the Supreme Court’s regulation of death penalty has been its failure 
to persuasively explain why the Court’s judgments surrounding its use should prevail 
over the decisions made by the political branches.1038 
 
It was against this background that Davila in her article on replacing the Privy Council 
with the Caribbean Court of Justice presented a clear position in addressing the 
concept of judicial politics which permeated the Privy Council’s judgements. She 
suggested that it would be in the best interest of all Caribbean nations, to join in and 
create a Caribbean Court of Justice that will lead these nations to strengthen their 
democratic institution.1039 
 
It was realised in this research that the Privy Council has developed on an ad hoc basis, 
reacting in a practical and principled way to the changing needs and standards. 
Interestingly in his writing on the Privy Council, Lord Neuberger seemingly captured 
this research perspective when he said that the Privy Council is a full-fledged appellate 
                                                 
1038 Jonathan F. Mitchell, ‘Death Penalty Commentary Series Capital Punishment and the Courts’ 
(2017) 130 Harvard Law Review Forum 269 -275 at 274. 
 
1039 Isabel C. Davila, Replacing the Privy Council with the Caribbean Court of Justice in the OECS 
Countries." (The Emerging Caribbean: Direction and Purpose for the 21* Century Caribbean Studies 
Association 1998) 1- 19 at 15 indicated that: (“The Privy Council may have been a useful institution 
during the colonial era. However, due to the changes that both Europe and the Caribbean have 
undergone its presence in the jurisdiction of the Caribbean is part of the colonial legacy of the last 
century. It would be in the best interest of all Caribbean nations, including those in the Organization of 
Eastern Caribbean states to join in and create a Caribbean Court of Justice that will lead these nations 
to strengthen their democratic institution, develop economically, socially and politically in addition to 




court and serves to support and develop the rule of law with a unique international 
character.1040 
 
 7.5: Responses to the Research Question 
 
Research analysis and findings.  In this research the main issue explored was whether 
in light of both the majority and minority decisions of the Privy Council in the Riley 
case and the subsequent ruling in the Pratt case, which adopted and embraced the said 
minority or dissenting decision in the Riley case, the constitutionality of the death 
penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean is influenced by and correlated to judicial 
politics. It is worth noting that from the case law study of secondary data and the legal 
and textual document review, the researcher was able to conduct a qualitative analysis 
of the constitutionality of death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean in an attempt 
to respond to the research issues. The analysis resulted in validating as credible that 
there is judicial politics in the Privy Council decisions on the constitutionality of death 
penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean.    
 
In addition, those research methods were able to gather illustrative information which 
aided in the validation and confirmation of the research hypothesis.  Within this 
measure of confirmation, the researcher was able to arrive at the main conclusion.  
                                                 
1040 Lord Neuberger, The Judicial Committee of The Privy Council In The 21st Century (2014) (3)1 
Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 30–57 at 57 said: (“It [Privy Council] is an 
appellate court which serves to support and develop the rule of law. While the JCPC's reach is far less 
than it was at the height of the Empire, in many ways, it has strengthened itself over the past century, 
through modernising its functions, so that today it is a fully-fledged appellate court, with a unique 
international character.”).     
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That is the concept of judicial politics has a causal negative effect on the 
constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean region. 
 
Judicial Politics.  This is the obvious conclusion to be deduced from the analysis 
pursued on the jurisprudential approach of the Privy Council to the constitutionality 
of the death penalty.  Thus, there was a measure of confirmation of the research 
hypothesis which indicates that the constitutionality of the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean is influenced by and correlated to judicial politics.  The 
doctrinal-politics of the Privy Council resulted in the creation of categories of cruelty 
which are exceptions for the death penalty and contains expressions of judicial 
politics.  
 
Paradigm of cruelty. The presence of judicial politics in the constitutionality of the 
death penalty has been expressed by the Privy Council through its attitudinal approach 
as it sought to interpret and define the term “inhuman or cruel” in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean States, Constitutions.  The Privy Council’s expression of “inhuman or 
cruel” resulted in the creation of six forms of judicial exceptions for the death penalty.  
Moreover, this paradigm has been the set of inflection of judicial politics that render 
implementation of the death penalty unconstitutional.  In reality such a paradigm has 
demonstrated that the judicial reasoning of the Privy Council impacts in the following 
manner:  
i.  A restrictive approach for the death penalty in the region through the ignoring 
of precedents and its exhibition of a liberal stance to decide matters according 
to judicial preferences and or ideologies.      
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ii.   Developing on the issue of cruelty in the death penalty from the constitutional 
principle:   
a. inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the Constitution of 
Jamaica and the Eastern Caribbean States. 
b. cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in the Constitution of   the 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.  
iii. Describing cruelty of the death penalty in terms of: 
  a. Delay of execution. 
 b. Swiftness of execution. 
 c. Mandatory death sentence. 
 d. Prison conditions. 
 e. Ministerial advice prior to execution. 
 f. Opinions of international human rights bodies.   
The development of those issues by the Privy Council demonstrates the concept of 
judicial politics in its decisions on the constitutionality of the death penalty.   
 
7.6: A Criminal Justice Explanation of the Death Penalty  
Overall research conclusion. The main purpose of this research was to conduct a 
contemporary legal analysis of judicial politics in the Privy Council in order to further 
understand and explain the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean. The 
exploratory research pursued on the death penalty in this region has unearthed 
significant data and illustrative information which when collated and analysed present 
a criminal justice understanding and explanation of it.  The true rationale of the Pratt 
principle and the importance and purpose of this research has been the recognition that 
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judicial decision making is an important area of study as it speaks of the concept of 
judicial politics as the component that influence the Privy Council decisions on the 
constitutionality of death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean.  
 
Critical in this research was the revelation that between the pronouncement of the 
death penalty and its implementation there is a gap.  Lying within that gap is an 
environmental determinant of the death penalty.  This environmental determinant is 
the judiciary and in particular to this study, the Privy Council as the judicial institution 
along with the justices of that institution that exhibit judicial politics.  This 
phenomenon of judicial politics in effect is the judicial condemnation of the death 
penalty on the basis of inhumanity or cruelty owing to the lack of decency to humanity. 
It is this lack of decency to humanity that has been the stimulus that is responsible for 
the application, implementation or consequences of the death penalty for persons 
convicted of murder in the Commonwealth Caribbean.   
 
7.7: Implications of the Death Penalty Research   
The cumulative effect of the research theory and the research findings can provide the 
basis for policy makers to reform the justice system in the region in keeping with the 
modern standard and decency within the society.  In reality, this research with its 
findings is sufficiently adequate to afford the addressing of the public policy issues 
concerning the way murderers are punished.  Primarily, it should now be decided 
whether in light of the validation of judicial politics as an environment variable 
negatively affecting the constitutionality of the death penalty, the region is prepared 
to continue with this form of punishment.  Therefore, it is now up to the policy makers 
325 
 




This research exploration has successfully achieved the research aim and goals. In 
essence there was the evaluation of the decision-making of the Privy Council on the 
issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean in 
order to explain the patterns of judicial politics in terms of the legal model approach, 
the institutional model approach and the attitudinal model approach. During this 
exploration other issues related to the death penalty are unearthed. These are the 
spiralling murder rate in the region and the real effectiveness of the death penalty, both 
of which engulfed the region’s justice system.   
 
This will require exploration to provide a further understanding of the effectiveness 
of the death penalty within the criminal justice in the region.  One suggestion would 
be to facilitate an exploratory research on the significance of the death penalty as the 
punishment for the crime of murder within the region’s justice system. The need for 
this is presented in the researcher’s personal statement and the ideal for the 
reformation of punishment. 
 
Researcher’s personal statement.  As this researcher concludes this exploration, it is 
submitted that the validation of the research theory and the measure of confirmation 
of the research hypothesis are evidence that the research goals have been achieved in 
this investigation. However, the research challenges experienced during the 
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immersion into some of the illustrative information in this exploration have been 
troubling. For instance, Vollum, Mallicoat and Buffington-Vollum writing on the death 
penalty said that: “Capital punishment remains a political and emotional hot button 
and polarizing point of debate as one of the de jour controversial issues in the realm 
of criminal justice and politics.”1041  In addition, Harrington in her writing the 
mandatory death penalty in the Commonwealth Caribbean indicated that: “The death 
penalty is a subject that … invariably elicits passionate comment. Such comment is 
particularly so within the states that make up the Commonwealth Caribbean, where 
rising rates of violent crime have led to strong public clamour for a swift and final 
response.”1042 
 
The immersion into these and other texts has forced this researcher to heed Beccaria’s 
request when in 1764 he published his essay ‘On Crimes and Punishments’ calling for 
a rethinking of the prevailing concepts of law and justice.1043 Having done so this 
researcher has made a personal reflection on the death penalty as the punishment for 
persons convicted of murder in the Commonwealth Caribbean and it has led him to 
surmise that - the merits of having the death penalty as the punishment for the crime 
of murder is truly a complex social phenomenon with widespread shifting of morals 
and the expression of social, political and human rights concerns.  
                                                 
1041Scott Vollum, Stacy Mallicoat and Jacqueline Buffington-Vollum, ‘Death Penalty Attitudes in an 
Increasingly Critical Climate: Value- Expressive Support and Attitude Mutability’ (2009) 5 (3) The 
Southwest Journal of Criminal Justice 221 – 242 at 222. 
 
1042 Joanna Harrington, ‘The Challenge To the mandatory Death Penalty in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean’ (2011) 98 (126) The American Journal of International Law 125 – 140 at 126. 
 




 Reformation of punishment. This research exploration has demonstrated that there is 
a definite need for the reformation of the law on murder and the death penalty as the 
punishment that is associated with such a crime in the region. Of practical importance 
is that from the research pursued there seems to be no credibility in the statement made 
in 2007 by Mr. Patrick Manning the then Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago who 
said in part that Trinidad and Tobago’s inability to carry out the death penalty stems 
largely from the position adopted by the Privy Council.1044 What was borne out of this 
research was that the Privy Council was merely doing what the legislators in Trinidad 
and Tobago and the rest of the region have failed to do. 
 
In an Amnesty International journal article on the death penalty in the English-
Speaking Caribbean, Hanna Jr. said that the death penalty is really a dangerous 
weapon to be left in the hands of the legal system.1045 Owing to this, it is really the 
inherent role of the Privy Council to keep the death penalty law in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean region in tandem with social progress as public sentiment demands.  
 
                                                 
1044 Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Public Consultations on Crime in Trinidad and Tobago (Ministry 
of the National Security Trinidad 2007) 79 Mr. Patrick Manning the then Prime Minister of Trinidad 
and Tobago said: (“Capital punishment; that has been the subject of a lot of discussion in Trinidad and 
Tobago, and our inability to carry it out stems largely from the position adopted by the Privy Council.  
It has been particularly accentuated with the advent of Britain to the European Union and the attitude 
of the European Union to this whole question of capital punishment.  The law lords in London, the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which, as you know, is the highest court for Trinidad and 
Tobago, are taking the position that they put one impediment after the next in the way of the execution 
of capital punishment in this country.”). 
 
1045 Amnesty International Secretariat, ‘Death Penalty in the English-Speaking Caribbean A Human 




Another important ideology taken from a statement made by a former President of the 
United States of America, Thomas Jefferson, portrays the reality of the death penalty 
in terms of the attitudinal model or the liberal approach of the Privy Council. This 
ideology can be found chiselled in stone at the Jefferson Memorial in Washington 
D.C.  It was stated by the author that he was certainly not an advocate for frequent 
changes in the laws and the constitutions however, laws and constitutions must go 
hand in hand with the progress of the human mind.1046  
 
This idea clearly encapsulates the researcher’s personal statement and the research 
recommendation. It also illustrates the justification for the Privy Council’s attitudinal 
approach towards the death penalty.  Moreover, it naturally supports the aspect of 
Beccaria theoretical perspective which illustrates a rallying call for a rethinking of the 
way persons are punished.1047 
 
It is my sincere hope that the research analytic model of judicial politics at the level 
of the Privy Council would generate a deeper understanding for the judicial behaviour 
of this institution towards the constitutionality of the death penalty in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. It should also specifically support the notion for a 
                                                 
1046 John D. Bessler, ‘Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death Penalty and 
the Abolitionist Movement’ (2009) 4 (2) Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy 195 said: (“I 
am certainly not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and constitutions. But laws and institutions 
must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more 
enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths discovered and manners and opinions change, 
with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times. We might 
as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy as civilized society to remain 
ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.”).        
 




rethinking of how convicted murderers are punished in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
and in general how other convicts are punished. In this regard Gangrade put it quite 
succinctly when he said that the law is an instrument of social change which should 
be altered from time to time to suit the changing social circumstances.1048 
 
In the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago the law prohibiting the crime of murders is 
contrary to the common law which interestingly was developed sometime around 
1602 by Lord Coke.  Naturally this law speaks to the antiquity of the authority 
prohibiting such a crime that carries the death penalty as its punishment. In this regard 
Bessler said that although the use of death sentences and executions was once seen as 
a lawful sanction, that antiquated societal norm should be replaced by a new norm as 
an international law standard prohibiting the death penalty under all circumstances as 
part of the existing jus cogens norm barring torture.1049 
 
In addition, Gangrade made it quite clear that law is an instrument of social change 
and it must keep pace with a progressive modern society and that living in the present 
times is a more complicated process than what it was in the times of our forefathers.1050  
                                                 
1048 K. D. Gangrade, ‘Legal Research and Methodology’ (2001) Journal of the Indian Law Institute 273 
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modern society. Living in the present times is a more complicated process than what it was in the times 
of our forefathers. The problems of today cannot be solved by the methods or tools known to them. 
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Review 8 – 48 at 47. 
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In furtherance of this, it is my earnest desire that the law on murder and the death 
penalty as a punishment for murder within the criminal justice system in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean society should be re-evaluated. This is necessary to reform 
the antiquated law on murder and also to determine the relevance of the death penalty 
in today’s Commonwealth Caribbean society. Such re-evaluation will also satisfy 
Bessler’s notion that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of 
the human mind.1051  
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